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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Minority Influence on Public Organization Change:  
 
Latinos and Local Education Politics.  (August 2005) 
 
Eric Juenke, B.A., University of North Texas; 
 
M.A., University of North Texas 
 
Chair of Advisory Committee:    Dr. Kenneth J. Meier 
 
The research presented here has three major purposes.  The first is to explain how 
political institutions and policy outputs can change in the presence of a growing minority 
population when the preferences of these minorities differ from those of the majority.  I 
show how representation in all three branches of government can lead to these changes, 
specifically in the local legislature and local bureaucracy.  Secondly, I demonstrate the 
relationship between local legislative representation of Latino minority populations to 
substantive policy outcomes that favor this minority group, and explain how variable 
electoral institutions influence this relationship.  The third general purpose of this 
research is to make the argument that the study of minority politics need not take place 
within a theoretical vacuum.  That is, I use theories of minority group behavior (as 
opposed to Latino group behavior), and relevant empirical tests, to inform mainstream 
democratic theory.  What democratic theory is missing, I argue, is the ability to fully 
explain and predict changes in institutions, policy, and policy outputs in a dynamic 
preference environment.  Examining minority politics over time helps fill this void. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The research presented here has three major purposes.  The first is to explain how 
political institutions and policy outputs can change in the presence of a growing minority 
population when the preferences of these minorities differ from those of the majority.  I 
show how representation in all three branches of government can lead to these changes, 
specifically in the local legislature and local bureaucracy.  Secondly, I demonstrate the 
relationship between local legislative representation of Latino minority populations to 
substantive policy outcomes that favor this minority group, and explain how variable 
electoral institutions influence this relationship.  The third general purpose of this 
research is to make the argument that the study of minority politics need not take place 
within a theoretical vacuum.  That is, I use theories of minority group behavior (as 
opposed to Latino group behavior), and relevant empirical tests, to inform mainstream 
democratic theory.  What democratic theory is missing, I argue, is the ability to fully 
explain and predict changes in institutions, policy, and policy outputs in a dynamic 
preference environment.  Examining minority politics over time helps fill this void. 
 
Latinos and Education: Fertile Ground for Policy Change    
The massive growth of the Latino population in the United States during the  
1980’s and 1990’s created new challenges for American democracy.  During these two 
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This dissertation follows the style of The American Journal of Political Science. 
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decades, the Latino1 population grew by 141 percent, while the African-American 
population increased by 31 percent, and the Anglo population increased by only 12 
percent (Census 2000).  Still a substantial minority, Latinos nearly doubled their share of 
the American demographic, moving from 6.4 percent of the population to 12.5 percent 
from 1980 to 2000.  This transformation has gained the widespread attention of political 
leaders and researchers because Latinos have the potential to bring different preferences 
into the policy process, coupled with the political numbers to press for resources.2  
Changes of this type put the political system under stress because previous winning 
coalitions must now attend to the desires of a newly competing (and growing) group.   
This study is about the institutional constraints these groups face in their efforts 
to transform policy.  It is also an assessment, conversely, of the policy changes minority 
groups can initiate, and how they transform the political establishment.  If political 
institutions are simply the legitimized preferences of past winning coalitions, then a new 
group with differing preferences inherently interacts with previous coalitions indirectly 
through these formal structures. Thus, new minority groups both affect, and are affected 
by, previous winning coalitions in all phases of the policy processes.  In the theoretical 
and empirical analyses presented here, I examine the effects of political institutions on a 
                                                          
1 I use the term Latino instead of Hispanic for reasons of consistency and clarity.  I share Rodolfo de la 
Garza’s (2004, 1) feeling that there is no substantive difference between the two terms, however “Latino” 
does appear to be currently preferred by scholars.  In terms of pan-ethnic coverage, I do not differentiate 
between different Latino sub-groups in this research, but I do recognize the need to do so in future national 
studies.  For the most part, the Texas school systems during the time period under scrutiny were dealing 
with an influx of Mexican-American families.  Although there are preference differences between this 
Latino sub-group and others, they are not nearly as large or interesting as the differences between Latinos 
and the Anglo majority.      
2 It is the growing Latino presence that has politicians and scholars taking notice.  The anticipation of 
future population figures (and in many places “majority” status) may have a greater impact on current 
political dynamics than the present population levels.       
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changing minority presence in the U.S. education system, as well as the effects of these 
groups on the political process over time.  The general theoretical goal is to highlight 
how minority coalitions bargain and negotiate with majority coalitions in the present, 
and also with those from the past.  Presumably, we could look at a broad array of salient 
Latino policy areas to test these interactions; however, this effort will focus carefully on 
one issue over time.           
For members of the Latino community, no political issue is more important than 
education.  Latino respondents consistently rank it above other issues such as the 
economy, health care, and immigration (Pew 2004a).  A mix of economic, social, 
political, and cultural factors help explain this prioritization.  First, Latino families 
typically have lower levels of wealth than Anglos, placing them in lower income school 
districts and under-performing schools.  Secondly, the Latino population is younger than 
the Anglo and Black populations (making this issue salient for more Latino families), 
with a significantly lower median age of any racial or ethnic group in 2000, and a much 
larger percentage of five to nineteen year-olds than non-Latinos in 1980 and 2000 
(Therrien and Ramirez 2001).  This younger demographic is reflected in the massive 
influx of Latino students to the education system between 1990 and 2000.  As Figures 
1.1 and 1.2 demonstrate, Latino enrollment in the United States was the driving force 
behind the total enrollment increase across the United States during the 1990’s.   
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Figure 1.1: Average Change in Percentage of State 
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Figure 1.2: Average State Enrollment Change by 
Group, 
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A third reason for the importance of education in the Latino community is that 
Latino children often have different needs than traditional American students, ranging 
from bilingual education to culturally responsive instruction (Pew 2004b).  It is the 
consistent pattern of preference differences between minority and non-minority groups 
that make the political interaction of these groups worth investigating.  Finally, Latino 
education preferences are shaped by the historical efforts of the majority Anglo 
population to exclude racial and ethnic minorities from an equal education (Frankenberg 
2003; Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000).  The remnants of these past efforts, both formal and 
informal, are part of what constrain minority groups in the present from directly 
implementing their policy choices.     
A consistent pattern of unequal and ethnically biased educational outcomes 
emerges from this wide array of causal factors.  Latino students under-perform when 
compared to non-Latinos using every conceivable measure of educational success, 
including: graduation rates (Greene 2002; National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES) 2004), dropout rates (Greene and Winters 2002; Lockwood and Secada 1999; 
Secada et al. 1998; Velez 1989), gifted and talented placement (Meier and Stewart 1991, 
170-171), performance on standardized tests (NCES 2004; Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000; 
Meier and Stewart 1991; Texas Education Agency (TEA) 2004), and college prep and 
college graduation (Horn et al. 2002; Fry 2002).  The historical consistency of these 
differences lead both policy makers and parents to conclude that policy change is needed 
to achieve a just remedy, but groups disagree on both the problems themselves as well as 
what solutions will work to resolve them.     
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Given the severity of the difficulties faced by Latino families in the education 
system, and the divergent factors that produce these outcomes, it is not surprising to find 
that Latinos have attitudes that differ considerably from those of Anglos (see Figure 1.3).  
Latinos are significantly more likely than Anglos to think that schools are too quick to 
label Latino children as having behavior or learning problems (Pew 2004b).  Latinos 
also differ from Anglos in that they believe Anglo teachers’ lack of cultural perspective 
is a “major” impediment to Latino student success (Pew 2004b, 36).  Lastly, Latinos are 
much more likely than Anglos to think that racial stereotypes and low expectations from 
principals and teachers are “major” obstacles to Latino student achievement (Pew 
2004b).  Perceptions of solutions in the education system, under these circumstances, 
begin to resemble the problems themselves; they are split along both racial and ethnic 
lines.     
Public organizations are central to political science.  Political scientists are 
concerned with, among other things, the boundaries of these organizations, how they 
differ from private organizations, how these public entities change over time, and who 
gets to set the rules of engagement (create institutions).  The research presented here is 
framed within this tradition.  It is an account of what happens to a particular type of 
public organization when it encounters new clientele and new constituents (new 
“masters” in democratic parlance).  I use multiple theoretical perspectives to inform my 
hypothesis tests, but the tests themselves are clearly and firmly about organizations and 
groups, not about individuals.  This is a critical point.  I take pains to discuss what 
actually happens inside the public organization when these new groups enter the system, 
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but in the end, the empirical evidence speaks (only) to differential group inputs, 
aggregate representational effects, and organizational outputs and outcomes.  Other 
research in this area provides evidence concerning what goes on inside the public 
organization, and I use this to motivate the present study; but it is not my main intent to 
add to the theoretical level of this debate.         
The dissertation is, consequently, a story about racial and ethnic groups with 
competing policy preferences, and what happens when those who are relatively new to 
the political arena and have growing political clout, interact with the institutions created 
by those who have historically controlled the political system.  This is a story about the 
addition of new problems and new preferences to a relatively stable policy system.  The 
political dynamic of a stable system adjusting to new preferences is a defining 
characteristic of modern representative democracies, thus turning a little story about 
what happens over time when Latinos interact with the education system into a story that 
is generalizable to democratic theory as a whole.   
 
Political Causal Explanations     
The research presented here is not focused on finding the complete casual 
explanation for the problems discussed above.  There are a multitude of causal factors 
for education outcomes.  Like other public policy areas, education is produced jointly by 
government and private actors; each contributes to the success and failure of the eventual 
outcome.  In the case of education, we can say that the outcome (usually measured in  
 9
 
 
Figure 1.3: Latino and Anglo Education Attitudes
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terms of student performance), comes about through the combined efforts of the 
students, their cohorts, their family, the local, state, and national economies, teachers, the 
school, the district, the state, and the federal government.  At any one time, groups 
involved in the education process blame or praise the efforts of one or more of these 
actors for their role in producing the eventual outcomes.  For example, students are often 
characterized as being lazy and disruptive, teachers are portrayed as indifferent to the 
needs of students and parents, parents are non-cooperative or non-supportive of the local 
school, the school board makes political hiring decisions or makes unreasonable 
curriculum choices, and the state and federal governments do not provide enough 
resources for districts and schools to do their jobs well.      
Consequently, this is not a search for the smoking gun that prevents Latinos from 
producing at the levels of their Anglo counterparts.  Rather, it is a study that uses the 
condition of U.S. Latinos in the area of education to examine a general theory of 
minority interaction with majority institutions.  More specifically, I examine the political 
institutions that affect minority representation at different levels of government in the 
area of education, how this representation changes over time, and how it affects minority 
student outcomes.   To this end, it is critical to take into account some of the other “non-
political” factors that may affect Latino student outcomes, but they will not be the 
central focus of the study.  In fact, to the extent that these other factors can be controlled, 
it is possible to measure the magnitude of the impact that political variables have on the 
policy process.  Further, it is prudent to look at the way these political variables have 
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changed over time, as both causes and effects of the growing Latino access to public 
bargaining.   
 The political institutions of interest include the local education legislature and 
bureaucracy.  In the U.S. education system, the school district is the entity to which 
policy creation and implementation has largely been delegated.3  Because I am interested 
in political dynamics, this examination occurs at the district level (the public 
organization), where political institutions and current coalitions interact.  The legislative 
body of the school district is the school board, (almost always) elected officials whose 
job is to set policy goals for the schools in the district, hire and fire administrators (and 
to an extent teachers), discuss and institute curriculum, set and maintain a budget, and 
oversee the implementation of district and state policy.  School board members are 
representatives in the same respect that state and federal legislators are representatives, 
meaning they are held accountable to their constituency through timely elections.  Much 
of the project is spent examining the crucial role of Latino representation on the school 
board, and the method by which these officials are elected, to account for some of the 
outcome variability we observe in student performance.      
 The second type of political actor I examine is the bureaucrat, a public agent who 
is appointed, not elected.  In the education system these actors consist of 
superintendents, principals, teachers, counselors, janitors, and other individuals hired by 
the district.  Bureaucrats are accountable, directly or indirectly, to the school board, 
                                                          
3 The recent “No Child Left Behind” Act is in the process of changing the chain of delegation in U.S. 
public education.  In effect, the NCLB takes over accountability and output measurement, giving the 
federal government a large amount of control over school district policy.  I will not discuss the NCLB 
here, but it is a fertile area of research for political control scholars.         
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characterizing a relationship that is typically labeled a “principal-agent” relationship 
(Brehm and Gates 1997; Calvert et al. 1989; Moe 1984).  That is, some amount of 
control and discretion over education policy has been delegated to bureaucratic agents 
by elected principals.  As I discuss in Chapter 2, legislators typically choose to delegate 
responsibility to public agents in order to solve transaction-cost problems (Moe 1995), 
however, this delegation presents a multitude of new dilemmas for the principal.  The 
process of delegating discretion and control to employees might give these non-elected 
actors political power, and defines the bureaucrat’s role in the policy process.           
 I also briefly explore the role of the judiciary in the education process.  The 
nature of this particular project prohibits a full account of the courts’ influence on policy 
change; however it is important to note the legal constraints under which the other 
political actors operate.  The judiciary serves a multitude of purposes, not the least of 
which is as an advocate for minority interests in the face of majority legislative and 
bureaucratic bias.  In the analyses that follow, I account for the courts to the extent that 
they influence a change in the rules of the game or a change in the behavior of the actors 
over time.     
 
The Politics of Education 
 In order to separate the political effects of a Latino presence on the education 
policy system properly, I constrain most of the analyses to the state of Texas over the 
ten-year period 1992 to 2002.  This has a number of advantages over a cross-state 
analysis alone.  First, I control for the impact of judicial variability across space, while 
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retaining the prospect of examining this variability across time within the state.  Also, 
Texas has historically been home to a large Latino population that became increasingly 
politically active during the 1990’s.  Thirdly, Texas has a variety of electoral 
(institutional) arrangements operating in the education system, and a large number of 
political units (1000+ school districts) with which to conduct pooled cross-sectional 
analyses.  Lastly, a singular focus on one state across time allows me to provide a more 
complete description of the context in which the political processes of interest take 
place.                  
Analyzing only one state however, does not provide leverage on important 
questions of generalizability.  If the relationships are only observed in the Texas school 
system, then it is likely that the findings are spurious, and what they reveal about the 
general underlying causal process is incomplete.  To supplement these findings I take a 
look at approximately 1,300 of the largest school districts in the United States and test 
for similar effects to those found in Texas.  This supplementary evidence provides 
further support for the appropriateness of the theoretical story in a variety of state 
contexts.  The combination of the detailed story in Texas over time, with the national 
evidence across space creates a great deal of support for a theory of institutional 
constraints and minority representation in the legislature and the bureaucracy.        
 The institutions under investigation include the formal rules used to select local 
school board members.  Nationally, the three most widely used school board selection 
types are appointment, at-large election, and single member district election.  In Texas 
the appointment process is eschewed, and almost every district uses at-large elections or 
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single-member district elections.  I will demonstrate how the apparently modest 
differences between these electoral types can have consistently strong impacts on the 
amount of Latino representation on the school board, and how the electoral type 
continues to have substantive implications for minorities throughout the policy process.  
Next, I turn the question around, and ask how these electoral structures developed in 
Texas, and to what extent Latino bureaucrats affect the outcomes we normally attribute 
to legislative representation.  This second question is a contentious one in political 
science, with some scholars arguing that bureaucrats have little to no influence on policy 
outcomes outside of that which is delegated to them by elected officials.  Many 
bureaucracy scholars, however, believe that appointed agents often use their delegated 
discretion to move policy away from legislative intent, in a direction that benefits or 
hinders particular clientele.  The theory and tests developed in this paper go a long way 
towards sorting out some of these issues over time.        
 
Different Types of Political Representation 
 Preference representation is the key goal of democratic governments (Dahl 1971, 
1-16). But what exactly do scholars mean when we talk about representation?  Who is 
responsible for representation – the legislature, the courts, or the bureaucracy?  In terms 
of majority and minority populations, who is accountable to racial and ethnic minorities?  
Scholars have grappled with these concepts for centuries but we have few answers, not 
only in normative terms, but also within a positive framework (Dunn 1999, 316; 
Hutchings and Valentino 2004).  The labyrinth of the modern separated powers system, 
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in conjunction with a changing racial and ethnic demographic in the United States leaves 
the question of representation open to interpretation.   
 This study is focused on the representation of Latino policy preferences in the 
local legislature and bureaucracy.  As with many policy areas, a mix of elected and 
unelected officials “represent” the interests of students and parents.  Elections hold 
school board members accountable to the public (Manin et al. 1999), but this allows 
untrained, uninformed citizens to control local policy.  Relative to district administrators 
and teachers, many of whom have been in the system ten to twenty years, the average 
school board member is at a distinct disadvantage (Chubb and Moe 1990, Dunn 1999).  
Bureaucrats have experience, expertise, information advantages, and most importantly 
discretion (Fredrickson and Smith 2003; Moe 1995).  The decentralized nature of the 
U.S. education system allows individuals who have little experience with education to 
win legitimate control over these bureaucratic “experts.”               
 The authors who study the “political control of the bureaucracy,” have a view of 
the bureaucracy grounded in the law.  That is to say, they recognize the constitutional 
and representative parts of our system that many others forget, and assume that 
administrative power flows from elected officials to public agencies.  They argue that 
the people are represented by elected officials, not by the bureaucracy (Calvert et al. 
1989; Fiorina 1981; McCubbins 1991;).   
 The most robust line of political control theory and analysis comes from the 
legislative and presidential literature.  In general, the authors of the most recent 
scholarship in this area share a set of assumptions about political actors and their 
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relationship with the bureaucracy: 1) People are intendedly rational and are interested in 
satisficing their preferences, 2) Politicians are interested in getting re-elected (satisficing 
votes) and thus align their preferences with interests that will assist them in doing so, 
and 3) the legislative-bureaucracy relationship can be modeled as a principal-agent 
relationship respectively (and importantly, not the other way around); this is the 
relationship the Constitution sets up.  The third assumption is the key to the normative 
bent this group of authors share.  Borrowing from earlier work in organizational theory 
and decision theory (Barnard 1938; Cyert and March 1987; Simon 1947; Williamson 
1995), agency theory models the legislative-administrative relationship as a hierarchal 
contract between two actors (Fredrickson and Smith 2003, 37; Wood and Waterman 
1994).   
 This differentiates the more recent work from the earlier politics/administration 
dichotomy because it acknowledges the preferences, goals and power of the bureaucrat.  
The public agent has its own values, its unique expertise, its ability to signal, and its 
preference to shirk (Brehm and Gates 1997) that make it difficult for the legal principal 
to simply give away broad discretion (Calvert et al. 1989; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; 
McCubbins et al. 1987; McCubbins 1991; Moe 1995; Wood and Waterman 1994).  
Because of this, principals design either ex-post or ex-ante constraints that will diminish 
bureaucratic drift (indeed, they must decide whether to delegate authority to the agent in 
the first place).  To this end, Bendor and Moe (1985, 772) define the role of the 
bureaucracy in a democracy by concluding “The power of bureaus to get what they want 
has been exaggerated.”  Other authors of this genre would similarly argue that whatever 
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decision-making ability an agency appears to have has been “abdicated” (Kiewet and 
McCubbins 1991 as quoted in Whittington and Carpenter 2003, 496), given away under 
tight restraints that largely prevent true bureaucratic “discretion.” 
 The political relationship in this policy area is filled with tension.  Teachers and 
administrators who have spent their lives developing expertise about what is good for 
students, come face to face with less qualified (but more “legitimate”) political masters 
(the public, represented by school boards).  When a new racial group enters the system 
with different needs and preferences than those of the majority, the decision about what 
is best for these students is often left up to majority representatives (either in the 
legislature or the bureaucracy).  For Latinos, this has historically spelled disaster.  Most 
of the evidence concerning discrimination against Latino students in the areas of ability 
tracking, discipline, college preparation, testing, bilingual education, and special 
education assignment has come at the hands of Anglo majority school boards, 
administrators, and teachers (Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000; Meier and Stewart 1991)  
Because of this, many Latino parents and voters with policy preferences that concentrate 
on the education gap between Latinos and other racial groups, use race and ethnicity as a 
voting cue to select representatives that will deliver resources to their minority 
constituency (Bullock 1984; Eisinger 1980).  
 The legislature and the bureaucracy offer two different kinds of representation.  
Wood and Waterman (1994) point out that the longer tenure of bureaucratic agents 
(along with their other organizational advantages) allows them to ride out policy churn 
(Hess 1999) and legislative fads.  Their discretion can oftentimes be used to buffer the 
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public system from legislative shocks (Wood and Waterman 1994, 127).  In this sense, 
the bureaucracy can become an advocate for minority groups that are not being 
adequately represented by the legislature.  Latinos who are being ignored by elected 
district officials (whose constituency is often the median, majority voter) may find their 
policy preferences represented by Latino administrators and teachers in the school.  An 
increasing presence of Latino teachers and administrators in a school district can move 
policy towards the needs of a minority population before formal policy change occurs at 
the legislative level, necessitating the use outcomes instead of formal policy change.  
Latino teachers often discipline and track Latino students differently than Anglo teachers 
(Meier and Stewart 1991, 16-18), and Latino bureaucrats can be advocates for policy 
change in their interaction with the school board, forcing elected officials to choose 
between the desires of the voting majority and the expertise of district employees.             
An alternative perspective suggests that the bureaucracy can be less 
representative of minority populations than locally elected school boards.  Oftentimes, 
public organizations move slowly in terms of “responsiveness” because they are not held 
accountable to the public through elections (Dahl 1971; Manin et al. 1999).  These two 
facets of representation can be mapped onto the bureaucratic and legislative aspects of 
government.  As I argued above, many times the bureaucracy responds to the needs of 
clientele before the legislature can.  However, because legislators are accountable to the 
public every few years through elections, it is also likely that legislative representation 
may precede a bureaucratic response.  Latino legislators may enter the policy process 
and push for more bilingual education programs, a greater emphasis on the recruitment 
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of Latino teachers and administrators, and even advocate the hiring of a Latino 
superintendent to lead the district in a new direction.  Under this scenario, the legislature 
is more responsive because of its accountability to the public (and perhaps because of 
electoral mechanisms that favor the election of minority candidates).  These different 
conceptions of representation mirror the discussion between political control and 
bureaucratic representation scholars 
 
Research Design 
 The empirical design revolves around the implications of public organizational 
change in the face of new minority preferences.  I focus on local organizational change 
because this is where minorities are most likely to have substantial purchase with their 
limited resources.  The hypothesis tests can be separated into two general sections that 
reflect their theoretical foci.  The first set of hypotheses address organizational change 
from a political control, top-down perspective. I assess this theoretical frame by looking 
at the election of Latino legislators in different institutional environments: at-large and 
single member district (“ward”) elections.  Some general hypotheses from this section 
include the following: 
H1: In Latino minority districts (where Latinos are less than 50% of the 
population), as the Latino population increases, districts using ward election rules 
will be associated with higher levels of Latino legislative representation than 
those using at-large election rules, all else equal. 
 
H2: In Latino minority districts, as Latino legislative representation increases, 
districts using ward election rules will be associated with a higher percentage of 
Latino administrative appointments than those using at-large election rules, all 
else equal. 
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H3: In Latino majority districts (where Latinos are 50% or more of the 
population), as the Latino population increases, there is no difference in the 
levels of Latino legislative representation due to election rules, all else equal.   
 
H4: In Latino majority districts, as Latino legislative representation increases, 
there is no difference in the percentage of Latino administrators due to election 
rules, all else equal.   
  
 To test the top-down model of policy influence, I present evidence using both a 
national and single-state sample of school districts and their school boards.  The national 
sample is a cross-section of over 1,300 of the largest school districts in the U.S.  These 
districts have an enrollment of at least 5,000 students and were surveyed in (2001) about 
the ethnic and racial characteristics of their school board, administrators, teachers, and 
students.  The single-state sample is also a cross-section, but includes all districts in the 
state of Texas that do not have appointed boards (N=1041), and includes the same 
information about the organization’s legislative, bureaucratic, and clientele 
characteristics.  Both samples are supplemented with census data to control for other 
factors in the policy process.  The obvious advantage of examining two different 
samples (gathered using different surveys) is one of generalizability.  By demonstrating 
the same relationship between electoral structure, minority legislative representation, and 
bureaucratic outcomes in two different samples, I bolster the case for a top-down, 
institutional/representational causal process.  I interact the electoral system with Latino 
population and representation levels (in different models) to explicitly examine the effect 
of electoral rules on organizational outcomes.  This process will be described in greater 
detail in Chapter 4.       
 I examine the bottom-up, bureaucratic representation story in the second section 
 21
of the empirical chapters.  This section is motivated by a simple question, “What is the 
role of the minority bureaucrat in producing organizational change (i.e. institutional and 
outcome change)?”  That is, perhaps the Latino bureaucrat enters the policy process first 
and influences the election of Latino legislators, or even the electoral rules by which 
they are chosen.  Beyond this, perhaps street level Latino bureaucrats (teachers in this 
case) can also influence the appointment of Latino administrators, and public outcomes 
directly in the classroom.   
 To examine these endogenous causal issues, I move beyond the cross sectional 
samples and focus on school districts in Texas over time.  The 1990’s was a crucial 
decade for Latinos in Texas for a number of reasons.  One of the most important reasons 
Latinos became politically successful during this period is the interpretation of the 
Voting Rights Act by the courts in a way that favored electoral changes at the local level.  
Coupled with the 1990 census, court rulings, and the threat of lawsuits from Latino 
organizations forced many electoral districts to change the way their board members 
were selected.  Therefore, this time period (1993-2001) is of particular interest to the 
causal analysis of minority representation. 
 The cross sectional analyses speak to associations between variables, but they 
cannot directly answer questions about causality between such closely-related variables 
(Latino population figures and their counterparts in the legislature and the bureaucracy).  
To analyze the causal process more thoroughly (and this gets to the heart of the tension 
between organizational change from above or from below), I examine all Texas school 
districts during the period 1993-2001, using the same variables from the cross-sectional 
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analyses.  The dependent variables from the cross-sectional analyses become 
independent variables, as I attempt to untangle the endogenous relationships between 
legislative and bureaucratic actors.  Because the dataset covers only ten years and 
contains over 1,000 units (and because of the nature of each type of representational 
change), I cannot use the tools that scholars typically apply to these kinds of data (e.g. 
VAR and structural equation modeling).  Instead, I examine sub-samples of the data 
across time, and supplement this with a pooled analysis to tease out which type of 
representatives (legislative or bureaucratic) causes the other, and which factors 
contribute to institutional change.  Thus, some general hypotheses I test in this section 
include: 
 H5: As the percentage of Latino administrators increases in ward districts, the  
likelihood of Latino legislative representation increases at a greater rate than in 
at-large districts, all else equal. 
             
 H6: As the percentage of Latino teachers increases in ward districts, the  
likelihood of Latino legislative representation increases at a greater rate than in 
at-large districts, all else equal. 
 
H7: Bureaucratic representation (at both the street and managerial levels) is a 
necessary condition for institutional change (electoral structural change), and 
generally occurs before Latino legislative representation, all else equal.     
 
  
Outline of the Project 
 In Chapter two I return to the more specific political literature of interest.  The 
chapter is divided into three broad sections.  The first section analyzes the two main 
macro-theories used to frame minority politics generally, and Latino politics specifically.  
I discuss how both pluralist and non-pluralist perspectives offer leverage on 
 23
minority/majority politics, but that each is singularly deficient for a full understanding of 
the problem.  I argue that mainstream political theories of the policy process are 
sufficient to guide minority politics research, moving the unique historical and cultural 
characteristics of particular minority groups away from the principal discussion of their 
political behavior.  Concurrently, I argue that minority politics should be a fundamental 
area of interest for democratic theorists, institutional change scholars, and policy change 
researchers.  Although minorities are not necessarily unique among U.S. political actors, 
their influence on the policy process is crucial, and unfortunately overlooked by many 
American scholars.             
 The next two sections discuss the apparent tensions between the political control 
and the bureaucratic representation models of politics.  These two perspectives reflect 
other issues in political science, specifically those that address different types of 
“representation.”  What do we mean when we speak of representation: the electoral 
process, the legislative process, or the bureaucracy and the judicial system?  Although 
these theories typically speak to individual preferences and behavior, I argue that they 
provide crucial insight into organizational processes and outcomes.  Political control 
models minimize the ability of bureaucrats to influence policy outputs and outcomes, 
instead attributing causation to the rules of the game and the authority of elected 
officials.  I explore whether certain public organizations are open to group influence at 
the bureaucratic level, and add a new perspective to the debate by looking at how a 
minority presence in the bureaucracy over time can change institutions and influence the 
look of local legislative bodies.      
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 Chapter three is a descriptive chapter of the political institutions of the U.S. 
education system and its relevance as an area of interest for students of bureaucratic 
representation.  The organization of the U.S. education system is distinguished by its 
decentralization (compared to other developed democracies) where minorities have 
greater access to power (through local school districts) than they do in other policy areas.  
I discuss how the current system has continued to leave Latinos and Blacks lagging 
behind their Anglo counterparts on all indicators of achievement.  I portray this in 
historical terms, showing that institutions constrain policy victories and prevent major 
gains on issues minority groups care about.  I also discuss the success of minority 
coalitions over time, as they have navigated the political system to find access points 
where policy change can take place.  In Texas, these demographic shifts and their 
requisite representational changes have produced legislative, bureaucratic, judicial, and 
policy outcome changes that speak to the power, and limitations, of minority influence 
under majority constraints.   
 A major part of the chapter is the discussion of judicial constraints, particularly 
the decisions after the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA), which govern electoral reform in 
Texas.  I describe how these rulings provided an important bargaining tool for Latinos in 
Texas looking for a way to increase legislative representation, especially after the 1990 
census.  The story of Latinos in the Texas school system during this decade provides the 
specific framework for the empirical analyses in the chapters that follow.            
 Chapter four begins by recapitulating the theoretical discussion from chapter two 
and developing specific hypotheses for the national and Texas school districts described 
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in chapter three.  The chapter might best be described as the “top-down” chapter.  The 
hypotheses and empirical tests speak to the political control mechanisms, electoral 
structures and legislative representation, which affect the hiring of Latino teachers and 
administrators at the district level (a substantive policy outcome).  I demonstrate how 
electoral differences between at-large and ward systems affect descriptive and 
substantive representation of Latino groups, using a cross-sectional design to examine 
both a national and single state sample of school districts.  The single state sample 
allows for a look at districts where Latinos are a numerical minority and where they 
make up a majority of the population separately.  Congruent with a theory of minority 
politics, I find that Latino majority status reverses the effect of electoral variation on 
representation for this group.  The chapter provides evidence of top-down political 
control, showing how the rules of the game can have impacts that reach beyond the color 
of the legislative body. 
 Chapter five is the key component of the project.  Perhaps there is an alternative 
causal process at work that cannot be observed using the cross-sectional design 
presented in chapter four.  Here I use a pooled cross-section of Texas school districts for 
the ten year period 1993-2001 to look at the role of Latino bureaucrats in the electoral 
process, policy change, and institutional change (specifically, the move from at-large to 
ward electoral structures).  After presenting some preliminary causal tests for whether 
Latino bureaucrats or Latino legislators are endogenously related, or whether one group 
is predominantly responsible for the presence of the other (whether the process is top-
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down or bottom-up), I look specifically at districts that underwent electoral change 
during the 1990’s to determine the causal mechanism for institutional change.            
 While chapter four examines a static model of political control, chapter five 
presents a dynamic story of the influence of minorities on the public organization.  It 
presents an examination of changes in bureaucratic and legislative representation over 
time and suggests a much more nuanced causal process.  Institutions, at times, are 
altered by “agents” and not “principals.”  Oftentimes, bureaucrats select their own 
legislators in order to control their work environment. Many times, bureaucratic agents 
turn their discretion (over time) into autonomy, directly challenging the political control 
literature.  I end the chapter with a discussion of what this kind of bureaucratic 
representation means for minorities in a liberal democracy.       
 I conclude the project by reiterating the main themes and stressing the 
importance of the work for political scientists in general, not just policy scholars.  I 
discuss different types of representation, and how these particular findings may force 
political control scholars to rethink their static models of institutional influence.  In 
contrast to this, I discuss why institutions remain so important to understanding the 
outcomes of politics, specifically for minority groups.  There is a reason political control 
dominates discussions of the bureaucracy, because for the most part institutions and the 
electoral/legislative process do control the public agency.  But there are times when this 
is not the case, and the reasons for this pertain to the type of policy under observation, 
the level of government, and the salience of the issue to minority groups (shaped by 
unique historical and cultural factors).  I provide a general theory of minority/majority 
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political conflict, of use to those studying other policy areas (crime, health care, and 
welfare policies for example) and those studying various institutional arrangements in 
other nations.                
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CHAPTER II 
 
A THEORY OF MINORITY POLITICS  
 
 The study of minority politics continues to cause theoretical problems for 
political scientists because of the difficult task of trying to fit a unique 
political/cultural/historical experience within general policy theory.  For example, how 
does the Latino political experience differ from that of African-Americans, Italian 
Americans, or non-ethnic Anglos?  Historically, we know that it does, but do these 
differences necessitate a separate branch of democratic theory for each minority group?  
Or instead, should political scientists simply describe the political behavior of these 
groups distinctively, and explain the consequences of their activity post hoc?   
 On its own, a descriptive and atheoretical approach does little to advance general 
political science, so we should not expect it to benefit the sub-field of minority politics 
either.  Conversely, it is difficult to imagine that the political experiences of minority 
groups in the U.S. can be completely captured by a democratic theory that disputes their 
perspective as unique or theoretically interesting.  Further, it is unlikely that the minority 
political experience could have no effect on political theory more generally.  Put plainly, 
“What is the relevance of minority politics to political science?”   
 A lively debate continues about the proper theoretical perspective with which to 
study minority politics, and Latino politics more specifically (Browning et al. 1984; 
Dahl 1961; Dawson and Cohen 2002; De la Garza 2004; Fuchs 1990; Hero 1992; 
Hutchings and Valentino 2004; Pinderhughes 1987; Walton et al. 1995).  During the 
1980’s and 1990’s, Latino scholars began to search for the most appropriate lens with 
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which to examine the role of minorities in the American political system (Dawson and 
Cohen 2002; De la Garza 2004; Pachon and DeSipio 1992; Uhlaner et al. 1989; Uhlaner 
and Garcia 2002).  This discussion is of the utmost importance to both Latino scholars 
and political scientists in general because of its potential to make the study of a specific 
group (or groups) relevant to all political scientists and policy makers, not just the group 
members themselves.    
 This chapter makes a number of specific arguments about the study of Latino 
politics and its role in preparing the ground for the empirical tests conducted within.  But 
the general point is singular, and possibly more important than the detailed discussions 
of bureaucratic and representation theory.  The overarching theme of this project is that 
the study of minority politics is essential to the study of democratic politics.  Democratic 
theory must be able to predict and explain the influence that minority interests have on 
majoritarian politics, and must be able to account for the constraints faced by minority 
interests as they press for policy change.  Thus, the study of Latino politics (as minority 
politics) becomes an integral part of democratic theory, on par with the study of the 
relationship between the legislature and the bureaucracy, voting behavior, the judiciary, 
or any other sub-field of the discipline.   
 I consider theory and tests that place the study of minority populations within 
broad political science, but I use the role of minority interests to inform and amend 
mainstream democratic theory.  This is a tricky proposition, but it is critical to the 
project.  I argue that the study of democratic politics is incomplete without accounting 
for the influence of new minority interests, and that minority politics must be explored 
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using generalizable, established political theory.   The study of Latino politics, if 
undertaken with an eye towards general political theory, has the potential to inform the 
areas of policy change, institutionalism, implementation, representation, comparative 
politics, democratic theory, and many others.             
 There are a variety of ways in which minority groups can achieve representation.  
This chapter covers a substantial amount of theoretical ground, connecting some general 
theories of minority influence on a liberal-democratic system with more recent work that 
focuses specifically on the relationship between legislative representation and 
bureaucratic representation.  I begin to develop a story of when and where minority 
groups might find political leverage in a majority system, and how they have taken 
advantage of these opportunities over time.          
   
How to Examine the “Dilemma” of Race and Ethnicity:  Disagreement over Theory      
 Political scientists have generally cast the study of minority politics using 
pluralist or non-pluralist theoretical frames.4  Work that pushes the uniqueness of racial 
and ethnic factors in the American political process fall into the latter category (Garcia 
2003; Hero 1992; Hero 2003; Munoz 1991; Myrdal 1944; Pinderhughes 1987; Regalado 
1997; Stokes 2003), while research that downplays the role of these factors (although not 
ignoring them completely) is typically suggestive of the former perspective (Browning et 
                                                          
4 Throughout the dissertation, I use the terms “pluralist / non-pluralist” and “mainstream / niche” 
interchangeably.  This is done to highlight the close relationship between seemingly disparate theoretical 
models.  Pluralist scholars want to cast minority politics in mainstream theoretical terms, while non-
pluralist advocates use niche Latino or Black explanations to explain these groups’ political behavior 
(Pinderhughes 1987; Walton et al. 1995).  This is not always the case, but it is generally true, and it serves 
as a useful heuristic for the theoretical argument I make in this project.   
 31
al. 1984; Dahl 1961; De la Garza 2004; Fuchs 1990; Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997; 
Uhlaner et al. 1989; Wolfinger 1974).  These meta-theoretical frames are useful for 
delineating a broad difference in approaches to the question of race and ethnicity in 
American politics, but they obscure the progress of more useful mid-range theory 
building and empirical work.5   
 The pluralist/non-pluralist split is useful however because it is characteristic of a 
number of other mid-level debates in the literature.  In fact, I argue, it is with these other 
mid-range theories where progress can be made on questions critical to minority politics.  
I demonstrate that the best theoretical frame, and the one I use in this project, combines 
features of the pluralist and non-pluralist traditions; the reason there is such discord over 
which of these two theories is the most useful is because both contain important insights.  
In culling the vital pieces from both perspectives, I show that their differences can be 
mapped onto the following mid-level discussions:  
1) Descriptive and substantive representation  
2) Political control and bureaucratic representation  
3) Racial gerrymandering 
                                                          
5 Raymond Wolfinger argues that the pluralist frame is of little use to political scientists because “it 
occupies a limited and dull segment of the subject matter of political science.  Few interesting and 
controversial subjects seem to be subsumed under this rubric, and knowing whether a particular political 
scientist is a ‘pluralist’ or an ‘elitist’ does not help classify him with respect to such issues” (1974, 10).  
Before most Latino scholarship is even conceived, one of the leading ethnic politics scholars puts the 
search for a separate meta-theory to rest.  In fact, Wolfnger refuses to be described as a pluralist, elitist or 
a group theorist, leaving one to conclude that his understanding of ethnic politics lies outside of any 
conventional theoretical frame (1974, 7-12).  Instead of entering into this debate in search of a general 
theory of minority politics, I take Wolfinger’s advice and dispose of the pluralist/elite dichotomy to focus 
instead on how an integrated theory of mainstream and niche perspectives can rescue minority political 
study from the margins. 
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 After evaluating the usefulness of these frames to the study of minority politics, I 
reconstruct the broad pluralist/non-pluralist approach into a more useful neo-
institutionalist perspective.  Using this premise, the level of analysis becomes the public 
organization, the institutions include the electoral structure, the legislative/bureaucratic 
arrangement, and statutes protecting minority voting rights.  Thus, change comes from 
demographic (preference) shifts, both in the population and the legislative-bureaucratic 
relationship.  The goal is to offer a theory of minority politics that accepts and uses the 
assumptions and approaches of mainstream political science (the pluralist case), while at 
the same time, incorporates the unique context and history of minority preferences (the 
non-pluralist case).     
 
Broad Strokes: Why Pluralism Fails (and Succeeds)          
 Pluralist approaches to minority politics have typically downplayed the role of 
racial and ethnic factors in the policy process.  They argue that much of what is 
considered racial politics is actually class politics, urban politics, or partisan politics 
(Browning et al. 1984; De la Garza 2004; Fuchs 1990; Huckfeldt 1983; Wolfinger 1965; 
Wolfinger 1974).  This perspective is best summarized by Rodolfo De la Garza’s (2004, 
116) concluding statements from his recent literature survey: 
 Is pluralism the best model for analyzing Latino Politics?  Twenty years 
 ago I would have said no.  Today, based on my understanding of the  
 material I have read, I respond with a qualified yes.  This is not to say that 
anti-Hispanic racism no longer exists; instead, as a result of long and bitter 
struggles, Latinos are now a part of the mainstream and have attained the  
clout to influence the system from within as well as from without.                
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De la Garza concludes this statement with the qualification that if “immigrant 
incorporation” is not handled appropriately, Latino politics could well retreat to an 
Anglo/elite-dominated model.  Two things are important here.  First, De la Garza 
suggests that the political situation for Latinos is dynamic and tenuous, that at one time it 
could have been described as non-pluralist, and that it could yet change back based on 
further uncontrolled demographic shifts.  Second, he states that the presence of racism 
against Latinos does not preclude a pluralist model.  Both of these arguments 
characterize the debate between the opposing models, and should be explored.   
 The first argument is the most prominent in the pluralist literature.  That is, 
formal, racist, and elitist barriers to Latino political participation may have existed in the 
past, but because of the civil rights successes of Blacks and Latinos (De la Garza 2004; 
Fuchs 1990; Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997), or shifts in attitudes (Merelman 1994; 
Carmines and Stimson 1982), or cultural factors helped them prosper anyway (Fraga 
1997; Fuchs 1990, 257-271; Garcia 2003), these barriers are no longer primary to the 
Latino political experience.  Therefore, pluralist approaches provide other causal 
mechanisms to explain policy outputs and outcomes that favor Anglo populations.  It is 
important then to take a closer look at some of this influential research, to see if the 
approach has informed the discipline more generally, or if it has instead clouded the 
picture.   
 The second of De la Garza’a suggestions, that political racism against Latinos 
does not preclude a pluralist perspective, is important because it sets the evidentiary bar 
higher for those who disagree with the pluralist frame.  In order to turn aside the pluralist 
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argument, one cannot simply show a pattern of unequal policy outcomes or direct 
evidence of institutional racism.  Instead, one must demonstrate that these types of 
political obstacles cannot be overcome by Latino mobilization, representation, and other 
forms of political participation.  To be useful, a non-pluralist theory of racial and ethnic 
politics must show continued policy discrimination over time in spite of equal political 
opportunity, a lack of formal barriers to the policy process, and growing Latino 
engagement in the political system.  As I discuss later, these are precisely the arguments 
made by scholars who do not subscribe to De la Garza’s concluding comments.  For 
them, Latinos must undertake a variety of non-traditional political strategies and rely on 
specific remedial solutions to attain a semblance of policy responsiveness. 
 One of the most influential works in the pluralist tradition of racial and ethnic 
politics is the Browning, Marshall, and Tabb study of Blacks and Latinos in urban 
settings, Protest is Not Enough (1984).  As the title suggests, the authors claim that 
traditional explanations of Black and Latino political progress (e.g. protest and electoral 
representation) are not sufficient to explain policy responsiveness in an urban 
environment.  Instead, they argue that “political incorporation” occurs when Blacks and 
Latinos mobilize, form broad liberal coalitions with Anglos, control the mayor’s office, 
and work to replace candidates opposed to their policies (Browning et al. 1984).  To be 
clear, the authors stipulate that these activities must take place in a political environment 
“where conditions are relatively favorable” (249), but their main thesis is that political 
influence is available to those “with the gumption, the persistence, and the skill to pursue 
it long enough” (Gamson 175, 3 as quoted in Browning et al. 1984, 249).   
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 Browning et al.’s innovation, however, is to look at multiple indicators of 
minority representation and label it “incorporation” (24-27).  They argue that control of 
the mayor’s office and cooperation within a liberal majority coalition will further 
improve the situation for urban minorities, rather than holding just a seat or two on the 
city council (27-31).  This is, of course, true.  Unfortunately, the authors’ explanation for 
how minorities achieve these multiple representations ignores institutional change and 
non-pluralist contributions to the process.  They instead focus on liberal-Anglo-Latino 
coalitions that formed in some cities and not others (75-135).  In short, the authors tell a 
story of urban politics, with a Latino and Black flavor, compelling the reader to 
recognize the inevitability of policy responsiveness once these groups understand how to 
play politics correctly.   
 Rodney Hero (1991) notes the deficiencies of this argument in a number of ways.  
First, the very existence of a study of Black and Latino politics begs the question of 
whether there is something unique about the experiences of these groups that go beyond 
simple pluralist politics (Hero 1991, 3).  Second, Hero notes that regardless of the policy 
outcome, Blacks and Latinos remain severely underrepresented, continue to under 
perform, and face substantial un-incorporation (7-8).   Thus, even though there is 
variation in the levels of representation and outcomes in different urban environments, 
Black and Latino group members achieve satisfactory success in none of them, 
suggesting a more pessimistic view of the process (7-8).  Thirdly, and most importantly, 
Browning et al. do not address the institutional factors involved in the process of turning 
minority demand into representation, and then into policy (Hero 1991, 4-6; see also Hero 
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1992).  This last complaint is the most damning, and it is the one Hero takes on in his 
book Latinos and the U.S. Political System: Two-Tiered Pluralism (1992).  This attack is 
also the one I tackle most directly in the research presented here.   
 Hero’s title can be interpreted as a jab at Browning et al.’s study, and could 
easily be re-worded Pluralism is not Enough.  His “two-tiered pluralism” is an 
amalgamation of pluralist and non-pluralist theories.   
            Basically, two-tiered pluralism describes a situation in which there 
 is formal legal equality on the one hand, and simultaneously, actual  
 practice that undercuts equality for most members of minority groups, 
 even if some individuals register significant achievements (Stone  
 1990; Hochshild 1984, 169).  In other words, certain basic equalities 
 and rights apply to all Americans, but because of the distinctive  
 historical experiences and structural features of some groups, and  
 because cultural or racial deficiencies are alleged to exist, (Barrera 
 1979), equality is largely formal or procedural, not substantive. (Hero  
 1992, 189-190).     
 
To be clear, Hero is not simply saying (as others do) that time and further Latino 
mobilization will repair whatever political ailments remain.  If this were the case, simple 
pluralist models would suffice.  His project is an indictment of research like Browning et 
al.’s which does not look at the remedial or quasi-legitimate political solutions that have 
been so critical to minority political success.  Secondly, Hero’s definition notes that even 
after fixing all of the structural barriers and institutional constraints, after winning all of 
the “political” battles, the overwhelming majority of Latinos (and for that matter, 
Blacks) continue to suffer unequal policy outputs and outcomes.   
 Thus, the pluralist models fail to explain three main problems in minority 
politics.  First, instead of groups finding a way to engage in politics within the system, 
minorities may force institutional changes to the system itself, permanently modifying 
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the structures of democratic states.  More clearly, do minorities force democracies to 
fine-tune their institutions in the face of preference heterogeneity?  Does their presence 
make democracy “better?”  Secondly, after engaging in the politics of pluralism, 
minority groups still find themselves behind in every measure of policy success.  Do 
these results suggest that the pluralistic victories of minority groups are substantively 
empty gestures?  Pluralism is unable to account for the response of majority populations 
to these minority victories.  Third, the pluralist frame, by definition, ignores alternative 
and un-democratic strategies for access to political influence.  Illegitimate political 
behavior like engaging in violence and implementing policy in a manner that differs 
from legislative intent is not considered in pluralist models, however, these activities 
may contribute significantly to minority efforts for policy responsiveness.         
 Non-pluralist studies, as I am categorizing them, focus on unique Latino cultural 
or historical characteristics to explain Latino politics.  Typical explanations for failed 
representation or incorporation include continued immigration (Citrin and Highton 2002;  
Hritzuk and Park 2000; Jones-Correa 1998), the lack of a Latino “identity” (Bickford 
1999; 452; De la Garza 1997, Garcia 2003; Stokes 2003), differences in country of 
origin (Moran 1997), language differences (Schmidt 1991; Schmidt 1997), and elite 
organizational difficulties (Garcia 2003; Sierra 1991).  These explanations are generally 
used as a response to studies that utilize a pluralist or mainstream framework (Bickford 
1999; Hardy-Fanta 1997; Regalado 1997; San Miguel and Valencia 1998).  In doing so, 
the authors of niche Latino explanations insist that this group differs from every other 
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U.S. minority group, both in the present and from the past, forcing democracy to adjust 
to dynamics previously unknown.        
 Although Latino politics brings a variety of new questions to the forefront of 
democratic theory, it does not exist in isolation.  That is, we can still understand minority 
political behavior using traditional, specifically pluralistic, political theory; it is not, as 
some scholars suggest, outside the purview of mainstream political science (see Bickford 
1999; Lindblom 1982; Moran 1997).  The project here is to confront the problem of 
marginal preferences in a democracy by combining generalizable theory with the 
nuances and insights provided by the minority dilemma.  Above, I explained how 
minority politics can play a vital role in educating mainstream democratic politics.  Next,   
I describe how the opposite is true, how traditional theories of the policy process must be 
used to frame the study of minorities in a democracy.                  
 The pluralist perspective starts from the assumption that individuals and groups 
behave (or at least have the opportunity to behave) similarly when placed in the same 
political environment (Browning et al. 1984; Dahl 1961, 1-8; Fuchs 1990; Wolfinger 
1974).  Examining Latino politics (and Black politics) from the perspective of minority 
politics maintains this assumption.  Instead of situating Latinos within a unique 
theoretical niche, operating from a minority politics perspective allows us to make 
prominent use of mainstream political theory in predicting and explaining the 
phenomena.  The minority politics frame emphasizes the situation of being a politically 
dominated minority, not the particular individuals or groups who occupy that situation.     
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 The majority of political science research concerning racial and ethnic policy 
questions has focused on group electoral behavior (voting, participation, media presence, 
etc.).  To be certain, it is difficult to study racial and ethnic minorities in Congress, the 
Presidency, or the judiciary because of small N problems, so the ubiquitous nature of the 
behavioral questions is understandable.  The underlying theoretical split discussed above 
however, is a defining characteristic of these sub-fields as well.   
 The rich tradition of racial and ethnic behavioral studies is not crucial to the 
present study, but its macro-theoretical discussion is useful as an example of how 
mainstream (pluralist) theories can be applied to the unique problem of the minority 
experience.  Jan Leighley (2001) tries to sort through these multiple theoretical 
perspectives in her book Strength in Numbers.  Her project is very similar to this one.  In 
an effort to construct a theory of minority participation, she presents a framework that 
includes Latinos, Blacks, and Asian minorities, as well as Anglo majorities (2001, 8-10).  
In doing so, Leighley brings together mainstream behavioral theory, which she claims 
ignores or marginalizes the minority experience (22-24), with racial/ethnic niche theories 
that provide no insight into general theories of political behavior (15).   
 The project is much like that of comparative scholars who attempt to move from 
models that use country names to ones that use political variables (Przeworski and Teune 
1966, 554-555; Przeworski and Teune 1970).  Instead of relying on the unique historical 
experience of Blacks and Latinos to explain their political behavior, Leighley’s theory 
combines a rational choice approach (2001, 15-27), with group relational incentives 
introduced by Uhlaner (1989), reputation benefits (Chong 1991; Leighley 2001, 18), and 
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other incentives for minorities to participate politically.  Thus, individuals react similarly 
to incentives, but the incentive structures differ depending on the group to which the 
individual belongs (Leighley 2001, 9-10).  Leighley’s models contain the same variables 
for each group member, but the group determines how these variables will interact, the 
direction of the relationship, and the size of the impact each has on the likelihood of 
participating.   
 This is fundamentally different from most other studies of minority behavior, and 
leads to variations in how the empirical analyses are carried out.  Traditional studies of 
minority voting behavior simply pile on as many relevant (Anglo-majority derived) 
variables as possible, and then add dummy variables for each race/ethnic group in the 
sample to look for any leftover variance that can be explained by being “Black” or 
“Latino” (Leighley 2001; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999, 1101-1102;).  Reflecting the 
different theoretical approach, Leighley’s models interact the race of the individual (the 
group they belong to which helps structure their incentives) with the same variables of 
interest used to study Anglo majorities (Leighley 2001; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999).  
The results of these tests tell us how the political incentives of an individual are 
structured by their position within a racial and ethnic minority, providing much more 
causal information than simply knowing that Black and Latino citizens behave 
differently from one another, and differently from Anglos.   
 Leighley’s project demonstrates the salience of developing models of minority 
political behavior that put quality mainstream work to use.  More importantly, she 
clearly understands the significance of her work to a broader audience.   Modeling 
 41
minority behavior also teaches us about Anglo (majority) behavior.  Understanding how 
majorities and minorities react to one another in a changing preference environment, 
within the institutional setting created by the majority, uncovers crucial information 
about how democracies function over time (Leighley 2001, 145-173). 
 Using an assortment of works from the minority politics literature, I have shown 
that the best way to frame the different approaches is through the pluralist/non-pluralist 
divide.  The differences between the two approaches are not subtle, and I argue that they 
are critical to understanding modern minority politics.  While a discussion of a macro-
theory of minority politics is premature, scholarship that bridges this divide is beginning 
to contribute to a broad political science audience; not because it panders to one 
perspective or the other, but because it provides essential insights to students of majority 
politics, insights that could not be understood without looking at behavior in the 
margins.     
 The next two sections cover the specific theoretical frame for this study.  I am 
interested in institutional, organizational, and policy change in the face of 
representational, agency, and clientele changes; therefore my concern is the public 
organization, not the individual or the group.  The three most important government 
players in the public organization are the legislature, the agency, and the courts.  In this 
chapter I cover the first two, and in chapter three I discuss the legal constraints and 
changes that occurred both prior to, and during, the time period under study.  The neo-
institutionalist perspective forces the researcher to account for the influence of both the 
principal and the agent in what a public organization looks like, and how it evolves over 
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time.  Up to this point, I have revealed a placement of mainstream political theory in the 
service of questions about minority politics, and also, that there are particular lessons 
only minority phenomena can teach democratic theory.  The remainder of this chapter 
presents a consistent theory that negotiates this apparent contradiction. 
 
Legislative Representation and Legislative Control       
 Elected representatives make policy in liberal democracies.  The overwhelming 
majority of these elected officials are legislators, but others include mid-level executives, 
judges, governors, mayors, railroad commissioners, district attorneys, and the President.  
There is a lively debate in the literature about the exact role of executives and judicial 
officials in the policy making process, but there is general agreement that they influence 
every stage of the policy making process to some degree (Segal and Spaeth 1993; Wood 
and Waterman 1994; Moe 1995; Bertelli and Feldman 2004; Carpenter 2001).  The 
discussion of the role of non-legislative actors in the policy process is typically labeled 
“political control of the bureaucracy”6 (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; McCubbins et 
al. 1987), a title that indicates the central role of the legislative body in U.S. politics.   
 A top-down model of legislative dominance is used by minority politics scholars 
to explain the lack of policy influence for Blacks and Latinos in the U.S. over time 
(Swain 1993; Guinier 1994; Kerr and Mladenka 1994; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; 
LeVeaux and Garand 2003).  The theoretical argument is an example of how mainstream 
representation theory can be applied to minority problems, and is fairly straightforward.  
                                                          
6 Also called the “congressional dominance” model, I use the more general political control label to 
highlight the difference between the constellation of “political” actors: the courts, executives, and 
legislatures, and their appointed counterpoints in the bureaucracy.      
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Without representatives that share cultural, physical, and historical characteristics and 
experiences with the minority community, Latino and Black citizens will have little 
access to policy influence, and are less likely to have their preferences included in the 
political process (Pitkin 1967; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Mansbridge 1999).  This 
theoretical relationship is not unique to Blacks and Latinos, but it does rely on the logic 
that class, party, economic, and regional preferences can sometimes be overwhelmed by 
ethnic and racial factors.  That is, for minority voters, the ethnicity and race of a 
candidate or elected official serves as a strong cue about their policy preferences, and 
these preferences are likely to be consistent with those of voters who share the same 
physical and cultural characteristics (Bullock 1984; ).     
 Minority politics scholars and political control scholars share the same 
assumptions about the primacy of legislative influence in the policy process.  When 
Carol Swain (1993) talks about the inability of Black congressional officials to turn their 
legislative seats into policy influence, she is not questioning the power of the legislature, 
indeed she is emphasizing it.  When Grofman et al. (1994) write about the historical 
efforts of Anglos to suppress the Black and Latino vote through electoral manipulation, 
they (and their subjects of study) are reinforcing the power of legislatures to control the 
policy process (4-28).  Epstein and O’Halloran’s (1999) “candidate of choice” argument 
is also predicated on the idea that elected legislative representatives are the key actors in 
enhancing minority political futures.  The indirect use of political control arguments to 
guide minority representation theory suggests that mainstream political theory has much 
to offer the present study.   
 44
 There are two main outcomes of the political control assumptions in the minority 
politics literature.  First, as noted above, there has been a concerted effort to test 
descriptive representation effects for Blacks, and to a lesser extent Latinos (Karnig 1976; 
Robinson and Dye, 1978; Engstrom and McDonald 1981, 1986, 1987; Welch 1990; Kerr 
and Mladenka 1994).  Second, there has been a long tradition of attention to electoral 
structures and vote dilution, and their effects on the minority vote (Key 1984; Browning 
et al. 1984; Davidson 1989; Grofman and Davidson 1992; Davidson and Grofman 1994; 
Grofman et al. 1994; Adams 2000; Behr 2004).  I will review both of these theoretical 
traditions here and in the following chapters, as they provide essential insight into the 
hypotheses of interest.   
 Descriptive representation is normally used to depict politicians who share 
distinct physical traits with their constituencies (Pitkin 1967; although see Mansbridge 
1999).  Early studies of minority representation were predominately concerned with 
descriptive representation because the initial question of electoral impact centered on the 
winning candidates’ ethnicity.  This research agenda questioned whether electoral 
structures, primarily the change from at-large elections to single member district (or 
“ward”) elections, provided added benefits to minority candidates, or whether non-
institutional factors were more important to the process.   
 Early results seemed to indicate that both socio-economic and electoral variables 
were important to black representation (Karnig 1976; Robinson and Dye, 1978), but 
contrary findings challenged this conclusion, downplaying the role of structure in the 
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representative process (Cole 1974; MacManus 1978).7  Later research bolstered the 
former claim, suggesting that not only were at-large electoral arrangements critical to 
black failure at the polls (Davidson and Korbel 1981; Karnig and Welch 1982; Engstrom 
and McDonald 1981, 1986, 1987; Welch 1990) but that these structures were more 
powerful than socio-economic characteristics (Stewart et al. 1989).  The most recent 
studies using data from national samples affirm that these results are generalizable and 
significant (Lublin 1997; Canon 1999); however, they may not hold for other minorities. 
 The outcomes of descriptive representation are varied, but it is generally asserted 
that they are beneficial to minorities.  Mandsbridge (1999) argues that there are 
psychological benefits to having representatives that look like you.  Minorities who see a 
person who looks like them for the first time in a position of political influence begin to 
see possibility and kinship with the political system for the first time (Mansbridge 1999; 
see also Swain 1993, 219).  In terms of mobilization and participation, Leighley (2001) 
maintains that minority officeholders and candidates are more likely to contact and 
attempt to mobilize minority voters than their non-minority counterparts.  Also, Gay 
(2002) finds that Blacks are more likely to contact their representative if the 
representative is also Black.  The main interest in minority descriptive representation, 
however, is that it will translate into substantive representation, or policy outputs that 
favor the minority group (Cameron et al. 1996; Canon 1999; Epstein and O’Halloran 
1999; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Lublin 1997; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Swain 1993).  The 
                                                          
7 The selection structures of interest for this project are appointments (in the national sample), single-
member districts, where each candidate runs for office from a specific ward within the entire district, and 
at-large elections, where all of the candidates running for office face the same voters from the entire 
district.  These variable selection rules will be discussed in detail in chapters four and five.    
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relationship between descriptive and substantive representation has thus become an issue 
of critical importance to scholars who study minority politics. 
 Why would minority representatives not be able to turn their place at the table 
into policy change?  If the political control assumptions underlying the descriptive 
representation arguments are legitimate, then a minority legislative presence should 
translate into policy benefits for minority constituencies.  There are a number of reasons 
why this might not be the case however.  Four impediments are specifically pertinent to 
this study: legislative size, policy diversity, partisan responsibilities, and electoral rules.   
 In large legislative bodies, minority legislators may be severely outnumbered and 
rendered insignificant.  One Black member in the U.S. Senate may be unable to jostle for 
Black policy benefits, and a few minority House members may lack the presence to win 
substantive outcomes in a legislative body with 435 members.  As a simple matter of 
legislative size, minority officials will find their efficacy challenged.  In smaller 
legislative bodies, city councils, commissions, and school boards for example, one or 
two minority members may have a substantial impact on policy because the likelihood 
that they become a pivotal member on a number of issues increases (Canon 1999; 
Leighley 2001, 8).           
 The number of policy responsibilities also has an important impact on the ability 
of minority legislators to respond to particular constituency concerns.  It is difficult to 
gauge whether state or federal representatives have more policy responsibilities, and 
therefore fewer time resources to devote to a single issue.  It is likely, however, that local 
representatives have a less diverse set of policy duties than members of these other 
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bodies, and are able to have a more direct influence on outputs (Berry and Howell 
2005).8  At the level of the school board, there is a much more focused policy agenda, 
ensuring that (minority) members are held accountable for specific outputs.  Put another 
way, constituents elect local board members to attend to a short list of policy goals, and 
if these goals are not attained, it is easier for constituents (and opposing candidates) to 
hold them accountable by removing them from office.  In legislative bodies with larger, 
more diverse policy domains, the ability to hold legislators accountable is lessened.   
 Partisan and non-partisan environments have variable effects on the political 
dynamics of the legislative and voting processes.  Here, we are interested in how a non-
partisan environment may affect the ability of minority members to attend to the 
preferences of their minority constituency in a way that cannot be done in a partisan 
system.  First, a non-partisan election may increase the likelihood of a minority 
candidate being elected because voters are more likely to rely on racial and ethnic 
factors as a cue instead of party (Lieske and Hillard 1984; Pomper 1966, 95-96; Squire 
and Smith 1988).  Second, once in office, a minority office holder may feel cross-
pressured by party and minority preferences in a partisan environment.  Party affiliations 
diversify the constituency of a minority legislator, likely to include non-minority 
members; increasing the number of policy preferences they must address (Lineberry and 
Fowler 1967, 702; Pomper 1966).     
 Perhaps the most influential (certainly the most studied) factor affecting minority 
legislator’s ability to turn seats into policy output change is the electoral structure 
                                                          
8 This speaks to the use of single versus multiple policy spaces to model voter-officeholder relationships.  I 
will briefly discuss the appropriateness of this approach in the next chapter   
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(Adams 2000; Behr 2004; Cameron et al. 1996; Davidson and Grofman 1994; Davidson 
and Korbel 1981; Engstrom and McDonald 1981, 1986, 1987; Epstein and O’Halloran 
1999; Grofman and Davidson 1992; Grofman et al. 1994; Karnig and Welch 1982; 
Swain 1993; Welch 1990).  While partisanship can be considered part of the electoral 
rules, it is generally not measured conjointly with the other institutional features like at-
large vs. single member districts, or appointments.  Scholars are not only interested in 
the presence of a single-member district system, but also how the district lines are drawn 
once implemented (Davidson 1989; Guinier 1994; Swain 1993).  In the following 
chapters I explore the long history of vote dilution and legal challenges in the United 
States that have affected the Texas system, but here I want to briefly cover the more 
general logic to electoral variation and how it specifically affects turning descriptive 
representation into substantive representation.       
 Throughout U.S. history, both majority and minority groups have recognized the 
effects of electoral manipulation on substantive policy outcomes.  Blacks have been 
particularly targeted by literacy tests, grandfather clauses, and physical intimidation, but 
Latinos and other groups have also had their voting rights jeopardized by these tactics 
(Davidson and Grofman 1994; De la Garza 2004; Key 1984).  After years of struggle in 
the courts and in legislatures, these direct devices have been removed, however, 
minorities have still had difficulties achieving both descriptive and substantive 
legislative representation.  Scholarly attention has thus turned to possible indirect 
influences of at-large elections, or gerrymandered districts, on minority “vote dilution” 
(Davidson 1989; Davidson and Grofman 1994; De la Garza and DeSipio 1997).   
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 The relationship between at-large elections and minority representation 
exemplifies the “two-tiered” pluralism argument made by Hero (1992).  Although civil 
rights legislation and court interpretation have rendered direct vote manipulation illegal, 
and no citizen’s right to vote is denied (tier one), electoral outputs and continued policy 
benefit shortages for particular groups suggests that in fact, minorities do not have 
proportional influence on the policy process (tier two).  The potential for minority 
under- representation in at-large elections has been recognized by both legislatures and 
the courts, and the remedial solutions reflect the two-tiered pluralism argument.  That is, 
after recognizing the influence of electoral institutions on individuals, regardless of race, 
ethnicity, historical experience, or culture (a “rational choice” approach if you will), 
particular institutional changes are implemented to remedy the substantive outcomes of 
elections (a potentially unfair, certainly biased remedy that recognizes the unique history 
and culture of particular minority groups).                  
 The primary remedy for minority vote dilution is the single-member district, 
gerrymandered in a way to create at least one “minority opportunity district” (Behr 
2004).  This solution has been used at all levels of government to stunning descriptive 
success (Fraga 1997, 443), but in the translation of these seats into policy, the evidence 
is at least mixed, and perhaps absent (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Lublin 1999; Swain 
1993).   
Swain (1993) contends that “majority-minority” districts may dilute overall 
support for Black policies because Anglo candidates no longer have to contend with 
minority constituencies in their own majority districts.  She notes that Republicans 
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actually helped create many of the black majority districts in the early 1990s in order to 
dilute overall Democratic Party political power (205-206).  Substantial research 
examines Swain’s argument at the national level, but overall the evidence is inconsistent.  
Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran (1996) use national-level data to look at the effect of 
Black representative behavior concerning civil rights votes and find that substantive 
Black political power is reduced as a result of the creation of majority-minority districts.  
They conclude that the use of this type of electoral solution trades descriptive for 
substantive gains, leaving Blacks at a disadvantage in important policy battles.   
 In a more recent study Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) arrive at mixed results 
after examining South Carolina state senate elections.  They find that many majority-
minority districts over represent minorities and hinder policy gains, but without these 
districts minorities risk losing descriptive representation.  David Lublin (1997) uses 
national data and concludes that single member districts severely hinder Black policy 
gains.  He suggests (like Swain, Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran) that the percentage 
of Blacks in majority-minority districts is too high and should be lowered in order to 
promote greater competition in adjacent Republican-controlled seats (Lublin 1999, 119).   
 The evidence supporting positive electoral effects on substantive representation 
includes multi-level and multi-ethnic analyses.  Karnig (1976, 237) explains why we 
would expect to see policy losses from minorities elected in at-large districts: “There 
would likely be a higher incidence of substantively unrepresentative black councilmen in 
at-large cities, where black candidates must appeal to the white electorate in order to 
gain office.  If policy attitudes of Black councilmen are basically the same as white 
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councilmen, major changes in policy outcomes are not likely” (1976, 237).  Stewart et 
al. (1989) test this theory using a national sample of Black school board members and 
affirm that single member structures create more opportunity for Black representation, 
and that this representation translates into more black administrative and teaching 
positions.  Leal et al. (2002) find a similar relationship for Latino school board members, 
administrators, and teachers using a more recent national survey.   
 Canon (1999) examines the U.S. House and finds that single member districts 
increase the quality of black candidates over time.  Also, the structure positively affects 
the way in which these members represent their constituents, noting that these members 
“often provide pivotal votes for passing important legislation, they are forceful 
advocates for black interests in their speeches and sponsorship of legislation, and the 
bills they sponsor are more likely to succeed than those with nonblack sponsors” (245).  
 The concrete theoretical relationship between election rules, descriptive 
representation, and substantive representation will be discussed in chapters four and five, 
in service to specific hypothesis development.  For now, the broader picture is more 
important.  The debate over electoral structure, gerrymandered districts, and substantive 
representation is firmly located within the political control literature.  Legislative actors 
are responsible for policy change, consequently, policy change that favors minorities can 
only come once the “correct” formula for electing minority legislators is found (either 
through the courts or through the scientific study of these structures).  This is the 
assumption shared by all who look into these remedial efforts.   
Secondly, we begin to see how mainstream theory and particular minority 
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experiences might be combined into a generalizable theory of a dynamic policy process.  
If a minority group’s historical experience, culture, and other unique features become 
the reasons for their preference development and their preference ordering, instead of 
post hoc explanations for their political successes and failures, these factors retain their 
importance but lose their position as the unique causal factors in the policy process.  
Political control assumptions are critical to any theory of minority politics and policy 
change, but are they the only piece of the minority politics puzzle?  Majoritarian politics 
cannot answer these questions completely, making the study of minority dynamics in a 
majority environment critical to the development of the theory of political control.     
 
Can the Bureaucracy Substantively “Represent” Anyone  
 The exact position of the public bureaucracy in a representative democracy is 
difficult for scholars to determine.  The original public administration/public policy 
“split” (whether initiated by the authors themselves or later scholars looking for a straw 
man to kick over, see Lynn 2001) was a question about where the bureaucracy fit within 
the democratic process (Goodnow 1900; Weber 1922; Willoughby 1918; Wilson 1887).  
Is the public bureau simply an efficiency machine, borne to do its political master’s 
bidding?  These authors conclude that whether the bureaucracy is a political player or 
not, it should try to best serve the Constitution and the people.  Their main concern is 
with ethics and the efficiency of service; the constitutional questions are to be answered 
by politicians (Wilson 1887, 209-210).   
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 Later scholars challenged this notion by arguing that the bureaucracy is its own 
entity, its own branch of a democratic government, and that questions of efficiency are 
secondary to (or at least on par with) the power of the bureaucracy to fix the problems 
that politicians and special interest groups create.  In many ways, the bureaucracy is a 
buffer between the powerful and the powerless.  Themes of study that fit here include 
representative bureaucracy (Hindera 1993; Meier 1993; Meier and Stewart 1991; Seldon 
1997), bureaucratic politics (Meier 1993; Waldo 1948; Wilson 1989), and much of the 
work on implementation (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983; Pressman and Wildavsky 
1984; Sabatier 1986; Wilson 1887).  From these vantage points, bureaucracy cannot (and 
should not) be perfectly efficient from the point of view of its political masters, because 
it is responsible to its clientele, past coalitions, minority groups, and the public at large 
to protect and represent their interests.   
 Other authors, who lie somewhere between the poles described above, believe 
that the role of the bureaucracy is that of a gateway between the people and their 
politicians.  In this sense, the bureaucracy serves as a dutiful employee of elected 
officials and the law, but at the same time provides information for, and even bargains 
with, its master for more equitable and efficient policy in the interest of the un-elected 
masses.  These studies congregate mostly in the public administration field and include: 
governance studies (Fredrickson and Smith 2003; Hienrich and Lynn 2000; Lynn et al. 
2001; Peters and Pierre 1998), networking (Agranoff and McGuire 1999; Howlett 2002; 
O’Toole 1997; O’Toole and Meier 2002), and the public management and public 
administration fields in general (Kettl 1993; Seidman 1998).   
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Woodrow Wilson (1887, 201) characterizes the early study of public 
administration research; “This is why there should be a science of administration which 
shall seek to straighten the paths of government, to make its business less 
unbusinesslike, to strengthen and purify its organization, and to crown its dutifulness.”  
Clearly Wilson and others of this era were referring to administrative efficiency when 
they spoke of a bureaucracy that was built upon a “more efficient and economical basis” 
(Taylor 1997 (1912); Willoughby 1997 (1918)).9  The stress on creating a more efficient 
government apparatus however, was not predicated on enduring a less democratic public 
agency.  In each, there is a common theme of practice towards the benefit of the 
government or the public good (Goodnow 1997 (1900); Herring 1997 (1936); White 
1997 (1926)).  There is a legalism inherent in these readings that positions the notion of 
efficiency on par with responsiveness and accountability, and leaves other democratic 
values close behind.  The concept of efficiency was not a stand-alone value for early 
public administration scholars or practitioners.   
This view began to change as organizational theory made breakthroughs in the 
study of the private and public firm.  Chester Barnard, Paul Appleby and Herbert Simon 
all played a part in recognizing that the most “efficient” organization of administration 
did not start with a simple hierarchy of authority.  The idea that individual workers had 
different types of leverage over their masters was not new (Taylor 1997; Weber 1922;), 
but the notion that the “firm,” a fixed and agreed upon object, was actually a constant 
                                                          
9 To be clear, the works described in this section define efficiency generally as a proportion of input to 
output (although it can also be defined by economists in an “allocative” sense, but this is more in line with 
what we would term “responsiveness” Boyne 2002).  I argue that this technical definition is not as 
important as the context within which it is made.  In fact, it is this context (the relative weight it is given 
among other democratic values) that defines the difference between some of the literature discussed here.   
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process of negotiation contributed to a rethinking of how public and private 
organizations differed.  Thus, the organizational theory literature had a direct impact on 
how implementation was viewed by social scientists, and added greatly to the demise of 
efficiency as the only explanation of policy failures (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983, 4).   
Terry Moe (1995) explains how public organizations and private organizations 
differ fundamentally (thus diminishing the lesson to be learned from comparing market 
and public efficiency evaluations).  A private firm is organized as a voluntary agreement 
between actors with property rights that cannot be taken away; thus the actors’ 
“organizational problem is a technical one” (Moe 1995, 147).  In a public firm where 
there are multiple principals, the property rights of government power (the authority to 
make decisions that affect both winners and losers of the political game) can be taken 
away at each election.  In order to prevent future coalitions from altering current 
policies, political actors create “complex, restrictive, and often bizarre administrative 
arrangements” (Moe 1995, 147).  This compelling insight leads Moe to conclude 
“[public administration scholars] cannot copy or mimic economic explanation” (147).10   
Implementation scholars had come to this conclusion long before (but they had 
not verbalized the dilemma so concisely), and the consideration of these new problems 
caused a shift in attention from efficiency to other components of democratic 
administration.  Donald Kettl (1993) notes that Paul Appleby and Dwight Waldo were 
among the originators of this broader examination; for them, “efficiency seemed 
unacceptably shallow” (411).  For Appleby, Waldo, and others, efficiency concerns have 
                                                          
10 See also, Lynn et al. 2001 Chapter 2, for a similar discussion of the differences between private and 
public structures.     
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little purchase in the public sphere because the most efficient method of service delivery 
can usually be found, however these solutions often show little regard for politics, 
justice, accountability and equity (Fredrickson and Smith 2003, 43-48; Meier 1987, 6-7).  
Thus, implementation came to focus on the political and environmental constraints faced 
by agencies in the public sphere, rather than on the simpler notion of efficient 
administration.  As a result, the implementation field exploded during this time (Kettl 
1993; Linder and Peters 1987; O’Toole 2000).   
The discussion between traditional public policy/public administration scholars 
and institutionalist theorists created an opportunity for the development of a blended 
theory of public organizations.  Taking into account the enormous amount of political 
(i.e. institutional) control over public agencies, combined with the variable amount of 
agency influence on the policy making process, neo-institutionalists describe a more 
endogenous relationship than their predecessors.  Neo-institutionalism is a general label 
for an array of approaches that treats the rules of the game as important constraints on 
the behavior of actors in a setting.  Fredrickson and Smith (2003, 69) characterize the 
state of public policy and public administration scholarship with this, “Today we are all 
institutionalists.”  This brand of institutionalism is “new” in the sense that it comes after 
the behavioral revolution, and reflects the insights of behavioralists and organizational 
theorists (March and Olson 1984, 738).  Beyond this, the framework reasserts the 
autonomy of institutions as the driving force behind much of the political behavior we 
observe, and looks very similar to the old institutionalist orthodoxy (March and Olson 
1984).  The difference between this theoretical version and the old institutionalism is 
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relevant because it lays the groundwork for the hypothesis development in the following 
chapters.   
 Decision theory, and organizational theory in general (especially the 
contributions of economists), added to the rise of institutions in the modern sense (Coase 
1938; Cyert and March 1959; Hill and Hupe 2002, 32-40; North 1993; Powell and 
DiMaggio 1991; Simon 1947; Williamson 1975).  The main break from the past is that 
previous policy and administration scholars treated institutions as fixed objects that 
produce outcomes on their own.  Neo-institutionalists are also concerned with how 
institutions are manipulated by actors (both within and outside of the institution) to 
produce outcomes (Ostrom 1990; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Schlager and Blomquist 
1996).   
 Terry Moe (1984; 1985) demonstrates why this new approach is so valuable.  
Because political actors are only allowed temporary “property rights” to make policy, 
they try to formalize their preferences in order to keep future coalitions from changing 
them (Moe 1985).  Rules, laws, executive orders, and even monuments are the formal 
representations of values (preferences) of past coalitions (see also Wood and Waterman 
1994, 127).  The institution itself does not do anything, rather it is the actions of 
individuals (or coalitions) who are beholden to these institutions that matter (Cyert and 
March 1959).  For example, Congress as an institution does not pass laws; rather it is the 
activities of the individual members who have all pledged an oath of conduct (stating 
they agree on the rules of the game, i.e. the Constitution) that we refer to when we talk 
about Congress as an institution.  The broad coalition of support for the rules of the 
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game (not to mention the use of force that backs it up)11 is what keeps the institution of 
Congress alive and well.  To build a coalition that does not agree with the rules of the 
game (to dissolve Congress) is an option that is off the equilibrium path, but is 
nevertheless an option.   
 What does this have to do with minority politics?  A neo-institutionalist approach 
allows us to develop hypotheses about three specific issues pertinent to the policy 
process and the minority role in it.  First, the political control literature emphasizes the 
role of institutions and legislative actors in producing policy outcomes that benefit (or 
hinder) minorities.  Thus, minority scholars who study the influence of electoral rules 
and descriptive representation on substantive outcomes are examining the major 
theoretical strain of the neo-institutionalist perspective.  Second, bureaucratic 
representation and implementation studies are of considerable importance to 
understanding the policy process.  The role of the agent in providing information, using 
her discretion to potentially change policy, and even influencing who gets elected to 
legislative seats is generally overlooked by political control scholars.  The minority role 
in the bureaucracy can provide substantial leverage on these questions.  The third related 
issue is institutional change.  Neo-institutionalism speaks directly to the possible 
temporary nature of the rules of the game.  Instead of assuming that electoral structures 
are exogenous, this perspective allows us to hypothesize a role for the agent in 
institutional change.  For minority communities, the resources and information that 
bureaucratic employment provides may be critical in promoting legislative institutional 
                                                          
11 This is important, because it details the difference between public institutions (those that can be backed 
up by the force of the state) and other types of “private” institutions (Fredrickson and Smith 2003, 74).   
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change.  That is, low resource minority groups who face substantial majority roadblocks 
in the electoral and legislative arenas may find that they have considerable influence in 
the bureaucracy and the courts.       
 As stand alone theories, bureaucratic representation and political control are on 
shaky ground; each has its shortcomings.  The problem with a theory of bureaucratic 
representation is that bureaucrats are appointed specifically to implement policy, not 
create, or alter it in a manner that diverges from legislative intent (McCubbins et al. 
1987; McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).  Theories of the bureaucracy however, have 
repeatedly recognized the power of the bureaucratic agent to use her discretion in a 
manner that can influence the policy process (Brehm and Gates 1997; Coleman et al. 
1998; Mosher 1968; Hindera and Young 1998).  But this discretionary power by itself is 
not proof of representation, indeed it is a key ingredient to the process of legislative 
control.  Bureaucrats are vital information providers for their legislative masters, and in 
an ideal relationship they are a neutral mechanism, insulated from the strategic political 
maneuverings of legislative politics (Taylor 1997; Weber 1922; Wilson 1887). 
 One difficulty with accepting political control arguments whole cloth is that they 
are typically applied to, and tested, at the federal level (Carpenter 2001; McCubbins et 
al. 1987; Moe 1984; Weingast and Moran 1983; Wood and Waterman 1994;).  While 
there is little doubt that the political control arguments will eventually be demonstrated 
at the state and local levels as well, these other levels of government are of particular 
interest for minority scholarship because it is here where minority groups have easier 
access to the policy process, and because state and local policies are generally more 
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salient to minority communities.  The political control arguments need to be examined at 
the local level in particular because it is here where less experienced politicians come 
into contact with experienced interests in the bureaucracy and clientele (Tucker and 
Ziegler 1980).  If minority groups are finding alternative avenues of policy influence 
(distinct from legislative representation), it will be observed at the local level.  
Moreover, the role of the “representative” agent in theories using political control may 
be absolutely critical to their validation.  Over time, legislative fire alarms and police 
patrols develop as a reaction to both anticipated and unforeseen influences; one of these 
is the power of the bureaucratic agent to affect policy in a variety of ways.  Perhaps, 
sometimes bureaucrats get want they want (in a way that differs from legislative 
preferences), and other times, possibly, legislatures change the rules of the game to 
prevent this from happening.  Either way, bureaucrats play a decisive role in the process 
of institutional and policy change.        
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CHAPTER III 
THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
 The Houston Independent School District in Houston, Texas is unlike most other 
school districts in the United States.  Its size (209,000 students), racial composition (80 
percent Black and Latino students), and budget (over one billion dollars for the 2004-
2005 school year) make it one of the most complex local public organizations in the 
United States (HISD 2005).  With all of these unique features however, HISD has been 
traditionally ordinary in terms of minority representation at the legislative and 
bureaucratic levels.  Although only one out of ten students in the district is Anglo, four 
of the nine current school board members are Anglo (HISD 2005).  The district’s first 
Black superintendent, Rod Paige, was not appointed until 1994, and helped recruit the 
district’s first permanent Latino superintendent, Abe Saavedra, in 2001 (Saavedra took 
the lead position in late 2004).  The only exceptional feature of these disproportionate 
numbers is that they are much better than most other school districts in the state and in 
the nation.     
 Like other private and public organizations reaching their first “firsts” in terms of 
racial minority leadership, HISD officials simultaneously celebrated and disdained the 
racial nature the appointment of Abe Saavedra to the superintendent post.  Board 
member Dianne Johnson stated, “A lot of media will portray your appointment today as 
a symbolic achievement for HISD, but my view is that in hiring Dr. Saavedra, we have 
chosen a first-rate educator” (Houston Chronicle 6/23/2004).  Indeed, Dr. Saavedra 
himself was quick to pull this maneuver on the day of the appointment.  “I think I offer a 
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certain level of sensitivity to (the Hispanic) culture, to those issues.  But quite frankly, 
the needs of this district are real for all kids, not just Hispanic kids.  And I intend to be 
superintendent for all kids” (Click2Houston.com 12/9/2004).  In separate comments, he 
continued, “I don’t necessarily believe that only a Hispanic person can meet the needs of 
Hispanic children, but I do believe that an individual who is Hispanic and knows the 
culture is able to offer a sensitivity to some of their challenges and problems” (Houston 
Chronicle 12/8/04).   
 Many of the interested parties in the process saw Saavedra’s appointment as a 
Hispanic, as symbolic, significant, and timely.  “Because he is Hispanic, because he is 
one of us, he should understand when we have the problems and he should understand 
that we should get these problems resolved as quickly as possible” commented William 
Morris of the Hispanic Policy Action Center (Click2Houston.com 12/9/2004).  Unlike 
HISD officials, Morris was free to expand upon what he meant, without resorting to 
coded language, “Having someone that looks like you, speaks like you—to some degree, 
eats the same things that you do—but in doing that, you should understand my problem” 
(Click2Houston.com 12/9/2004).   
 What do these sentiments mean in terms of Dr. Saavedra’s role as 
superintendent?  As a bureaucrat, an unelected executive, Saavedra is theoretically under 
the control of the school board that appointed him.  It appears as though the growing 
Latino population in Houston prefers a bureaucrat who looks like them, and will 
presumably be supportive of their preferences.  If this is the case, then the school board 
was being responsive to the preferences of the public in selecting Saavedra to helm the 
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district.  Had they selected another Anglo there may have been consequences in the next 
election.   
 It may be too easy to place Dr. Saavedra in this role alone however.  As a 
bureaucrat, he has been delegated enormous discretion on how to implement school 
district policy and must do so with the cooperation of parents, students, and interest 
groups.  If they are not on board with his policies, then producing substantive outputs 
and outcomes becomes difficult.  With their support however, Dr. Saavedra could move 
mountains, and potentially school board members.  That is, should Saavedra convince 
the public that his preferred implementation strategy is the best way to increase 
organizational efficiency and effectiveness, and should these preferences be at odds with 
the school board, it is conceivable that his influence could affect future electoral 
outcomes.  These are not abstract possibilities.  These are the conditions under which 
public education in the United States operates.     
 This chapter links the theoretical arguments made in chapter two with the 
empirical tests developed in chapters four and five.  Specifically, I describe the 
education system in the United States in a broad sense by defining the roles of each local 
political actor and explaining how these different roles can provide Latino individuals 
opportunities to act “politically.”  Secondly, the two datasets are presented in detail, 
providing an initial description of the political state of Latino education in at the turn of 
the 21st century.  The national and Texas datasets are uniquely suited to test the inputs 
and outcomes of minority influence in the local policy arena.  Lastly, the role of the 
courts is illustrated with a brief discussion of how different interpretations of the Voting 
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Rights Act of 1965 reversed Progressive electoral reforms from a century earlier, and 
lead to great gains in descriptive Latino representation.        
 
Education in the United States 
 The U.S. public education system is atypical among most developed democracies 
in terms of localized policy control.  Its system is one of the most decentralized of the 
Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) nations because 
throughout its history, almost all funding (for buildings, textbooks, teachers’ pay, etc.) 
has been in the hands of local school districts, counties, and states (Postlethwaite 1988; 
701-703; Smith and Marcano 2000; 22-23).12  State education agencies, local school 
boards, and their superintendents also have control over the choice of curriculum, 
textbooks, and school personnel (Postlethwaite 1988; 702; Tucker and Zeigler 1980).  
Further, lower level bureaucrats like principals and teachers have a large amount of 
discretion in their schools and classrooms compared to those in other nations.13  It is 
primarily this local discretion that separates public education in the United States from 
arrangements in other countries.   
 It is possible that the organization of the U.S. education system is a product of 
the nation’s political structure, and that organizational variation across all countries 
could in part be explained by different institutional incentives (as opposed to culture, 
                                                          
12 This is of course changing with the NCLB Act, producing political battles that validate the use of the 
political control perspective in education policy.    
13 For instance, Japanese teachers are all trained (through a process of certification much different than the  
U.S. state system) with uniform methods to teach in a manner consistent with the pragmatic vision of the 
central government (Kamijo 382).                       
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ideology, historical accidents, etc.).  The historical formation of the U.S. system and its 
ties to political incentives are not central to this study; however they do speak to why 
this particular policy area may be susceptible to minority and bureaucratic political 
influences that others are not.   
 Bertelli and Lynn (2004) use mental health policy in the United States to 
examine differences between principal-agent relationships in regulatory and welfare 
policy areas.  They claim that “as with virtually all public policies concerning social 
service provision, mental health policy originated in local, charitable, responses to 
human need” (Bertelli and Lynn 2004, 175; see also Meier et al. 2003).  Human service 
policy (including education)14 is thus characterized by: 1) difficult ideological decisions 
on what outputs are good for which clientele (or “controversial moral judgments”), 2) 
“selective inducements to stakeholders with private interests in service provision,” and 
3) “discretionary judgments by professionals and experts who value autonomy and may 
have strong ideological orientations” (Bertelli and Lynn 2004, 167).  Stated less 
formally, education policy, as with other human service provision, involves ideological 
and moral debate about what a “good” democratic education actually entails (Ravitch 
2000; Tyack and Cuban 1996), a large amount of bargaining with, and provision of 
“goodies” to, interest groups in the school district to overcome collective action 
problems, and a large amount of delegated discretion to low and mid-level bureaucrats 
(experts).   
                                                          
14 For work on education as a human service policy, see Wilson (1989);  For work on the history of 
education and the development of the local system, see Briffault (2005); Ravitch (2000) Tyack and Cuban 
(1995); Hirschland and Steinmo (2003) 
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 Bertelli and Lynn (2004) use this perspective to examine mental health policy 
from a common agency framework, specifying when and how policy change and 
institutional change occurs in these policy areas.  They identify two important factors in 
the policy change process: the presence of new groups in the policy system and a change 
in “influence technologies” (Bertelli and Lynn 2004, 174-175).  These factors coincide 
with the discussion of minority groups in the education system presented here.  That is, 
when new preference groups enter the system, or when they are granted new tools with 
which to influence the policy process (electoral change or court mandated influence), 
educational outputs may shift substantially.  Bertelli and Lynn’s approach however treats 
the bureau as a “preference congealing governmental structure” not a separate interest 
group (2004, n.15).  This is a critical assumption that is challenged in other work, and 
indeed is one of the key arguments for and against the idea of bureaucratic 
representation.  Beyond this specific theoretical difference however, it is clear that 
human service provision like public education is characterized from other policy areas 
by the ability of new interest groups to have a substantial impact on policy and 
institutional change, given the right circumstances.      
 Meier et al. (2003) directly challenge the assumption of bureaucratic neutrality in 
non-regulatory arenas like education policy.  In the tradition of policy studies in general, 
(see Horn 1995; Pressman and Wildavsky 1979; Rourke 1984) the authors differentiate 
the top-down perspective of regulatory policy control from more mutable welfare 
policies, as Bertelli and Lynn (2004) do.  Meier et al. (2003) however, feature the 
powerful role of the bureaucracy in these unique environments, rather than assuming it 
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away.  Brehm and Gates also emphasize the substantial role played by low and mid-level 
bureaucrats in agencies that produce information rather than material public goods 
(1997, 192).  Monitoring what these agencies actually produce proves to be difficult; 
“the supervisor has a much more difficult time assessing ‘how much’ or ‘how 
efficiently’ a given subordinate produces.  That is, even if the subordinate’s production 
were fully visible with zero monitoring costs, production is itself ambiguous.” (Brehm 
and Gates 1997, 192).   
 Combining the bureaucratic representation perspective with the idea of common 
agency in human service provision suggests that in particular environments, bureaucrats 
can potentially act like interest groups and influence policy using their information 
advantages, their expertise, their discretion to produce ambiguous outcomes, and their 
relationship with the clientele to create policy change.  And it is not just in their 
relationship with their direct political masters.  In the United States, because local 
education legislators are elected, low and mid-level bureaucrats also carry substantial 
weight with clientele on what is being produced, who is at fault for ineffective delivery, 
and who should be held accountable.  Teachers and administrators play a variety of roles 
in the election process as well.  They are cue-givers, agenda setters, and in some cases, 
they may make up a large part of the election-day turnout.  These roles will be discussed 
below, but first, if we want to apply the bureaucratic representation perspective we must 
show that education policy is difficult to monitor at the local level.                                      
 The delegation (or abdication) of education policy to local actors in the United 
States may be a result of the high degree of co-production of outcomes in this policy 
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area, and the technical difficulty in determining responsibility for policy success or 
failure.  That is, because of the ambiguity in the production of non-material goods, and 
because of the inherent ideological pluralism that defines public education in the U.S.,  
legislators may delegate a larger amount of discretion to bureaucrats than would be 
expected in other agencies.  This ambiguity springs from multiple factors.  Education 
outputs, in any society, are a conglomeration of student, parent, teacher, school, and 
community recourses (including political, economic, and ideological factors).  In a 
heterogeneous ideological and economic environment, these factors are even further 
varied and less predictable. 
 How does one gauge educational success?  It might be assessed using student test 
scores, graduation rates, parent satisfaction, student success on the job market or dropout 
rates. But each of these measures contains inputs from the individual student, the 
teacher, community resources, school board members, the superintendent, and 
potentially even school security guards and janitors.  This is common in human service 
provision (See Wilson 1989, 168-171 on “coping organizations”).  The client is a co-
producer of the policy output and their compliance with the agency is critical to what 
types of outcomes are observed.  When teachers do not have the cooperation of the 
students, the co-production does not function optimally.  Similarly, when a 
superintendent does not have the support of the community (or particular groups within 
the community) he has a harder time getting parents involved in the inherently 
cooperative nature of production.   
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 Returning to the Abe Saavedra story in Houston, as the new face of the school 
district Saavedra was engaged in this process with stakeholders early on.  Facing a 
largely Black audience at Yates High School, Saavedra was surprised by the animosity 
expressed towards the possibility of handing over these underperforming schools to 
outside groups.  “I did not anticipate (their fierce reaction)” Dr. Saavedra said afterwards 
(Houston Chronicle 2/25/05).  “I did anticipate challenges and the need to put more 
information out.  (But) the level of response we got was a complete surprise to me” 
(Houston Chronicle 2/25/05).   
 In their first meeting with the Latino bureaucrat, Blacks in the Yates area 
expressed their displeasure with his handling of recent cheating investigations and 
reform schemes (Houston Chronicle 2/25/05).  The parents were deciding whether to 
expend cooperative or non-cooperative resources towards Mr. Saavedra (in a real sense, 
deciding whether to “work” or “shirk”).  “The jury is still out” said former NAACP 
president Howard Jefferson, “It is up to him and the actions he takes that will determine 
how the African-American community, Hispanic, white, Asian all feel.  It’s not on the 
best of terms right now” (Houston Chronicle 2/25/05).  Another seasoned elected Black 
official, State Representative Sylvester Turner, had this advice for Saavedra, “Before 
you can make sweeping changes, you have to take time to get all of the stakeholders to 
buy into your plan…But if you try to move too quickly, unilaterally without getting the 
stakeholders to buy in, you are going to get resistance” (Houston Chronicle 2/25/05).     
 Because of the indefinite assessment environment in education, and the degree to 
which clientele shirking can affect bureaucratic outcomes, I argue that bureaucratic 
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neutrality is a suspect concept in education policy.  That is, teachers and administrators 
have more control in this policy space than other agents in other public organizations.15    
Tucker and Zeigler stress this point in their innovative study of school boards 
Professionals Versus the Public: Attitudes, Communication, and Response in School 
Districts (1980).  Elected school board members operate at a severe disadvantage to the 
professional educators and administrators who redefine democratic responsiveness in a 
manner as to make the term irrelevant (Tucker and Zeigler 1980, 5-6).  From this 
perspective, bureaucrats use their expertise and information advantages to redefine their 
own preferences as those of the clientele, post-hoc.        
 The sentiments of hope in the appointment of Abe Saavedra reflect the inherent 
co-productive nature of education policy (and social welfare policy more generally).  
Pressure from minority parent and community groups may have lead to Saavedra’s 
appointment, but these co-producers are just as willing to flex their cooperative muscle 
should he not do their bidding.  These clients did not want a neutral bureaucrat to do the 
school board’s wishes because the school board explicitly delegated this representative 
policy role to the bureaucracy.  The appointment of Saavedra and other minority 
bureaucrats is seen as a substantive benefit for minority clientele, not simply for reasons 
of patronage, but because education policy is unique in its susceptibility to minority 
influence at multiple points in the implementation process.  Without bureaucratic 
representation, clientele stakeholders will shirk, and policy outputs will decline as 
                                                          
15 It should be repeated here that the NCLB directly addresses these ambiguity issues, as well as the nature 
of measuring who is responsible for failures.  It remains to be seen whether it actually sheds light on some 
of these issues, or simply burdens a politically convenient opponent to libertarian privatization reforms.         
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parents, students and community groups wait to be convinced that their preferences are 
being represented.                    
 If any public policy is susceptible to bureaucratic representation in the United 
States, it is public education.  This is due to the high degree of decentralization of policy 
control, the inherent nature of cooperative production of outcomes, the localized nature 
of legislative representation, and because of the particular features of human service 
provision that constrain the ability of elected officials to control agents.  All of these 
factors make it likely that minority groups with new preferences can enter the 
bureaucracy, and influence both policy and the rules of the game.  To what extent this 
occurs is unknown however, and must be addressed empirically.  The next sections 
describe the exact role of the main actors at the local level and also provide a descriptive 
picture of the two data sets I use for the analyses that follow. 
 
Legislators: School Board Members 
 School board members are locally elected legislators with responsibility for 
every general area of policy in the school district.  They decide on the school calendar, 
what qualifications teachers will have, which buildings will get capital improvement 
funding, write budgets, create academic standards, and refine the curriculum (Berry and 
Howell 2005; Tucker and Zeigler 1980).  In cooperation with the superintendent, school 
board members deal with state and federal mandates and incentives, bargain with other 
public stakeholders as well as interest groups outside of the formal public organization 
(Tucker and Zeigler 1980, 7).  This large amount of responsibility is surprisingly handed 
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over to laypeople whose primary qualification is residence in the school district.  These 
members are mothers, fathers, former teachers, businesspeople, and other inexperienced 
politicians.  Statistics for school board candidate characteristics are rare, but some 
indication can be gleaned from figures for Chicago in the 1990’s (Catalyst 1998).  
During this time period, roughly 20 percent of the school board candidates were former 
teachers, 23 percent were “community” members, and 57 percent were parents (Catalyst 
1998).  The same statistics show that open seats in this urban district are typically 
uncontested, hovering around 1.5 candidates per seat (Catalyst 1998).   
 This picture of local control is celebrated as one of the last vestiges of pure 
democracy in the United States (Campbell 2005; Tucker and Zeigler 1980).  While many 
school board members (particularly in larger urban districts) are highly educated, 67 
percent had college degrees in 2000, most have very little expertise in a policymaking 
role (Carr 2003).  These laypeople are charged with selecting agents who are more 
experienced than they are, have typically been in the system longer, and resent any 
intrusion on how children should be educated (Carr 2003; Tucker and Zeigler 1980).  
This paradoxical relationship between the people and the experts is a direct by-product 
of the localized delegation of authority by the states (Briffault 2005; Tucker and Zeigler 
1980), and reflects the historical development of other human service provision policies 
(Bertelli and Lynn 2004).           
 Tucker and Zeigler (1980) present a strong case for bureaucratic control of 
educational policy.  Their study examines the preferences of board members, 
administrators, community elites, and the public in eleven U.S. school districts (Tucker 
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and Zeigler 1980).  The authors compare the survey preferences of each group with 
measures of policy responsiveness and find that school district policy is dominated by 
district bureaucrats, not the public.  Even though local board members are elected, few 
voters bother to show up.  While board meetings are open to the public, the 
superintendent and other bureaucrats get to set the agenda and counter balance public 
perception with their expert testimony.  School board members do select these 
bureaucrats, but it is often with the advice and consent of administrators already in the 
system (in the case of Abe Saavedra, he was handpicked by a previous superintendent 
Rod Paige).  In every area of discretion, board members are heavily influenced by 
teacher and administrative input (Tucker and Zeigler 1980, 229-233).  While board 
members have de jure authority over the entirety of school district policy, suggesting a 
strong top-down policy flow, “the superintendent and other professional administrators 
consistently dominate the lay school board and public…largely because the latter abstain 
from participation” (Tucker and Zeigler 1980, 229-230).  This is the question that 
dominates the present study.  Do minority school board members make a difference on 
policy that responds to their constituency interests, or does the process work in the 
opposite direction?    
 If in fact Tucker and Zeigler are wrong, or perhaps if conditions have changed 
since the mid-seventies, there are a number of institutional factors that may contribute to 
top-down influence from minority legislative representation.  The size of the school 
board is of particular concern for this study, as it pertains to the ability of one or two 
members to influence policy.  School boards typically consist of seven members, but 
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their size can range from five to twenty.  Compared to the legislative bodies at the state 
and federal levels, the ability of one member to bargain, logroll, or otherwise influence 
their counterparts is enhanced greatly.  In an interview with a Latino former 
superintendent of two Texas school districts, I was told that strategic voting was the 
modus operandi for Latino members on an Anglo board; “They are the jokers in the 
deck,” “a wildcard” on any issue (Manzano 2005).  This strategy of survival, in terms of 
the electorate as well as fellow board members, is made easier by the likelihood that one 
Latino will be pivotal on most votes because of small numbers.                               
 A second condition that contributes to greater individual influence on these 
bodies concerns the range of policies they consider.  Berry and Howell (2005) argue that 
unlike multiple function governments, school boards are amazingly policy uni-
dimensional.  In response to Fiorina’s claim that “few elections can be treated as free-
standing decisions on a single issue,” Berry and Howell argue that this characterization 
defines many local level elections (Fiorina, quoted in Berry and Howell 2005, 7).  They 
state, “The job responsibilities of school board members…are reasonably well-defined—
certainly more so than mayors or city council members, much less governors, Senators, 
or presidents” (Berry and Howell 2005, 7).           
 The smaller policy responsibility of school board members does two things.  
First, it makes elections much clearer events for voters.  “In the context of school board 
elections, however, (other) problems evaporate as issue spaces collapse onto a single 
function.  A successful tenure on school boards ultimately reduces to demonstrated 
improvements in student learning” (Berry and Howell 2005, 11).  Because bureaucrats 
 75
are insulated from the wrath of voters, even though they may have a greater influence on 
student outcomes, school board members “must face the full brunt of voter discontent 
when student performance slips” (Berry and Howell 2005, 12).  Thus, parents who are 
unhappy with school performance can hold their elected officials responsible to a greater 
degree than they can with state or federal legislators.            
 Secondly, minority school board members are able to focus their constituency 
preferences into every aspect of policy.  Without the cross-pressures of a multiple policy 
space, members can ask, “Is this decision good for my (minority) community?”  Thus, 
modeling funding, curriculum, and hiring decisions on a single policy dimension (Latino 
versus Anglo for example) is justifiable and seemingly consistent with the real-world 
rationale employed by both legislators and voters alike.  This is certainly not the case in 
other local, state and federal governing bodies.   
 
Bureaucrats: Administrators and Teachers 
Administrators 
 The role of the school board, although constrained, is fairly clear in a public 
policy arena like education, however, the role of the bureaucracy is less certain.  
Obviously, superintendents, assistant superintendents, principals, assistant principals, 
and other administrative staff have clearly defined job descriptions, but their 
discretionary influence lies in their interaction with the school board and public (a large 
part of their delegated role).  Administrators are formally charged with recruiting and 
hiring teachers, cafeteria staff, janitors, and other street level agents.  These hires are 
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made with the approval of the school board, but can be framed in terms of district needs.  
That is, if administrators prefer to hire more certified staff, they can frame the problem 
in terms of budget constraints and class size reduction.  If these agents prefer to hire 
more minority teachers (at a higher cost perhaps), they can frame the problem in terms 
of student performance and communication, as well as parent/teacher interface.   
 Many of the hiring decisions in Texas have to do with labor supply and 
teacher/client communication.  In my interview with Jose Manzano I learned that a big 
issue with Anglo teachers in Latino schools is that they have a very difficult time 
speaking to Latino parents due to language and cultural differences.  This problem was 
highlighted in another interview with an Anglo Denver middle school teacher.  He stated 
that many times he couldn’t work with a student’s parents because they simply could not 
understand him.  Given the large role of the parents and students in the co-production of 
educational outputs, this language and culture gap could be highly detrimental to student 
performance.   
 To counter this problem, many Texas school districts recruit new teachers from 
largely Latino districts, and have recently begun to recruit heavily from Mexican 
Universities.  Mr. Manzano said that this was a major administrative problem in his 
Latino district.  Much of his work involved the retention of quality Latino teachers who 
were being cherry-picked by larger and better funded bureaucracies.  The market for 
quality Latino labor in Texas is tight, and recruitment and hiring is an authentic policy 
choice made by administrators and/or school board members.  The question is, do Latino 
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board members or administrators have any real (or differential) effect on this process, or 
is it being driven by other factors instead?                       
 
Teachers 
 Teachers are street-level bureaucrats (Brehm and Gates 1997; Lipsky 1980).  
Their job is to implement the curriculum of the district in a manner that is consistent 
with school board and administrative preferences.  These bureaucrats, to an extent, are 
selected on type based on their education and a certification process that further ensures 
that they do not change policy once in the classroom.  But the nature of education 
production requires a high level of discretion in the classroom.  This discretion is 
fundamental to the job.  Their expertise lies in their ability (or preference) to give 
attention to particular children, track and grade students based on their expert judgment, 
and communicate with parents constantly (Meier and Sewart 1991).  In a top-down 
world, teachers are selected on type, and constrained by the district to apply their 
discretion in a manner consistent with district policy.   
 This is not the only role of a teacher however.  Like other bureaucrats these 
individuals have the opportunity to work, shirk, or sabotage the efforts of their superiors 
(Brehm and Gates 1997).  Unlike the top-down perspective, a bottom-up frame stresses 
teachers’ ability to influence policy churn (Hess 1999), set agendas (Chubb and Moe 
1990), and use their discretion in a manner inconsistent with particular racial and ethnic 
clientele preferences (Meier and Stewart 1991).  This capability is substantial, if not 
legendary, in the teaching profession.  Given the high turnover rate of superintendents 
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(Hess 1999), the relative security of teaching jobs, and their sheer numbers, it is 
theoretically possible for these low-level bureaucrats to shirk and sabotage their way into 
selecting administrators they prefer.   
 Teacher interaction with the public is another potential source of influence.  As 
voters in school board elections, teachers can serve as substantial cue-givers and even 
swing voters.  Terry Moe is currently examining the considerable influence of the 
teachers’ unions on electing candidates to office in California (Moe 2002).  While Texas 
is a non-union state, it is still possible that organized and informed minority teachers 
could serve the same function in that state.  If this group is unhappy with the policies of 
Anglo or Black administrators and school board officials, they have the opportunity to 
campaign for a public supported regime change.         
 The ambiguous nature of education outputs favors the teacher and administrator 
in this process.  While they want to educate children, they also want to do it at lower 
personal costs for more pay, and will make sure that this becomes part of the information 
packet they provide to clientele (Chubb and Moe 1990; Hanushek 1998).  Erik 
Hanushek, who studies the effects of class-size reduction on student outcomes, 
concludes, “In essence, nobody’s job or economic rewards depend on what happens with 
student performance…One appeal of simple class size policies for many current actors 
in the system is that they maintain the existing structure of schools while simply adding 
more resources” (my emphasis; 1998, 35-36).  Hanushek implies that the importance of 
class size to parents has more to do with the preferences of teachers rather than any real-
world evidence of their effect on students.  It is in light of this power that Latino teacher 
 79
influence on demographic changes to administrative and school board positions must be 
explored empirically.   
 Indeed, their influence may even extend to the rules of the game.  Is it possible 
that minority teachers and administrators who are frustrated with a lack of representation 
on the school board might be able to change how these legislators are elected?  This 
issue will be taken up in chapter five, however first we must understand how electoral 
changes occur more generally.   
                 
Local Election Institutions: The Influence of the Courts  
 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) was a watershed event for Black civil 
rights.  The legislation removed formal barriers to the voting booth, and stands out as 
one of the major federal policy shifts in American history.  The VRA was targeted 
initially to Southern areas with a history of voter discrimination against African-
Americans, providing substantial statutory relief for groups seeking electoral reform.  In 
terms of electing Black leaders to local, state, and federal office, the VRA has been an 
unqualified success (its substantive participatory and policy effects are still being 
debated however), but Latinos were forced to wait for future legislation and the courts in 
order to reap the same benefits.     
 The variation in election rules under investigation here are tied directly to the 
VRA’s history as it pertains to Latinos.  De la Garza and DeSipio explain that Latinos 
(and other language minorities) were not considered a priority of the VRA until the 1975 
extension (1997, 74).  In fact, Latino input on the legislation was nonexistent until the 
 80
1982 extensions where Congress initiated the “effects” standard for proving 
discrimination (de la Garza and DeSipio 1997).  This standard, a direct response to the 
Supreme Court’s “intent” precedent set forth in City of Bolden v. Mobile in 1980, made 
the process of pushing for electoral reform easier for minority groups (de la Garza and 
DeSipio 1997).  In 1986, the Supreme Court supported the drawing of racially 
gerrymandered districts in Thornberg v Gingles when a violation of section 2 of the 
VRA was found (de la Garza and DeSipio 1997; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).  This 
was seen as another victory for minority groups seeking redress at the polls.     
 Section 2 pertains to vote dilution rather than direct voter intimidation or vote 
denial, and has been the focus of litigation and legislation since the late seventies 
(Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).  In Thornberg v. Gingles the Court stated that a violation 
of section 2 of the VRA occurred when “(1) the minority group in question is 
‘sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority of a single 
member district’; (2) the minority group is ‘politically cohesive’; and (3) the white 
majority votes ‘sufficiently as a bloc to enable it…usually to defeat the minority’s 
preferred candidate’” (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, 368).  With these guidelines in 
hand, cartographers went to work to create and redraw district lines, with the full support 
of the federal government and courts (Behr 2004, 34)    
 The Thornberg v. Gingles guidelines were valuable to local level reform in the 
1980’s and early 1990’s, when changes from at-large to single-member ward elections 
flourished (Behr 2004, 34).  The effect of this and other court decisions placed heavy 
burdens on the election district, as many lawsuits were settled out of court and many 
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jurisdictions switched from at-large to ward systems in anticipation of costly (and 
apparently fruitless from their standpoint) legal battles (Behr 2004, 34-36).  The 
combination of section 2 (coverage), section 5 (pre-clearance), and the 1990 census 
created an environment where Latino interests finally had substantial influence on the 
choice of election structure at the local level.   
 The mid-nineties changed this environment drastically.  A series of court 
decisions deemphasized the use the race and ethnicity in the process of creating single-
member districts (Behr 2004; Brockington et al. 1998; Cameron et al 1996; Hill 1995).  
Shaw v. Reno (1993) and Miller and Johnson (1995) addressed the strangely shaped 
districts created to ensure minorities their “candidate of choice” (Epstein and O’Halloran 
1999) and the use of race as the primary factor in this decision, respectively 
(Brockington et al. 1998).    Shaw v. Hunt (1996), and Bush v. Vera (1996) further de-
legitimized the purely racial nature of electoral manipulation by finding different 
redistricting plans in violation of the equal protection clause (Brockington et al. 1998, 
1109).  The stream of change from at-large to single member districts during the 70’s, 
80’s, and early 90’s lost momentum, and this de facto moratorium continues to the 
present day.                              
 The exact nature of local electoral variation will be discussed in chapters four 
and five, but there are a few remaining institutional factors that require attention.  For the 
most part, local school board elections are nonpartisan affairs, denying citizens a 
valuable cue in the voting process (Behr 2004, 37; Davidson and Korbel 1981).  The 
lack of this voting cue is extremely relevant for the theoretical story of minority political 
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influence.  In this environment voters are more likely to rely on racial and ethnic cues for 
candidate information (Squire and Smith 1988).  In addition to this, the overall paucity 
of information is more likely to affect low resource groups like Latinos and Blacks 
(Davidson and Korbel 1981; Leighley 2001).  With this in mind, school district 
elections, after controlling for other factors, should show greater signs of racial and 
ethnic voting than in city council, state, and federal elections.  Also, in these elections 
cue-givers become very important, as they attempt to fill in the gap left by parties.  
There is certainly more room for bureaucrats to play a larger role in this process than in 
other policy areas.    
 Lastly, school board elections are notorious for being low-turnout affairs (Tucker 
and Zeigler 1980).  Given the lower proportion of Black and Latino turnout in general, 
the influence of their community population may be depleted because of the increased 
information costs of participating.  Again, because of this, there is substantial room for 
interested stakeholders to have a greater impact here than in other elections.  Groups like 
teachers may be significantly outnumbered in a general election, but in school board 
elections, they make up a large part of the electorate (Catalyst 1998).   
  The education system in the United States is in many ways the perfect arena for 
testing competing models of minority policy influence.  While it is possible that some of 
the results observed in this policy space may not be generalizable to other levels of 
government or other policies, the theoretical story explains exactly why that is the case.  
By stipulating what institutional factors play a role, and exactly how they contribute to 
the observed outcomes, the present research goes a long way towards bridging the divide 
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between research of minorities in education and studies of minority representation at 
other levels of government.    
 
Describing the Data 
The data I use to analyze the school systems center around two samples.  The 
main analysis takes place in Texas, using all school districts in the state that elect their 
school boards from at-large and single-member districts (1013 of 1043, or 97% of the 
districts in Texas).16  The initial sample comes from a 1999 district survey which asked 
questions about the race and ethnicity of the district’s school board members, 
administrators, teachers, and students, as well as the election method used by the district.  
This sample is supplemented with 2000 Census data, slightly reducing the number of 
usable observations to about 1000 (Census 2000).  The Census variables include the 
percentage of Latinos in the population, the percentage of Latinos who have at least a 
high school degree, the percentage of non-citizens in the district, and the percentage of 
Latinos below poverty.                    
I am interested in testing the models outside of Texas as well, to broaden the 
scope of the investigation to different contexts.   I do this using a national sample of all 
school districts in the United States with more than 5,000 students.  The national survey 
was similar to the original Texas survey, requesting information about school board 
election structures, school board, administrator, teacher, and student ethnicity.  The 
original survey was conducted in the summer of 2001 by members of the Texas 
                                                          
16 The remaining Texas school boards are either appointed or use cumulative voting procedures.  
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Educational Excellence Project at Texas A&M University.  The first three waves were 
sent by mail, and after these initial efforts I helped contact the remaining districts by 
phone, and then eventually by email.17  The typical survey phone respondent (and 
presumably mail respondents as well) was the school board secretary or another district 
administrator.  These individuals were usually forthcoming and knowledgeable about the 
requested information, but in some cases the questions needed to be explained further, 
and in even fewer cases a reluctant respondent was reminded of the public nature of the 
data.  Of the 1,831 districts, 1,751 provided data on school boards (95.6%) and 1621 
(88.5%) on teachers and administrators.  Survey respondents were not statistically 
different from the universe of school districts in the United States in terms of census 
characteristics such as ethnicity.  The actual number of observations in the regression 
analysis is somewhat lower due to missing census data.  I supplement these survey data 
with the same census data used in the Texas sample.  While the national sample contains 
some Texas districts from 2001 (146 Texas school districts), the two datasets are almost 
completely exclusive of one another and provide an opportunity to test the models in 
multiple political and social environments.  These cross-sectional datasets are used 
exclusively in chapter four.                    
 In chapter five, I extend the cross-district study in Texas to incorporate changes 
over time.    This dataset includes yearly observations from the 1993-94 school year to 
                                                          
17 The original paper surveys were conducted before my arrival at Texas A&M in the fall of 2001.  I was 
immediately assigned to verifying and cleaning this original dataset, as well as implementing the phone 
and email waves, which were conducted with Miner Marchbanks III in the fall of 2001.  The Texas 
Educational Excellence Project (TEEP) is overseen by Ken Meier, and has since been subsumed under the 
Project for Equity, Representation, and Governance (PERG).     
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the 2001-02 school year.18  Collecting these data was complicated and involved multiple 
sources.  The Texas Education Agency (TEA) was the primary source of teacher, 
administrator, and student ethnicity data for each year.  The National Association of 
Latino Elected Officials (NALEO)19 provided the Latino school board representation 
data for the years 1993-2001.  Because these data are based on the ability of NALEO to 
locate and track thousands of school board members in the United States across time, 
they were subjected to a strenuous verification process.  They were first compared with 
the Texas survey data from 1999, and then compared with a Census of Government 
survey taken in 1992. 
 One other factor in the discussion of bureaucratic and representational effects 
over time involves institutional change.  The changes from at-large to single-member 
wards in Texas involved pre-clearance from the U.S. Justice Department before 
implementing these new rules.  I contacted the Justice Department and submitted a 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for this pre-clearance data.  I received a 
hundred-page document that covered all Texas school district requests for rule changes 
during the 1990’s.  The information included the dates of different requests, the Justice 
Department’s judgment concerning these requests, and the ultimate outcome of the 
federal role in this process (“no objection” or “request withdrawn” for example).  I 
created a variable that marks the first election in the school district after Justice 
Department clearance.  This dummy variable presents an extremely valuable tool in 
                                                          
18 My labeling convention follows that of the TEA.  The “year” indicates the beginning of the school year 
(1993 for the 93-94 school year and so on).     
19 NALEO now goes by the name, “National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials 
Education Fund.” 
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distinguishing what factors lead to rule changes in some districts and not others.  I 
discuss this variable further in chapter five. 
 Finally, I combine these panel data with census data from 1990 and 2000 
regarding the percentage of Latinos in the population, the percent non-citizens in the 
district, the percentage of Latino high school graduates, and the percentage of Latinos 
below the poverty line.  These data are critical to the cross-sectional analyses, as well as 
some of the cross-time analyses I perform, however they are limited in their use from 
year to year.  That is, the nature of the census at the school district level does not allow 
for iteration across yearly units for the variables of interest.  I deal with these issues in 
chapter five.                                
 Figure 3.1 presents some descriptive statistics for the 1999 Texas sample of 
school districts using election structure as a way to divide the sample.  The main 
variables of interest are percent Latino population in the school district, percent Latino 
student population, percentage of the school board that is Latino, percent Latino 
administrators in the district (superintendents, principals, assistant principals, and central 
staff), and percent Latino teachers in the district.20   
 A number of features in the Texas sample stand out.  First, there is a substantial 
discrepancy between the percentage of Latino clientele (overall population and students), 
and the percentage of legislative and bureaucratic representation.  While this is expected 
given this group’s historical hurdles, the size of the under-representation is nonetheless  
                                                          
20 The number of observations in each group varies slightly due to missing data.  The N’s for figures 1and 
3 are based on the Latino school board representation, the N’s for figure 2 and 4 are based on population 
numbers (these variables were chosen to reflect the way the samples were split).   
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Figure 3.1: Latinos in the Texas Sample: Structural Differences 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
  All Districts                 At-Large Districts                 Ward Districts
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
L
a
t
i
n
o
 
Total Population
Students
Board Representation
Administrators
Teachers
N = 1013 N = 875 N = 138
 
  
88
Figure 3.2: Latinos in the Texas Sample: Population Differences 
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stunning.  Second, there is a great deal of consistency between legislative and 
bureaucratic representation.  At first glance it appears that the fates of Latino board 
members, upper level managers, and street level bureaucrats are tied together.  Thirdly, 
there is evidence of a large young Latino population.  As we will see in the other figures, 
these samples are reflective of census data showing Latinos to be a larger percentage of 
school-age children than the population at large. 
 Is it useful to cut the data using election structure as our knife?  Without 
controlling for other factors, there is still some evidence that representation at all levels 
is greater in school districts using wards than those using at-large rules.  School board 
representation almost doubles and bureaucratic representation increases by about 50 
percent.  This result, however, is tempered by the fact that overall Latino population and 
the Latino student population also increase by roughly 60 percent.  That is, perhaps the 
descriptive representation in the legislature and in the bureaucracy is simply due to the 
fact that there are more Latinos in these districts (and that wards may be implemented in 
districts with more Latinos in them).  These data suggest a potentially endogenous 
process, and one with a high level of collinearity between the relevant indicators. 
 Perhaps instead of electoral structure, it is more useful to examine the data in 
terms of majority and minority politics.  Figure 3.2 presents the results of this procedure 
and demonstrates some expected relationships.  In Latino minority districts legislative 
and bureaucratic representation drops substantially, and in Latino majority districts this 
trend is reversed.  While under-representation is still present in Latino majority districts, 
it appears as though majoritarian politics has an influence on school board, managerial, 
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and teaching jobs.  Again, this is not unexpected, but it highlights the need to account for 
minority and majority populations in the analyses that follow.  As will be demonstrated 
more rigorously in chapters four and five, this is not simply a population induced 
phenomenon, there is something specific and dominant about majority status in the 
election district.   
 Do these relationships describe the national sample as well?  To some extent they 
do, however there are some interesting differences to note.  Figure 3.3 demonstrates that 
the differences between at-large and ward districts are not nearly as drastic in the 
national sample as they are in the Texas sample.  This is expected for a couple of 
reasons.  First, the induced structural changes are motivated by Voting Rights Act 
provisions put in place to protect (originally) Blacks (de la Garza and De Sipio 1997).  In 
Texas, the main minority group is Latino and thus differences in Latino population 
would be reflected in the structural variation.  Outside of Texas and California this is 
probably not the case.  Secondly, if we look at figure 3.3 and 3.4 together, we see that 
majority status indicates average population differences extremely well in the national 
sample.  This difference is expected of course, but the comparative magnitude measured 
against the Texas sample in figure 3.2 suggests that Latinos are more residentially 
concentrated in the national sample than in Texas.  Latino majorities in the national 
sample are super-majorities.  Conversely, Latino minority districts in the Texas sample 
are have a fairly sizable Latino population, and their Latino clientele are less 
concentrated in urban school districts. 
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Figure 3.3: Latinos in the National Sample: Structural Differences 
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Figure 3.4: Latinos in the National Sample: Population Differences 
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 Other features of the national sample stand out and require comment.  First, 
Latino legislative and bureaucratic representation is lower in ward districts than in at-
large ones in the absence of formal control variables (although the difference is 
minimal).  This differs from the Texas sample.  Second, in every iteration Latinos make 
up a larger percentage of the student population than the overall population, a pattern 
consistent with Texas and reflective of the growing Latino population nationwide.  
Lastly, we again see the powerful impact of majority status on Latino legislative and 
bureaucratic representation.  The surprising size of the difference in all of the variables 
demonstrates the necessity of looking at these two sub-samples separately.  Majority 
politics and minority politics may interact with structure and representation in 
completely different ways (Davidson and Korbel 1981).  Further information about the 
datasets is available in the appendices, and I will detail the data further in chapters four 
and five. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ELECTORAL BIAS AND LEGISLATIVE CONTROL 
 
 In this chapter, I develop the theory from the preceding sections into testable 
hypotheses, and analyze them empirically using national and (separately) Texas samples 
of school districts in the United States.  I am particularly interested in examining the top-
down model of political control, specifically minority representation and the institutional 
electoral influence on the behavior of these representatives.  That is, what structural and 
legislative representational factors are associated with responsive organizational 
outcomes that favor Latinos?  I make an explicit institutional argument in favor of 
increased policy outcomes, using the formal logic of the median voter theorem to 
motivate my hypothesis construction.  These hypotheses stipulate that ward structures 
have a positive influence on getting minorities elected, and create incentives for ward 
officials to provide benefits to their minority constituency after they take office.  I 
present findings from the national and Texas samples simultaneously and compare the 
results.  These samples include at-large and ward elected officials along with both 
minority/majority Latino populations, showing support for a theory of “minority” 
politics, not a particular Latino version.   
 I begin by reiterating a broad top-down theoretical model of local education 
policy.  This perspective emphasizes the exogenous nature of election rules, which 
contributes to variable Latino descriptive representation on the school board.  I continue 
by explaining the delegation of various types of bureaucratic agents based on electoral 
constraints, including superintendents, principals, assistant principals, and teachers.  The 
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delegation of discretion to different agents is explained in substantive terms, and I 
continue by explaining the impact of these delegation decisions on a variety of Latino 
student outcomes.  This causal chain is examined step by step, controlling for other 
plausible factors, presenting both the direct and indirect influence of election structures 
on every phase of the local policy system.   
 The evidence presented in this chapter is broad and generalizable, but is also 
limited for a number of reasons.  Ideally, the direct measurement of political control 
relationships would entail calculating the preferences of the public, their representatives, 
and those of the bureaucracy.  It would also necessarily include measuring, on a 
corresponding scale, the statutory policies enacted by the legislative body.  Because of a 
lack of data on these components for a large number of observations at the local level, I 
am forced to make a trade-off between precision and generalizability.  Therefore, I use 
ethnicity as a differential preference indicator, and policy outputs and outcomes in place 
of statutory objectives.  I explain why I make these decisions, and how the measures still 
provide provocative (if indirect) evidence in support of political control models.  In the 
concluding chapter I explain that the next step in this research program is to collect and 
analyze each of these actors’ preferences, and describe how these data would provide 
greater leverage on questions of legislative and bureaucratic representation at the local 
level.     
  
Structural Variation and Legislative Representation 
The key to the story so far is that the top-down perspective is the most useful for 
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describing how institutions affect policy change.  In a representative democracy, the 
people (voters and non-voters) begin the causal chain, and preference differences are 
necessarily associated with policy differences.  These preference differences are 
translated into representation through a variety of election structures, producing 
predictable outcomes.  Moreover, once in office, legislators face various constituency 
constraints (based on election rules) that alter their policy decisions, leading to diverse 
results.   
This chain of events is presented for Latinos in the local education system in 
figure 4.1.  The model illustrates that areas with more Latinos will have more descriptive 
representation on the school board, but that this relationship is moderated by the 
electoral rules, finally producing higher levels of Latino bureaucratic representation and 
better student outcomes in some systems.  In this section I explain how electoral rules 
directly affect descriptive representation. 
The two most widely used legislative selection mechanisms in the United States 
are at-large and single-member district elections.  At-large systems use a single 
geographic area to include all voters for all seats to a legislative body, while single-
member district (or “ward”) systems divide a geographic area into separate wards that 
each select only one member to the legislative body.  These systems have been studied 
extensively at the federal, state, and local levels, but the underpinning constraints they 
produce on candidates and officeholders is typically assumed and not formalized.          
 Why might one expect descriptive representation to vary with the electoral 
structure?  More specifically, why would Latino voters who want to elect a Latino  
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Figure 4.1: “Top-Down” Political Control 
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representative fare better under ward rules rather than at-large ones?  The formal story 
rests on three general assumptions: 
Assumption 1. Voters are rational and will vote for candidates most likely to represent  
their interests. 
 
Assumption 2. Candidates are rational and, therefore, will seek to satisfy constituency  
interests (either because they seek reelection for its own sake or seek reelection 
to pursue policy goals). 
 
Assumption 3. In the absence of partisan information, ethnicity is a critical election cue  
for voters.21  
 
Given these assumptions, we can work out a general model of what happens in 
each type of election in a school district with a minority of Latinos (under 50 percent).  
The situation is shown spatially in figure 4.2a for a jurisdiction that is 80% Anglo and 
20% Latino (the logic works for other percentages, but the illustrations are more obvious 
in this case).  The policy space is uni-dimensional, but represents the preference 
differences between Anglos and Latinos on a variety of educational issues regarding 
funding, curriculum, hiring, and outcomes.  While I have drawn figure 4.2a to show 
Latinos with relatively extreme views, the logic works as long as the median Latino 
voter VL is different from the median voter VM.   
 To illustrate, consider a five member school board all elected at-large.  In such a 
situation, candidates will position themselves at the median voter VM so that no  
                                                          
21 The idea of descriptive representation rests on the assumption that voters are polarized by race and use it 
as a cue to select representatives.  Eisinger (1982) explains that black voters have good reasons to select 
black candidates to represent them.  He finds that the presence of a black mayor has an impact on the 
percentage of black administrators and professionals in the city (Eisinger 1982).  Karnig and Welch (1980) 
also find that mayoral representation increases social spending on “black” policy issues, although like 
Eisinger, they can make no such claims about city council representation.  Thus, crossover voting by black 
voters (choosing Anglo representatives when a Black candidate is available) in many circumstances makes 
little sense, and is not the observed pattern in most elections (Bullock 1984). 
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challenger can locate a policy position that can attract a majority of the votes.  In a 
traditional at-large system where voters get one vote per position, all candidates face the 
same electorate.  Because the median is well within the Anglo portion of the electorate, 
Latino candidates face a daunting challenge.  They must either try to capture a seat by 
appealing to the median Anglo voter, or risk losing the majority of votes by courting the 
minority Latino constituency.  Based on assumptions one through three, Latino 
candidates will be unable to overcome these constraints, and Anglos will capture all five 
seats.22 
 Moving the identical set of circumstances to a single-member district system 
changes the calculus (see figure 4.2b)23.  If we assume that electoral districts are not 
created to be exact microcosms of the entire jurisdiction, then the median voters in each 
of the five electoral districts is not the same as the median voter in the overall 
jurisdiction.  If Latinos are mostly gerrymandered into a single district, then the median 
voter in that district (VL) is the optimal candidate position in that district. In fact, if 
Latinos compose a majority of the electorate in any one of the wards, then the median 
voter in that ward is Latino, and a Latino is therefore more likely to be elected to the 
school board.  This process suggests the following hypothesis: 
H1 In Latino minority districts, ward-based systems will be associated with a higher  
percentage of Latino school board members than at-large systems, as the 
percentage of Latinos in the district increases. 
 
                                                          
22 To the extent that any one of these assumptions is relaxed, Latinos are expected to gain elective office in 
at-large systems, but the closer these assumptions come to being “always true,” the more likely it is 
expected that the models will produce the predicted outcomes.  We know that Latinos get elected at-large 
to school boards in districts where they are the minority, but the tradeoffs they make in order to do so 
leads into the discussion of variations in substantive representation.       
23 Thanks to Gary Segura for his suggestions regarding this formal picture.   
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 Using the same logic, when Latinos are a majority in the school district, they are 
able to exploit the at-large system in the same way Anglo majorities do, suggesting that 
the benefits of ward elections disappear.  This promotes a second hypothesis:  
H2 In Latino majority districts, ward-based systems will be associated with the same  
percentage of Latino school board members than at-large systems, as the 
percentage of Latinos in the district increases. 
 
Thus, local elections (in Latino minority school districts) that use ward systems 
should be associated with higher levels of descriptive representation for Latinos.  But the 
more interesting question is what happens to these representatives once they get into 
office.  That is, does the electoral system constrain behavior in a predictable fashion?  
There are two possible outcomes to the use of wards to select legislators.  The first, 
presented in figure 4.2b, is that policy will shift towards Latino preferences, reflecting 
the presence of new representation on the school board.  This shift occurs because the 
Latino legislator is constrained to (or prefers to) cater to the wishes of her Latino 
constituency, and uses her position on the small board to create space for Latino issues.  
The Latino elected in an at-large system (L1 in figure 4.2a) must moderate his or her 
push for Latino benefits to avoid alienating the median voter who is not Latino, but L2 
faces no such constraint and can push for policies that reflect VL, the median of the 
Latino community.  This is the essence of substantive representation based on 
descriptive minority victories from gerrymandered regions. 
A second, and contrary, outcome of descriptive representation arises because of 
the nature of gerrymandered wards (see figure 4.2c).  By consolidating the Latino 
population into specific wards, the electoral system may create a corresponding shift 
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towards Anglo policy, as the other members of the board become less concerned with 
Latino voters who are no longer in their constituency.  Just like Latinos, Anglos in other 
wards may have preferences that deviate considerably from the median voter.  If more 
Anglo-centric candidates win seats in these wards, the outcome of the election may 
actually substantively disenfranchise Latino interests even further.  This is a potential 
risk of changing from at-large to ward based systems, and is the subject of much debate 
in the federal single-member district literature (see discussion of evidence below).  It 
also presents an opportunity to test the competing hypotheses at the level of the local 
education organization with the following: 
H3(null) In Latino minority districts, Latino school board members in ward systems will be  
associated with the same percentage of Latino administrators than will Latino 
representatives in at-large systems.   
 
H3a In Latino minority districts, Latino school board members in ward systems will be  
associated with the presence of more Latino administrators than will Latino 
representatives in at-large systems (figure 4.2b).   
 
H3b In Latino minority districts, Latino school board members in ward systems will be  
associated with the presence of fewer Latino administrators than will Latino 
representatives in at-large systems (figure 4.2c).   
 
H4(null) In Latino minority districts, Latino school board members in ward systems will be  
associated with the same percentage of Latino teachers than will Latino 
representatives in at-large systems.   
 
H4a In Latino minority districts, Latino school board members in ward systems will be  
associated with the presence of more Latino teachers than will Latino 
representatives in at-large systems (figure 4.2b).   
 
H4b In Latino minority districts, Latino school board members in ward systems will be  
associated with the presence of fewer Latino teachers than will Latino 
representatives in at-large systems (figure 4.2c).   
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 Finally, we want to examine the role of Latino majority status in the school 
district and how it interacts with these structures in substantive terms.  Like the 
descriptive story, it is expected that when Latinos make up a majority of the school 
district’s population, they no longer need the benefits of wards to translate their 
preferences into policy.  In fact, they may even be hindered by these rules, as non-Latino 
groups take advantage of them to mitigate the importance of Latino issues.  Thus, in 
Latino majority districts we would expect relationships similar to those made explicit in 
H3(null) and H4(null).  That is, in Latino majority school districts: 
 
H5 Latino school board members in ward systems will be associated with the same  
percentage of Latino administrators than will Latino representatives in at-large 
systems.   
 
H6 Latino school board members in ward systems will be associated with the same  
percentage of Latino teachers than will Latino representatives in at-large systems.   
 
 
Evidence at Multiple Levels of Government 
 These theoretical relationships have been studied for decades, but they have 
rarely been placed in a formal context.  Also, even though the influences of electoral 
structure have been studied at multiple levels of government, they have not been tied 
together under one general framework.  The argument at the federal level is about where 
to draw single-member district lines, and finding what percentage of the minority 
population would benefit ward inhabitants most substantively; the debate about whether 
single-member district elections produce more minority descriptive representation in the 
U.S. Congress is settled (compare at-large Senate elections to ward based House 
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elections).   
Federal level studies, however, are still pertinent to the local level discussion for 
two main reasons.  First, the focus at the federal level is explicitly linked to the 
competing hypotheses obtained from figures 4.2a and 4.2b.  That is, every single federal 
level study in this area is concerned with whether minority policies are harmed or helped 
by drawing minority gerrymandered districts.  Second, the substantive differences 
between federal (and state) and local level processes can be attributed to a number of 
specific institutional factors, rather than treating the relationships at these levels of 
government as fundamentally dissimilar.              
Federal and state level studies of minority descriptive and substantive outcomes 
exploded in the early 1990’s as state legislatures began to re-draw congressional districts 
following the census.  The main question concerned tradeoffs between descriptive and 
substantive representation of minorities in the House due to the prescription of majority-
minority districts (Swain 1993).  Carol Swain (1993) claims that the amount of 
descriptive gains from the creation of majority-minority districts has reached its limit, 
and that if minorities want to perform better in the electoral arena, they need to spread 
their influence by mixing their majority-minority districts into majority Anglo districts.  
This likely leads to less descriptive representation, but would foster long-term coalition 
building and more substantive representation among Anglo representatives (Swain 
1993). 
A number of scholars rigorously test Swain’s general argument and find that for 
the most part, she is correct.  Overby and Cosgrove (1996) look at the impact of 
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redistricting on Anglo representatives’ support of Black policy and find that Anglo 
House members who lost Black constituents in the early 1990’s voted less often for 
Black policies than they did prior to redistricting.  This made members who lost Black 
constituents more “Anglo-oriented” as suggested above in figure 4.2c.   
Cameron et al. (1996) examine a number of hypotheses about policy shifts due to 
redistricting and find that, in fact, most majority-minority congressional districts are too 
concentrated with minority voters.  The authors examine the effects of redistricting on 
both descriptive and substantive representation of Blacks in the U.S. House, and find 
descriptive benefits and substantive costs as Swain predicted (Cameron et al. 1996).  
Cameron et al. (1996) produce simulation evidence that supports Swain’s prescription 
for reducing Black voter concentration in favor of diffusing this group’s support among 
many districts to achieve long-term policy benefits.24 
Kevin Hill (1995) introduces empirical evidence on the partisan effects of 
redistricting.  He has three main findings.  First, he examines the 1992 House elections 
and concludes that Republicans actually benefited from the majority-minority districts 
created by Democrat-controlled state legislatures (Hill 1995).  Second, Hill looks at what 
would have happened in 1992 had redistricting not occurred.  He finds that Republicans 
would have still picked up seats in 1992, but that they would not have won as many as 
they did, and that this difference could be explicitly traced to the concentration of Black 
Democrats into already strongly Democratic areas (diluting their influence elsewhere; 
                                                          
24 Indeed, the authors provide a “formula” for state legislatures and scholars to use for calculating the 
trade-offs between descriptive and substantive representation given a particular percentage of Black voters 
in the congressional district (Cameron et al. 1996, 808).  Depending on what outcomes one prefers, the 
formula provides the optimal redistricting strategy. 
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Hill 1995).  Lastly, Hill estimates the outcomes of the 1994 elections (which had yet to 
take place when the article was written), and predicts even more Republican gains in the 
House due to redistricting, a historical event that did in fact occur (1995).   
The evidence on partisan effects is considerably important in linking the federal 
and local level structures into one coherent model.  In most local elections, and 
particularly in school board elections, party cues are not available to voters, making 
them more likely to rely on ethnic cues (Lieske and Hillard 1984; Pomper 1966, 95-96; 
Squire and Smith 1988).  It also makes the drawing of ward lines less partisan, but based 
more on race and ethnicity as was discussed in chapter 3 (Behr 2004).  More generally 
however, it formalizes the features of each level of government’s legislative and 
electoral system that speak to why we would expect the outcomes in figure 4.2b at the 
local level, even if we observe outcomes similar to figure 4.2c at the federal and state 
levels.                                       
At the local school board level, not only are partisan cues absent in most 
elections, but a number of other factors makes these legislative bodies different from 
their federal counterparts.  Legislative size is particularly relevant in increasing each 
member’s influence on the outcomes of local policy.  The smaller size of school boards 
(generally five to seven members) makes the presence of one minority member much 
more pivotal in pushing for benefits, building coalitions, and casting deciding votes.  On 
top of this, the legislative mandate of school boards is much more focused than that of 
state or federal representatives, creating uni-dimensional policy spaces with which to 
judge outcomes and hold legislators responsible.   
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The final and most important factors at the local level are the electoral rules.  
Unlike federal and state elections, local elections are still differentiated by at-large and 
ward designs (and to a much lesser extent appointments).  Scholars are still interested in 
the impact of these structures because of their variable use across the country, and 
because their substantive effects are still largely unknown.   
The battle over at-large and ward electoral arrangements at the local level has 
almost always included racial and ethnic aspects.  Davidson and Korbel (1981) present 
historical evidence showing that at-large arrangements were a progressive response to 
ethnic ward politics in the first half of the twentieth century.  The shift to at-large 
elections in large cities in the north and in the south was a response to “the inferior moral 
fiber of the foreign-born and lower-class electorates and their representatives” (Holli, 
quoted in Davidson and Korbel 1981, 985), in addition to the advent of the city-manager 
and a reduction in the size of the city council.   
Given that at-large rules were purposefully implemented in many cities to reduce 
minority interests, it is no surprise that the empirical evidence supports their success (at 
least in descriptive terms).  For Blacks, aside from a few studies (Cole 1974; MacManus 
1978; Welch and Karnig 1978)25, the data provide strong and consistent support for the 
hypothesis that ward elections have been largely responsible for descriptive 
representation gains on city councils (Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Karnig 1976; 
Karnig 1980; Karnig and Welch 1978, 1982; Robinson and Dye 1978; Taebel 1978).   
                                                          
25 The problems with MacManus’ study are well known, and Welch has since downplayed the results of 
this one study in favor of a large amount of evidence she has discovered to the contrary (see Davidson and 
Korbel 1981, 996-997).   
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The evidence for Latinos is less clear.  In a study of city council representation, 
Taebel (1978) found that Hispanics gained only marginal benefits from ward elections.  
He conjectured that the reason for this was that residential segregation was not as 
prevalent for Hispanics as it was for Blacks (Taebel 1978).  Susan Welch (1990), using a 
national sample of city councils from large U.S. cities, concluded that Hispanics gained 
almost nothing due to structural variation.  Brischetto et al. (1994) similarly found that 
Latinos achieve little relative to blacks when electoral structures are manipulated; rather, 
Latino population size has a greater impact on political gains.  Adams (2000) discovered 
highly mixed results for Latino representation based on case studies of eight cities and 
four unified school systems that switched from multimember or at-large districts to 
single-member districts.  More recent national findings, however, suggest that Latinos 
are aided significantly by a change from at-large to district elections, and also by 
appointed selection (Leal et al. 2002; Lublin 1997).  
 Two issues arise out of the preceding sections.  First, Swain (1993) presents a 
trade-off between descriptive and substantive representation that may keep minority 
interests from being served.  If this is true, then local Black and Latino representatives 
full of good intentions and supported by a large (ward) constituency will fail to live up to 
their promises in office due to their diluted influence in the political arena.  Second, 
manipulating the electoral system may inadvertently create more racial polarization 
among voters, and in turn create minority candidates who must behave differently 
(support majority policy preferences) if elected or appointed outside of racially 
gerrymandered wards.     
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 At the level of the school board, there is very little work dealing with substantive 
representation, but the little evidence that exists appears to support positive outcomes in 
association with ward structures and descriptive representation.  Stewart et al. (1989) test 
this theory using a national sample of black school board members and affirm that single 
member structures create more opportunity for Black representation, and that this 
representation translates into more black administrative and teaching positions.  Meier 
and Stewart (1991) produce the most thorough evidence yet of substantive educative 
outcomes (using a number of different indicators) due to structural variation.  Their 
evidence is important for this study because it focuses on Latinos and it specifically 
examines school boards (Meier and Stewart 1991).  Leal et al. (2002) find a similar 
relationship for Latino school board members, administrators, and teachers using a more 
recent national survey.   
 Thus far I have presented a large amount of seemingly contradictory evidence 
concerning substantive minority representation (contingent on the level of analysis).  By 
examining different electoral structures in a variety of settings and looking at Latino 
substantive outcomes, this paper will contribute quantitative evidence that should help 
clarify the debate.   
 
Data Analysis and Results 
 The data on the national and Texas samples of school boards are described in 
detail in chapter three.  Briefly, however, the data for this chapter come from three 
sources.  For the national sample, information on school board election structures, school 
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board ethnicity, administrator ethnicity, teacher ethnicity, and student ethnicity come 
from a survey of all school districts with more than 5,000 students.  The original survey 
was conducted in the summer of 2001 by the Texas Educational Excellence Project at 
Texas A&M University.  Of the 1,831 districts, 1,751 provided data on school boards 
(95.6%) and 1621 (88.5%) on teachers and administrators.  Survey respondents were not 
statistically different from the universe of school districts in the United States in terms of 
census characteristics such as ethnicity.  The actual number of observations in the 
regression analysis are somewhat lower due to missing data.  I supplement these survey 
data with Census data concerning the percentage of Latino non-citizens in the district, 
the percentage of Latinos in poverty, and the percentage of Latinos with a high school 
diploma.  Lastly, the Texas sample comes from a 1999 survey that was similar in nature 
to the national survey except that it captured all Texas school districts that used at-large 
or ward elections to select their school boards (1013 of 1043, or 97% of the districts in 
Texas).26  This sample is also supplemented with Census data, slightly reducing the 
number of usable observations to about 1000 (Census 2000).      
 I analyze the data in two ways.  First, I use OLS regression to estimate the effects 
of structure and population on Latino representation on the school board.  Descriptive 
Latino representation ranges from 0 to 100 percent and the effects are estimated in a 
linear fashion to reflect the theoretical process of proportionality to the population.  
Many school districts, however, do not have any Latino representation on the school 
board (76 percent in Texas and 82 percent in the National sample), and we want to make 
                                                          
26 The remaining Texas school boards are either appointed or use cumulative voting procedures.  
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sure that the estimation procedure reflects this skewed distribution.  Paulino (2001) and 
Buckley (2003) suggest that when using percentage data with this type of distribution, a 
maximum likelihood estimation procedure with a beta function (ml beta) is most 
appropriate.  To this end, I estimate the models using both procedures, relying on the 
OLS estimates for coefficient interpretation, and the maximum likelihood estimates as a 
check on the reliability of these OLS results.27  The ml beta z-scores are displayed next 
the OLS t-scores, and I discuss the cases where statistical significance is not consistent 
across methods.           
 In order to examine the role of electoral structure on the amount of Latino 
descriptive representation, I introduce two interactions in these models.  Two dummy 
variables, one for at-large/ward structures (0,1 respectively), and the other for 
minority/majority  Latino populations (0,1 respectively) are created to test the multiple 
hypotheses described above.28  These dummies are interacted with the percent Latino 
population in a manner consistent with other representation work done at this level.29  
The equation, a modification of the one popularized by Engstrom and McDonald (1981) 
and used by most analyses of minority representation since then (Austin 1998; Meier and 
England 1991; Meier et al. 1989), can be decomposed into separate parts for at-large and 
                                                          
27  Because of the multiple interactions in the models it is difficult to demonstrate to the reader the effects 
of the independent variables using the ml beta coefficients.  This method is thus used for reliability.  Also, 
because of the inherent collinearity in the OLS models, the ml beta method is conducted with robust 
standard errors for additional rigor.       
28  In the national sample, mixed districts, those using both at-large and single member ward structures, are 
coded for the proportion of seats that are elected by wards.  Because this variable’s distribution is largely 
bi-modal, I interpret the interactions at the 0 (fully at-large) and 1 (fully single-member wards) positions 
for ease of display.     
29 Total Latino population is used in the electoral structure models, although Latino voting age population 
would be preferred theoretically.  I use the general population measure for ease of comparison with the 
bureaucratic models, and because the results do not change when using Latino voting age population (they 
are correlated above the .99 level).     
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ward-based systems in both Latino majority and Latino minority school districts.30  The 
percentage of Latino school board seats is then regressed on Latino population, ward 
elections, whether Latinos are a majority, the interaction of Latino population by ward 
elections, the interaction of Latino population by majority status, and the three way 
interaction of majority status, ward elections and Latino population.  The results from 
the two different samples are presented side by side in each table for comparison 
purposes; consistency across samples furthers claims of theoretical generalizability.  The 
different interactions are interpreted step by step below.         
 Table 4.1 presents the results of this first examination of both samples.  When 
Latinos are a minority in a district with at-large elections, the last four structural 
variables are all reduced to constants (zero) producing the following equation: 
[National sample]  %Seats = -3.18 + .438 * (Latino Population) 
[Texas sample]  %Seats = -3.43 + .289 * (Latino Population) 
Proportional representation would produce a coefficient of one for the population 
variable, and by comparing the actual population coefficient to this ideal we can see how 
close or far from this proportional situation the process actually is.  For every one 
percentage point increase in Latino population in these samples, the amount of 
representation on the school board increases by .44 and .29 in the national and Texas  
                                                          
30 I tested all of the models using different plurality “break” points (50%, 45%, 40%, 35%, 30%, 25%, 
20% Latino population) to examine the population percentage at which Latinos began to see declines in 
structural effects.  The models using “50% Latino” fit the data best and explained the most variance.  This 
is an interesting finding and should be explored further, but a potential explanation is that school board 
elections are not well attended, and an absolute population majority (and not a simple plurality) is 
necessary before at-large elections can be successfully contested by Latinos.   
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Table 4.1: The Impact of Ward Elections and Majority Status on School Board Seats 
Dependent Variable = % Latino Seats on School Board 
 
        National Sample      Texas Sample 
Independent Variable    OLS*       ML-Beta**   OLS       ML-Beta 
    
Intercept             -3.18                -3.43        
     (-1.77)       (-24.25)   (-1.75)  (-22.53)  
 
Latino Population         .438                     .289        
     (15.37)       (7.65)   (6.85)  (7.20) 
 
Ward Elections         -.251                   -1.37      
     (-.36)           (-.80)   (-.52)  (-1.22) 
 
Ward x Latino Population   .131                       .212      
     (2.70)        (1.53)   (2.37)  (3.07) 
 
Latino Majority            -58.95                      -38.08       
     (-12.95)      (-4.27)   (-6.80)  (-1.72) 
Latino Majority times 
 
     Latino Population       1.19                         .838       
     (17.08)        (6.79)   (10.32)  (2.53) 
 
     Wards x Latino Pop.    -.103                   -.300       
     (-1.95)        (-1.21)   (-4.16)  (-3.27) 
 
% Latino Noncitizen    -.057                -.059      
     (-3.29)        (-4.82)   (-2.05)  (-2.00) 
 
Latino Education (H.S.)     .034                     .044     
     (1.76)        (1.51)   (1.87)  (3.93) 
 
% Latinos Below Poverty    .031                     .027      
     (1.45)        (2.58)   (1.00)  (1.65) 
 
 
R Squared                               .75                .65 
F                                   453.53                     201.34 
N                                  1352                              1003 
Standard Error                       8.34                             11.88 
 
* OLS results (t-statistics in parentheses) 
** Maximum likelihood z-scores estimating a beta distribution with robust standard errors.  All models 
estimated using STATA 8.  
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samples respectively.  This is expected, given the severe amount of under representation 
witnessed in the descriptive numbers from chapter three.   
 Next, we want to see the independent effect of ward election rules in Latino 
minority districts.  To do this, I include the coefficient for the “Ward x Latino 
Population” (significant) interaction and the “Ward” dummy coefficient (not significant) 
to the previous equation.  The insignificant ward coefficient means that the intercept for 
ward systems is not different from the intercept for at-large systems.  The significant 
Ward x Latino Population coefficient means that the ward slope is statistically different 
from the at-large slope (that is, it is larger).  The reduced equation confirms this 
relationship; in ward systems where Latinos are a minority, a one percentage point 
increase in Latino population is associated with a .57 (national) and .50 (Texas) 
percentage point increase in Latino representation.  These differences in Texas can be 
seen more clearly in figure 4.3. 
[National sample]  %Seats = -3.43 + .569 * (Latino Population)   
[Texas sample]  %Seats = -4.80 + .501 * (Latino Population)
Having examined the role of these rules in Latino minority districts, it is time to 
see if these effects disappear in Latino majority districts as hypothesized.  In Latino 
majority jurisdictions that elect school board members at-large, all the ward variables are 
turned into constants.  The representation equation for these districts is as follows: 
[National sample]  %Seats = -62.13+ ((.438 + 1.19) * (Latino Population)) 
[Texas sample]  %Seats = -41.51+ ((.289 + .838) * (Latino Population)) 
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Figure 4.3: Latino Representation: The Outcomes of Two Election Types in 
Latino Minority Districts  
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Figure 4.4: Latino Representation: The Outcomes of Two Election Types in 
Latino Majority Districts  
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The large negative intercepts reflect the fact that the baseline population for these 
districts is at least 50 percent.  In Latino majority jurisdictions with at-large elections, a 
one percentage point increase in Latino population is associated with a 1.63 (national) 
and 1.13 (Texas) percentage point increase in Latino representation.31 
If the hypothesis that majority Latino populations do not need the benefit of 
wards to maintain descriptive representation is correct, then we should not see a 
significant slope difference due to structure in these sub-samples.  Surprisingly, wards 
produce significantly less representation for Latinos in the majority context than at-large 
rules.  Determining the representation relationship in these districts necessitates using all 
of the structural coefficients in Table 4.1 producing the following: 
[National sample]  %Seats = -62.38 + 1.66 * (Latino Population)   
[Texas sample]  %Seats = -4.80 + 1.04 * (Latino Population) 
As shown in figure 4.4, not only do ward structures not help Latino representatives (as 
they do in Latino minority districts), they slightly hinder them.  In ward systems, a one 
percentage point increase in Latino population is associated with a 1.66 (national) and 
1.04 (Texas) percentage point increase in Latino school board seats.  The fact that these 
are significant differences is surprising but in many ways supports the idea that this is a 
politically induced relationship, and not a group-specific phenomenon.  That is, when 
Latinos constitute a majority of the district’s population, and ward rules are in place, 
                                                          
31 There are variety of reasons why Latinos might not win all the seats in a majoritarian system such as this 
one.  Winning elections is a function of mobilization and to the extent that Latinos have lower levels of 
turnout, either as a result of citizenship or other factors, or to the extent that good Latino candidates are not 
running, representation levels will fall.  Residual incumbency advantages of sitting Anglo board members 
might also slow the acquisition of Latino seats.  
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other groups (Blacks, Asians, Native Americans, and Anglos) are able to use the ward 
benefits to their advantage.  At-large rules favor the majority, no matter who they are, 
and wards seem to favor the minority regardless of which group occupies that space.   
 There are a few other important things to note in table 4.1.  Because the majority 
dummy is a rough measure of majority and minority politics, the predicted levels around 
50 percent are potentially off (if only slightly).  In future research, it would be prudent to 
test alternative functional forms to figure out exactly where minority politics ends, and 
majority politics begins at the local level.  Secondly, all of the OLS structural results 
maintain their significance using the maximum likelihood analysis, except for the 
minority ward coefficient in the national sample (although it is close in a one-tailed test).  
This is not alarming, because when partisan ward school districts are included in the 
models (not shown), this coefficient retains its significance.  Also, the high level of 
collinearity due to the multiple interactions combined with the robust technique suggests 
that confidence in this relationship is defensible.   
 The control variables in the models behave as expected, and the consistency 
across samples is intriguing.  The percentage of non-citizens in the district has a 
significantly depressing effect on Latino representation, as these individuals are not 
allowed to vote.  Although not consistently significant, the level of Latino education has 
a positive effect on descriptive representation.  The coefficient for Latino poverty is not 
consistently different from zero.                 
Summarizing the evidence thus far, the hypotheses about electoral structure and 
minority status are confirmed, while the hypotheses concerning Latino majority status 
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are not.  When Latinos are a minority, they do significantly better in electoral systems 
based on ward elections.  When Latinos are a majority, they receive the same benefits of 
at-large bias that other majorities do, but we do not know if this is because other 
minority groups are using wards to thwart Latino policy preferences, or because of other 
unobserved processes.   No matter what the system, however, Latino representation is 
never predicted to exceed the Latino population percentage. 
 
Substantive Representation at the Local Level 
Thus far, the results have substantiated the traditional findings for Blacks and 
Latinos in terms of descriptive representation.  We have also seen the influence of 
different types of politics (minority versus majority) and how these interact with election 
rules, something that has been relatively unexamined in the literature.  The question of 
how these representatives behave once in office is taken up next.  Of particular interest is 
examining the independent influence of electoral structure on minority recruitment to the 
bureaucracy.  As discussed in chapter three, school boards are responsible for hiring 
upper level managers, and to a lesser extent recruiting new teachers (either through 
policy changes or direct staffing).  These are the outcomes that are examined in the 
following analyses.       
As with descriptive representation, it is expected that at-large rules in Latino 
minority districts will constrain Latino board members from having an impact on these 
outcomes, when compared with their ward-elected counterparts.  The hiring of 
minorities to the bureaucracy after the election of a minority representative has long 
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been considered a substantive outcome (Eisinger 1982; Kerr and Mladenka 1994; 
Mladenka 1989; Polinard et al. 1994).  It is difficult to empirically differentiate this 
practice from patronage (Rich 1996), however the historical under-representation of 
these groups in the bureaucracy combined with the relationship between minority 
staffing and beneficial outcomes for clientele leads one to conclude that patronage may 
not be the primary goal.32  That is, it is credible to consider that minorities were 
excluded from these positions because of their race or ethnicity prior to group 
representation, and their recruitment after successful legislative representation simply 
“normalizes” the hiring process.  In particular, a substantial amount of anecdotal 
evidence and empirical research supports the notion that an increased Latino presence in 
the education bureaucracy benefits all students, and Latino students in particular (Meier 
and Stewart 1989; Meier et al. 1999; Meier et al. 2001; Polinard et al. 1994).33  This 
section empirically tests hypotheses 3 and 4 and their variants, pictured in figures 4.2a, 
4.2b, and 4.2c.       
To determine the efficacy of representatives elected under various structures, we 
can use the same interaction strategy as in table 4.1.  It is expected that the labor pool for 
most teachers in the district will reflect the population characteristics for the group.  That 
is, districts with more Latinos will produce and attract more Latino administrators and 
                                                          
32 This does not even begin to account for the effect of legal restrictions on pure patronage hiring in the 
public space.  Over time, legislators have lost most of their capacity to directly appoint unqualified 
candidates to the bureaucracy.  In fact, this practice was one of the reasons for the progressive reforms that 
made them illicit (Davidson and Korbel 1981).   
      
33 This corresponds with “substantive representation” as I have defined it (see also Hero and Tolbert 1995, 
641; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999, 385).  To be clear, it is not possible to directly measure the legislative 
policies of all 1000 + school boards, but we can capture substantive policy gains: 1) indirectly with the 
outcome measures of Latino administrative and teacher recruitment, and 2) directly, because an increase in 
Latino bureaucratic employment is a substantive good in and of itself (for Latino constituents).    
  
122
teachers. Also, we would expect that Latino education levels and Latino poverty levels 
will help explain the percentage of Latino bureaucrats in these districts.  I control for 
each of these socioeconomic (labor market) factors in each model.  Instead of interacting 
Latino population with electoral structure in these models, I use Latino representation on 
the school board to test the theoretical argument that Latino representatives are 
constrained by their variable incentives for constituency service.     
Table 4.2 presents the results for the models of administrative staffing.  I again 
present the results for the two samples side by side, as well as the maximum likelihood 
z-scores in the interest of robustness.  When Latinos are a minority and there is no 
school board representation, the Latino population coefficient tells us the level of 
bureaucratic representation we would expect to see in the average district.  This is a 
good baseline with which to compare the substantive results due solely to descriptive 
representation.  Staying in these minority districts we can see that in at-large 
arrangements, the coefficient for Latino descriptive representation is insignificant in the 
Texas sample, and tiny (and insignificant in the ml beta estimation) in the national 
sample.  Latino school board members appear to have little, if any, effect on substantive 
outcomes.      
Do ward constraints make a difference in terms of staffing outcomes?  In 
minority districts they certainly do.  The results for the Ward x Representation 
interaction may be the single most important finding in this chapter.  After controlling 
for population and other important factors in the causal process, we see that ward rules  
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Table 4.2: Bureaucratic Outcomes in Different Systems: Latino Administrators 
Dependent Variable = % Latino Administrators 
 
        National Sample      Texas Sample 
 
Independent Variable    OLS*       ML-Beta**   OLS       ML-Beta 
    
Intercept             -5.65                -2.73        
     (-5.29)        (-32.54)   (-1.87)  (-17.27)  
 
Latino Population         .343                     .171        
     (17.50)       (16.82)   (4.55)  (5.47) 
 
Latino Representation        .095                     -.053       
     (3.75)        (.76)   (-.82)  (-.54) 
 
Ward Elections         .133                   -.703      
     (.35)           (-.11)   (-.53)  (.59) 
 
Ward x Latino Representation .204                       .331      
     (5.27)        (2.52)   (3.46)  (2.19) 
 
Latino Majority            -25.36                      -61.57       
     (-7.15)        (2.87)   (-12.18) (-4.59) 
Latino Majority times 
 
     Latino Population      .327                         1.30       
     (4.82)        (-4.46)   (15.83)  (5.06) 
 
     Latino Representation  .295                         .164       
     (7.44)        (2.03)   (2.26)  (1.95) 
 
     Wards x Latino Rep.   -.095                   -.445       
     (-2.18)        (-1.20)   (-4.37)  (-3.94) 
 
Latino Education (H.S.)     .056                     .052     
     (4.51)        (4.16)   (2.71)  (5.46) 
 
% Latinos Below Poverty    .070                     -.008     
     (4.94)        (3.69)   (-.33)  (-3.22) 
 
 
R Squared                    .85    .77 
F                                    651.95                     336.74 
N                                  1144                           1002 
Standard Error                       5.28                             10.56 
 
* OLS results  
** Maximum likelihood z-scores estimating a beta distribution with robust standard errors.  All models 
estimated using STATA 8.  
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work the way we expect them to.  Latino representation in these districts is associated 
with a significant and substantial amount of substantive outcomes.  Instead of creating a  
shift towards Anglos (H3b), these rules constrain representatives to produce Latino 
benefits (H3a).  The results are similar in the national and Texas samples, providing 
ample support for the general theory.  They suggest two hypothetical possibilities.  
Either the exact same Latino representative would behave differently when elected by 
ward rather than at-large, or the different rules select different types of candidates into 
office.  Both however, would produce the observed outcomes.      
Figure 4.5 displays the predicted values of each system in minority districts in 
Texas.  This picture in conjunction with figure 4.3 shows that even small descriptive 
gains can translate into very large substantive returns.  In ward systems, a one 
percentage point increase in Latino school board representation is associated with a .30 
(national sample) and .28 (Texas sample) percentage point increase in Latino 
administrators.  Latino representation, in fact, has a larger impact than Latino population 
in Texas, and in the national sample the coefficients are similar in magnitude.  
Turning to Latino majority school districts however, we see the same surprising 
results from the descriptive table.  Latino at-large representation in this setting has an 
enormous effect on the staffing of Latino administrators, but in wards, the relationship is 
muted.  The predictions for Texas are displayed in figure 4.6, and show a very different 
picture than the one portrayed in the minority context of figure 4.5.  Again, not only do 
wards not help Latinos when they are a majority, they actually hurt them.  Much like the  
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Figure 4.5: The Substantive Outcomes of Latino Representation in Two 
Types of Latino Minority Districts   
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Figure 4.6: The Substantive Outcomes of Latino Representation in Two 
Types of Latino Majority Districts  
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previous results, we see a consistent structurally induced difference between majority 
and minority politics (this condition relates to population numbers, not majority or 
minority status on the board).  This last finding is surprising because it contradicts H4 in 
a direction I did not originally expect to observe.34 
Continuing now to an examination of the effects of election structure on the 
staffing of Latino teachers, I expect that if there is an influence, it will be small but 
consistent with the findings thus far.  As discussed in chapter 3, school boards are 
directly responsible for the hiring of top-level managers, but their relationship with 
teachers is more nuanced, and involves the superintendent and principals.  This process 
reinforces the importance of Latino representation in the district administration, but may 
reduce the direct influence that a Latino board member possesses.  The influence of 
school board members is likely to be through the adoption of new policies or by 
recruiting more in Latino labor pools.  To investigate the question of teacher 
representation, I use the same equation as in Table 4.2, but add the percentage of Latino 
administrators to the equation to control for their direct impact.  If the top-down story is 
correct, the administrator variable should dominate the model.   
Table 4.3 demonstrates that representation on the school board has little to no 
influence in either sample.  The only significant coefficient for any representation 
variable is in the Texas sample using OLS.  Because this finding is not corroborated in 
the national sample or by the ml beta method, I am not confident in its significance.   
                                                          
34 I expected no difference due to structure in these majority districts.  By “better” I do not refer to the 
absolute advantages seen in figure 6 (due to a larger intercept), rather I simply note the steeper slope. 
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Table 4.3: Bureaucratic Outcomes in Different Systems: Latino Teachers 
Dependent Variable = % Latino Teachers 
 
        National Sample      Texas Sample 
 
Independent Variable    OLS*       ML-Beta**   OLS       ML-Beta 
    
Intercept             -.909                -2.06        
     (-1.19)       (-24.53)   (-3.07)  (-39.05)  
 
Latino Population         .155                     .154        
     (9.88)        (18.95)   (8.85)  (12.51) 
 
% Latino Administrators  .458                 .245      
     (21.81)     (-9.05)   (16.86)  (4.56) 
 
Latino Representation        .028                     .076        
     (1.57)         (-.83)   (2.57)  (1.34) 
 
Ward Elections         .035                    .392      
     (.13)        (-3.57)   (.64)  (5.18) 
 
Ward x Latino Representation   -.014                       -.032     
     (-.51)       (.67)   (-.74)  (-1.55) 
 
Latino Majority            -30.04                      -50.74       
     (-11.72)     (2.93)   (-20.47) (-1.25) 
Latino Majority times 
 
     Latino Population      .626                         .947       
     (12.93)       (-4.28)   (22.55)  (.52) 
 
     Latino Representation  -.081                        -.010      
     (-2.83)       (-.80)   (-.31)  (-.82) 
 
     Wards x Latino Rep.   .024                    .090       
     (.76)       (.11)   (1.90)  (1.04) 
 
Latino Education (H.S.)     .013                     .036     
     (1.43)       (-1.12)   (4.08)  (5.54) 
 
% Latinos Below Poverty    .013                     .0003     
     (1.30)       (-1.05)   (.03)  (-3.56) 
 
 
R Squared                    .91    .93 
F                                1080.03                    1259.39 
N                                  1138                               1002 
Standard Error                       3.73                                4.83 
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Wards do not create the incentives for greater influence on teacher staffing than at-large 
rules, and in fact neither system produces any substantive gains for Latinos.   
Instead, Latino teachers are positively associated with the Latino population, 
Latino education levels (in Texas only), and Latino administrators.  As expected, Latino 
administrators dominate the equation in minority districts, and Latino population 
overwhelmingly controls the process in majority areas.  In short, there is almost no 
empirical support for the hypothesis that school board representation directly affects 
Latino teacher hires.  Also, there is no evidence that election structure changes this 
relationship in any significant manner.  The top-down model of influence however, is 
supported by the large impact of Latino administrators on street-level bureaucratic 
representation.  Because ward-elected board members produce more Latino 
administrators in minority districts, and Latino administrators are largely responsible for 
the staffing of more Latino teachers, the indirect influence of structure on Latino hires 
remains substantial.      
 As I have described them, the findings on bureaucratic representation as 
substantive representation can stand alone.  Other research, however, has shown a 
linkage between the presence of minority teachers in the classroom and in the district, 
and increases in student performance on a variety of measures.  In some ways, this  
consistent evidence provides a defense against the patronage argument for Latino hires.  
That is, if Latino teachers provide true policy benefits to clientele that Anglo teachers 
cannot, then efforts to increase their numbers in the school are reasonable and effective.   
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 As I discussed in chapter three this is exactly why so many school districts in 
Texas are going to great lengths to recruit Latino teachers.  Not only are these teachers 
more likely to have the skill sets to interact with bilingual students better, but they are 
also equipped to handle bilingual parents much better.  As my interview with the former 
superintendent of two school districts in Texas uncovered, Latino teachers are much 
better equipped to handle all of the duties of educating Latino students, including the 
crucial aspect of recruiting family resources to the process (time, money, and effort).  
Because education is a process of co-production between the bureau and the clientele, 
these efforts, while difficult to measure, are essential to student improvement.35   
 Latino teachers also potentially serve as role models to students, and may track 
and discipline students differently than their Anglo counterparts.  The latter aspect 
speaks to the potential general benefits minority bureaucrats bring to a public 
organization.  If, in fact, Anglo teachers (on average) are implementing the policies of 
the school district inefficiently, and using their informational and expertise advantages to 
conceal these practices (see Juenke 2005), then the arrival of bureaucrats who treat these 
students differently would have an objective and shared positive impact on the efficiency 
and effectiveness of organizational outcomes.  Perhaps the recruitment of Latino 
teachers is a process of selecting different types of bureaucrats, ones that have 
preferences matching those of the public and legislature more closely.  
 Tables 4.4 and 4.5 are reproductions of results showing the effects of Latino 
teachers on Latino student outcomes at the district level.  These models were generated  
                                                          
35 This belief was corroborated by an Anglo middle school teacher from Colorado.  He stated that the 
disconnect between himself and the parents of Latino students was significant and debilitating, translating 
to difficulties in the classroom.        
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Table 4.4: Latino Teacher Influence on Latino Student Test Scores 36 
 
Dependent Variable = Latino Pass Rate 
 
Independent Variables               Slope       t-score         
 
Latino Teachers                    .114         3.56 
 
Anglo Test Scores                         .771        15.69 
 
Resources 
 
Teacher Salaries (000s)      .554         2.37 
 
      Per Student Expenditures (000s)     .670           .84 
 
      Class Size                          -.126          .45 
 
      Teacher Experience            -.066          .32 
 
      Noncertified Teachers             .029           .36 
 
Constraints 
 
      Percent Black Students             -.126         3.67 
  
      Percent Latino Students            -.198         6.79 
 
      Percent Low Income Students          .043         1.31 
 
R Squared                                  .30 
F                                                 39.44 
N                                      935 
Standard Error                                 10.08 
                                                          
36 This table is reproduced exactly as it appears in Meier and Juenke (2005; except for style and formatting 
changes).  Ken Meier is responsible for the results, however I have validated them in my own analyses.  
These are OLS regression results estimated using STATA 8. 
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Table 4.5: The Influence of Latino Teachers on Other Policy Indicators in Texas 37 
 
Indicator                  Slope   t-score      R-square     N   
 
Latino Attendance          .022      6.93          .31        989 
 
Latino Dropouts          -.005       .82          .11        930 
 
Latino Advanced Classes   .088      3.55          .33        852 
 
Latinos Taking College 
       Boards              .388      4.99          .23        490 
 
Latino SAT Scores          .644      1.83          .46        248 
 
Latino ACT Scores         -.001       .14          .42        284 
 
Latinos Above 1110 SAT    .084      1.95          .32        360       
 
Latinos in AP Classes      .050      2.50          .44        682 
 
Latinos Passing AP         .048       .39          .55        158 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
All equations control for Anglo performance on the same indicator, teachers salaries, instructional 
funds, class size, teacher experience, noncertified teachers, and percent Latino, Black and poor 
students.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
37 This table is reproduced exactly as it appears in Meier and Juenke (2005; except for style and formatting 
changes).  Ken Meier is responsible for the results, however I have validated them in my own analyses.      
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in Meier and Juenke (2005).  A detailed explanation of the data and analyses can be 
found in there; because my co-author produced these particular results, I simply present 
them as evidence of the effects of increased bureaucratic representation (see also Meier  
and Stewart 1991).38  The data are from the same 1999 Texas dataset used in this paper, 
thus directly connected to the empirical story told thus far.                             
    In the presence of a tightly constrained model, Latino teachers show a positive 
and significant relationship with Latino student performance on the state-mandated 
knowledge and skills test (Table 4.4).39  Testing this same model on a variety of other 
Latino student outcomes shows a fairly consistent pattern of positive effects for Latino 
students (Table 4.5).  Aside from increased Latino attendance, the remaining significant 
relationships in the table seem to revolve around college preparation and interest in post-
secondary education.  At the high-school level, this would appear to support the role 
model hypothesis, as well as the idea that Latino teachers may be tracking students 
differently, and giving more attention to Latino students than their Anglo counterparts.  
This is mere speculation at this point, however, and is not central to the present study.        
 
Discussion 
This chapter developed and examined a top-down perspective of policy change in 
the presence of a variable Latino minority.  Extending the descriptive and theoretical 
                                                          
38 I validated all of these results in my own analyses, but because there is nothing new to add to the models 
I simply duplicate them here.   
 
39 The TAAS test (now TAKS) is the most important government measure of school district quality and 
success in the state of Texas.  It is the model on which other state tests have been developed since the 
adoption of the NCLB Act of 2001.   
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work from the previous chapters, I replaced a general top-down model (figure 4.1) with 
specific formal representations of the local electoral process in public education (figures 
4.2a, 4.2b, and 4.2c).  In particular, these models produce expectations derived from  
differences between at-large and ward election rules.  These expectations related to both 
descriptive and substantive representation of Latino interests.   
In a democracy, broad policy change is initiated from the public who is 
represented by legislative actors.  These legislators then appoint bureaucrats to 
implement policy in a way that minimizes the bureaucrat’s ability to make policy 
adjustments at the street level.  To the extent that this top-down model of influence and 
policy change holds true, we would expect differences in policy outputs and outcomes to 
be related to the constraints faced by legislators.  I examined two particular types of 
electoral constraints and tied them to 1) the amount of Latino descriptive representation 
on the school board, and 2) a particular policy output: the recruitment and hiring of 
Latino administrators and teachers.   
The hypotheses that were tested concerned two important political phenomenon, 
election rules and majority status.  Using national and Texas samples of school districts, 
I provide consistent evidence that both institutions and majority status have a large 
influence on who gets elected and what policy outputs these representatives are 
associated with once in office.  Ward structures have a significant and positive influence 
on the election of Latino school board members in minority districts.  These rules 
continue to have an influence on substantive policy outputs, at least in the recruitment 
and hiring of administrators, even after these legislators take office.  Direct and 
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independent structural effects disappeared once the staffing of Latino teachers was 
examined.  In fact, Latino representation had no consistent effect on this variable.  The 
model was dominated by Latino administrators, however, demonstrating support for the 
general causal chain depicted in figure 4.1.  Finally, using multiple measures from the 
Texas sample, I present evidence from other research (Meier and Juenke 2005) that 
bureaucratic representation is associated with positive educational outcomes.  Structure 
continues to have influence throughout the policy process, even after the election is over.   
The situation in Latino majority districts is clearly different than in those where 
they are a minority.  The evidence suggests that these are political processes, separate 
from Latino culture or history.  In Latino majority districts, contrary to hypotheses H2 
and H5, I found that the structure of elections still matter, but that Latinos use the at-
large system to their advantage.  Instead, their influence as a majority is reduced in 
ward-based school districts.   While the formal logic guides us to this outcome (other 
groups should benefit from wards when Latinos are a majority), I expected that the 
differences between racial groups’ political experiences (mobilization, residential 
segregation, and the use of race as a cue), would interact to suppress any purely 
structural effects in the Latino majority environment.  This is not the case here.  Other 
minority groups may be using the ward structures in Latino majority districts to thwart 
Latino policy.  The tests do not explicitly speak to this, but they consistently provide 
evidence of the effect.   
The next chapter turns this process on its head.  Instead of the simple top-down 
model of structural effects and legislative influence, I look at the possibility that Latino 
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bureaucrats are partly determining Latino legislative representation, and even perhaps 
influencing the rules of the game.  Maybe this entire process is endogenous.  If so, we 
would want to know the magnitude and direction of the relationship each actor has with 
others, and thus, their relationship to policy change in general.  If bureaucrats are helping 
to move policy in ways that normative democratic theory finds unhealthy, we should be 
able to specify exactly where and how it happens.  Where the present chapter uses a 
general pluralist framework of policy change, the next chapter explores the potential 
power of non-pluralist activity for minority populations that have historically been 
denied access to traditional avenues of political power.    
 
  
 
137
CHAPTER V 
THE INFLUENCE OF MINORITY BUREAUCRATS OVER TIME 
 The results from chapter four are compelling but potentially flawed.  A question 
remains as to the nature of causality in the relationships observed thus far.  While the 
pluralistic top-down policy model predicts influence from the public to elected 
representatives and then to bureaucratic agents, another perspective speaks to the 
possible endogeneity of this process.  This chapter finds fault with the assumption that 
election structures are exogenous to the participants in the system.  It also addresses the 
prospect that relationships observed at the level of the organization can mask competing 
causal stories.  More precisely, the questions that spawned this entire research project 
can be stated this way, “What if ward districts were where Latino bureaucrats already 
worked in the first place, and what if they were the cause of the electoral variation and 
Latino legislative representation?”  Instead of being a result of legislative activity 
interacted with institutional constraints, perhaps Latino bureaucrats are the ones that 
started the entire process: structure, legislative representation, and everything else we 
observe in chapter four.      
 In the case of the education bureaucracy, we know that the majority of Latinos 
enter the system as teachers, not school board members or administrators.  Here they 
gain expertise, learn about standard operating procedures, and seek more control over 
the policy process.  Most districts like to “grow” their administrators at home, offering 
training programs and incentives to work their way up the bureaucracy within the district 
This is particularly crucial to underrepresented groups like Latinos, who typically lack 
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the resources for the education and experience required of administrative work 
(Manzano 2005).  Secondly, there is both anecdotal and case study evidence that many 
current school board members were themselves district administrators and teachers (Carr 
2003).  If this process of moving up from street-level positions to managerial positions to 
legislative ones is correct, then the idea that Latino school board members are recruiting 
and hiring more Latino bureaucrats in response to clientele demand may be the 
exception rather than the rule.  Thirdly, Latino teachers can use their ability to shirk and 
sabotage when faced with supervisors they do not want.  In a sense, these agents can use 
their influence to “shop” for a principal (the principal-agent “principal”) until they find 
one that shares their preferences. This bottom-up theoretical process is examined in this 
chapter.       
 
Bureaucratic Representation  
 Every treatment of the policy process, and the role of the bureaucracy in it, 
discusses the potential for implementation that differs from the preferences of the 
legislature (Lipsky 1980; Meier 1979; Peters 2001; Pressman and Wildavsky 1979; 
Rourke 1984; Wilson 1989; Wood and Waterman 1994).  As I discussed in chapter 
three, the education system in the United States provides the perfect policy area to test 
the interaction of minority preferences and bureaucratic implementation shifts.  Local 
policy control, issue saliency, and institutional features that are absent in other public 
organizations help define the education system.  The pluralist perspective of policy 
responsiveness in the face of organized political effort takes a beating when applied to 
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education.  Despite the traditional priority of education in minority communities, they 
continue to occupy the worst schools with the lowest paid teachers in the least effective 
districts.  It is not surprising that minority voters judge candidates based on their racial 
and ethnic characteristics, as Anglo representation (whether a cause or not) has not been 
associated with positive outcomes for Latino clientele when they are a minority.   
 Thus, the general theoretical model from chapter four (seen again in figure 5.1) 
looks much different from the bottom-up perspective (figure 5.2).  Democracy is turned 
upside-down as street-level bureaucrats not only influence the level of Latino 
administrators appointed, but also have a direct influence on the amount of descriptive 
legislative representation present in the system.  Even further, this model predicts that 
Latino teachers may be driving institutional change, either through direct litigation, or 
through their interaction with the public (or particular members of the public).  In the 
same fashion, higher level bureaucrats like superintendents and principals are predicted 
to have an effect on the production of Latino school board members (who would likely 
support their preferences), as well as the rules of the election which would aid this 
endeavor.  
 Having become frustrated with the traditional means of pluralistic politics, did 
Latinos in some communities find ways to influence policy from within?  The tests in 
this chapter speak directly to this question.  Over time, do Latino bureaucrats create 
policy change by “infiltrating” the bureaucracy from the ground up, creating 
opportunities for legislative representation that would not have existed without their 
agency expertise?  If so, the pluralist model is turned on its head.  If this story is true,  
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Figure 5.1: “Top-Down” Political Control 
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Figure 5.2: “Bottom-Up” Policy Influence 
 
 
 
Latino Population  
 
 
Electoral Structure 
 
 
     Descriptive Board Representation 
 
 
Latino Administrators 
 
 
Latino Teachers 
 
 
Student Outcomes 
 
  
 
142
then Latinos have a long way to go before they can influence policy in a more traditional 
manner.  The answer remains to be seen, and can only be addressed empirically with 
data that measure changes over time.               
 Of particular interest in this chapter is the electoral change that some districts 
experienced during the 1990’s.  How does this process occur in the local system?  At the 
city council and state (thus federal) legislative levels, the battles are typically partisan 
(though not without a racial flavor; Adams 2000), and do not concern general structural 
decisions, instead they deal with marginal (but important) ward boundaries.  But in 
nonpartisan elections, ward-based institutional changes are important events in the 
lifetime of the organization. They are costly to litigate, costly to implement, and as we 
have seen, can have tremendous influence on the policy outputs of the organization.          
 Joshua Behr (2004) provides an extensive look at the process of local city council 
redistricting in Black and Latino cities.  While Behr is most interested in how district 
lines are drawn, his findings are related to the present study because they encompass the 
local level and discuss the same legal mechanisms used for institutional change in a 
school district.  He finds that Latinos have a more difficult time than Blacks creating 
“opportunity districts” for their candidate of choice, because of their lower levels of 
political capital and resources, essential ingredients to pressing for minority redistricting.  
He also looks at the role of minority legislative incumbents in the process.  Surprisingly, 
in districts where Latinos hold an at-large seat, the likelihood of creating a minority-
majority district was significantly lessened (Behr 2004).  If the creation of minority 
opportunity districts can be framed as a substantive policy outcome, this result supports 
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the present findings showing lower Latino outcomes in districts with at-large Latino 
members.   
 Florence Adams finds similar qualitative evidence in Watsonville, California 
where Latino activists described a more affluent Latino at-large member as “Tio Taco” 
(a Latino insult similar to “Uncle Tom;” 2000, 42-44).  She also points to possible 
protagonists in the structural shift story – unsuccessful Latino candidates (Adams 2000, 
40).  As elites who have the resources and desire to run for office, these individuals may 
also have the political and economic resources to challenge the organization (or threaten 
to challenge) in court.   
 These are critical factors to keep in mind as I discuss the data and analyses 
below.  As political resources, teachers and administrators who are stakeholders in the 
organization may play a substantial role in the movement from at-large to ward rules.  In 
areas where their expertise is absent, the costs may be too high for low resource voters 
and activists to campaign for change.  Thus, as bureaucratic representatives they might 
act on behalf of their clientele constituency and positively influence institutional change.  
Conversely, in a pluralist model their numbers should actually have a negative 
relationship with the likelihood of electoral change.  If the organization shows signs of 
representation in the legislature and in the bureaucracy without the need for wards, then 
there would seem to be little incentive for any of the actors (Latinos, the school district, 
the Justice Department) to agree to costly and divisive changes.  From this perspective, 
Latino teachers and administrators would be negatively and significantly associated with 
the likelihood of institutional change.                                         
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Data and Methods 
 The data for the following analyses supplement the Texas cross-sectional sample 
in a number of ways.  The percentage of Latinos on the school board from 1993 to 2001 
was gathered using NALEO’s count of Latino elected officials (NALEO multiple years).  
These data are slightly problematic in that they are based on self-reports from NALEO 
members, thus excluding latent Latino officeholders who may be unknown to NALEO, 
potentially producing an undercount.  To validate these reports, another graduate student 
and I cross-listed NALEO’s yearly data with the percentages from the Texas 1999 
sample, as well as data from 1992 Census of Governments report (Census of 
Governments 1992).  The data from these three sources were highly correlated, and 
appropriate adjustments were made to fill in any missing information. 
 Secondly, data for the percentage of Latino teachers, administrators, and students 
were collected from the Texas Education Agency, through their online data archive 
(TEA 2005).  These data go back to the 1993-94 school year thus keeping the analysis 
confined to the years 1993-2001.  I also collected these measures for the Black 
population to conduct the analysis of electoral change.  This process will be discussed 
below.     
These data were supplemented with Census data from 1990 and 2000 for 
population characteristics at the school district level (Census 1990, 2000).  These 
measures include the percentage of the population that is Latino, the percentage of 
Latinos with a high school degree, the percentage of non-citizens, and the percentage of 
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Latinos in poverty.  Related information for Blacks was also recorded.  Because I do not 
have yearly estimates of these variables at the school district level, they are used as 
controls for the early time period (1993) and the later time period of the dataset (2001).  
I also calculate the changes for each of these census measures from 1990 to 2000.                
 Lastly, unlike the cross sectional institutional data from chapter four, I was able 
to generate dynamic structural variation using information from the Justice Department.  
Each district that changes its election rules is required to get pre-clearance from the Civil 
Rights Division, and at my request the Justice Department provided the records for each 
organization that applied for, and received, pre-clearance for change (Justice Department 
2005).  This allows us to observe the year a district changed from at-large to single 
member wards, providing a unique opportunity to look at the direct effects of these 
changes on legislative and bureaucratic representation.  It also opens up the prospect of 
modeling the population and district characteristics that lead to institutional change.   
 Because the evidence in chapters three and four overwhelmingly support a 
separate look at Latino minority districts I contain the analyses in this chapter to those 
where Latinos make up 50 percent or less of the district population 1990.  Because 
structural influence appears to disappear once majority politics takes over, we are most 
interested in whether electoral variation has any effects across time, or whether the 
cross-sectional, top-down relationships are spurious.  In results not shown, majority 
politics does indeed interact differently with electoral variation over time.   
 In sum, I create a pooled cross-sectional dataset with eight years of information 
encompassing over one thousand school districts.  The election rules vary over time, as 
  
 
146
some school districts change from at-large to wards, providing extra leverage over the 
cross section used in the analyses from chapter four.  The nature of these data cause both 
empirical and theoretical difficulties that should be discussed.   
Empirically, a cross-section of this nature, where the units (1000+) far outnumber 
the time points (8), hinders our ability to speak to changes over time because the spatial 
variation dominates observed changes over time.  There are methods to correct for this, 
but endogeneity tests like VAR, SEM, or SURE, and to an extent traditional Granger 
causality tests, are not equipped to handle these kinds of situations (Greene 2003, 592-
593; Gujarati 2003, multiple chapters).  Models that are fixed over space and time can be 
estimated, and I do so, but they are limited by theoretical problems.     
 When we think about the cross-sectional results, they make theoretical sense.  
Public organizations with more Latino legislative representation are associated with 
more bureaucratic representation, all else equal.  And this legislative representation finds 
additional influence when it is supported (or constrained) by ward elections.  That is, 
representative variation, both positive and negative is related to positive and negative 
variation across space.  Is this what we would expect to see over time?  Yes, and no.  It 
is certainly expected that as Latinos get elected to the school board, they have the ability 
to appoint more Latino administrators and teachers to the district (this is the crux of the 
entire theoretical argument!).  But what happens when Latino representatives lose their 
seats (even if temporarily)?  Do we expect that Latino administrators and teachers will 
now lose their jobs or leave the district?  Not likely.  Perhaps if these jobs were strictly 
based on patronage we might expect a decrease in bureaucratic representation when 
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legislative representation is lost.  But this is obviously not the case in local education.  
These bureaucrats have an inordinate amount of job security.  Therefore, over time, as 
Latino representation fluctuates from year to year, or election to election, we would not 
expect to see co-variation in the Latino bureaucracy.  And this is not the only problem.   
 What is more difficult to come to grips with is how we expect this process to 
work in the absence of variation in Latino representation.  For example, take a 
hypothetical school district using ward elections that has one Latino school board 
member during the entire eight year period under observation.  This board member is the 
“ideal” representative of the theoretical model, bringing in new Latino administrators 
and teachers throughout the 1990’s.  The district will indicate 14 percent Latino 
representation (one out of seven members) for eight years and thus no variation across 
time.  But we expect theoretically that this one representative will have a substantial 
influence on teacher and administrative representation, especially if they stay in office 
for such a long tenure.  Thus, none of the positive effects towards bureaucratic 
representation will be attributed to the constant legislative representation.  This constant 
will not be related empirically to variation in the dependent variable, even though 
theoretically this is exactly what is happening.   
The “constant representation” problem can also be applied to the bottom-up 
model, where bureaucrats influence who gets elected.  If successful, these bureaucrats 
may achieve their goal of getting a Latino elected to the board in 1994, but if their 
numbers remain relatively constant over time (or even decrease), and they are successful 
in gaining a second seat in 1996, they will not be empirically credited for their influence.  
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There are a variety of other scenarios (each of them the rule rather than the exception), 
that disable a traditional year to year analysis.  Add to this that spatial variation across 
the 1000+ districts during the 1990’s is substantial, thus dominating any of the small (but 
significant) changes over time, and we can see that solving the endogeneity problems 
takes some creative thinking.   
This is, however, the goal of this chapter and the research project in general.  
Changes in the demographic makeup of Texas school systems did occur during the 
1990’s, and in fact we see evidence of these changes in Figures 5.3 – 5.6.  I create four 
categories of Latino representation for all Latino minority districts in 1993 and 2001: 1) 
“No Representation” districts are those where there are no Latino teachers, 
administrators, or school board members, 2) “Teachers Only” districts have no school 
board or administrative representation, 3) “Mixed” organizations have at least some 
administrative and school board representation in addition to (or even in the absence of) 
teacher representation, and 4) “All” districts with Latino representation in all three levels 
of the organization.   
Comparing the samples across electoral systems and across time reveals some 
telling evidence.  Looking at figure 5.3 (at-large in 1993) and figure 5.4 (ward in 1993), 
we can see that only 10 percent of the ward systems have no Latino representation, 
compared with almost half of the at-large districts.  Without controlling for other factors, 
it is not possible to explain these differences as effects of the election rules alone; 
however it does indicate that ward systems are inherently different than their at-large  
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Figure 5.3: Latino Representation in Minority, At-Large 
Districts: 1993-1994 (N = 825)
Representation at
All Levels
3 %
Teachers Only
33 %
No
Representation
49 %
Mixed
Representation
15 % 
Figure 5.4: Latino Representation in Minority, Ward
Districts: 1993-1994 (N = 68)
Representation at
All Levels 
28 % 
Teachers Only 
34 %
No
Representation 
10 %
Mixed
Representation 
28 %
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Figure 5.5: Latino Representation in Minority, At-Large 
Districts: 2001-2002 (N = 773)
Mixed
Representation
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No
Representation
36 %
Teachers Only
41 %
Representation at
All Levels
4 %
Figure 5.6: Latino Representation in Minority, Ward
Districts: 2001-2002 (N = 112)
Representation at
All Levels 
33 %
Teachers Only 
29 %
No
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4 % 
Mixed
Representation 
33 % 
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counterparts.  Keep in mind that only minority districts are included in these figures, 
controlling, in part, for Latino population.                      
 The changes across time are even more informative.  Comparing figure 5.3 to 
figure 5.5, we see that there has been little change in at-large districts across time.  
Certainly, those districts with no representation have decreased in number during the 
eight year period (from 49 to 36 percent), but the majority of that change can be 
attributed to districts with teacher representation only (from 33 to 41 percent), and some 
change in mixed systems (15 to 19 percent).   
A related examination of the ward systems across time shows a different pattern 
(figures 5.4 and 5.6).  First, note that in 2001 forty-four more organizations use ward 
rules to select their board members than did in 1993.  Secondly, from 1993 to 2001 
districts with “No Representation” decreased sixty percent.  Unlike at-large systems 
however, this change was at multiple levels of the organization.  The percentage of 
districts with “teacher only” representation actually decreases, suggesting some 
movement in the bureaucracy and legislature over time.  This is in fact what occurs, as 
both “Mixed” and “All” representative districts increase in number.   
The figures are interesting and informative, but in the absence of other control 
measures they are inconclusive.  Did top-down or bottom-up activity produce these 
results?  Is there any institutional evidence at all, or were districts that changed from at-
large to ward during the 1990’s already different from their at-large counterparts.  
Potentially, descriptive representation in the legislature and bureaucracy were already 
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present in these “changed” systems when some outside factor (MALDEF or LULAC or 
just an angry parent) forced them to switch their election rules.    
 
Results and Analyses 
In light of the initial descriptive evidence in support of structural influence over 
time, I present some analyses that are more rigorous.  Because of the empirical and 
theoretical difficulties with the pooled cross-sectional dataset discussed above, the 
preliminary analyses are constrained to the first and last years of the pool.  I approach 
the time dynamic by asking what outcomes we expect to see in 2001 based on the 
representational elements present in 1993.  That is, in the first models, I want to see if 
there are marginal gains made by one level of representation after controlling for a 
lagged dependent variable and other measures.  Here we are not interested in coefficient 
magnitudes, as much as the sign and significance of the variables.  To the extent that 
these relationships are endogenous, the coefficient magnitudes will be biased in the 
presence of a lagged dependent variable.  The first models look like the following: 
 
Model 1 
LADMIN2001 = Constant + b1LSBR1993 + b2LADMIN1993 + 
b3LTEACH1993 + b4WARD1993 + b5 (WARD1993*LSBR1993) + sum of 
effects for control variables + error term 
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Model 2 
LTEACH2001 = Constant + b1LSBR1993 + b2LADMIN1993 + 
b3LTEACH1993 + b4WARD1993 + b5 (WARD1993*LSBR1993) + sum of 
effects for control variables + error term 
 
Model 3 
LSBR2001 = Constant + b1LSBR1993 + b2LADMIN1993 + 
b3LTEACH1993 + b4WARD1993 + b5 (WARD1993*LPOP1993) + sum of 
effects for control variables + error term 
Where: 
LSBR – % Latino school board representation 
WARD – Used ward rules in 1993 
LADMIN – % Latino administrative representation 
LTEACH – % Latino teacher representation 
LPOP – % Latino population 
 These are essentially cross-sectional designs with lagged effects.  These are very 
strict models that deal with the time element by controlling for the lagged dependent 
variable as well as contemporaneous factors.  The control variables for these three 
models include district enrollment, the percentage of Latinos in the population, those 
with a high school degree, those below poverty, and in the last model, the percentage of 
non-citizens (which is expected to influence election results because these individuals 
can’t vote).  These controls are for the year 2001 (Census 2000), and provide a 
substantial amount of population context.  That is, if the top-down model is correct, 
these variables will contribute to the representation process at all levels.          
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 The general hypotheses for this chapter reflect the endogenous nature of the 
representational process and take the general form: 
 
Explaining Latino Administration 
 
H1 In Latino minority districts, Latino school board members (in 1993) will be  
associated with the presence of more Latino administrators (in 2001).   
 
H1a In Latino minority districts, Latino school board members in ward systems (in 1993)  
will be associated with the presence of more Latino administrators (in 2001) than  
will Latino representatives in at-large systems.   
 
Explaining Latino Teachers 
 
H2 In Latino minority districts, Latino school board members (in 1993) will be  
associated with the presence of more Latino teachers (in 2001).   
 
H2a In Latino minority districts, Latino school board members in ward systems (in 1993)  
will be associated with the presence of more Latino teachers (in 2001) than will 
Latino representatives in at-large systems.   
 
Explaining Latino School Board Representation 
 
H3 In Latino minority districts, ward-based systems will be associated with a higher  
percentage of Latino school board members (in 2001) than at-large systems, as 
the percentage of Latinos in the district increases (in 1993). 
 
H3a In Latino minority districts, Latino administrators (in 1993) will be associated with a  
higher percentage of Latino school board members (in 2001). 
 
H3b In Latino minority districts, Latino teachers (in 1993) will be associated with a  
higher percentage of Latino school board members (in 2001). 
 
Contextual Characteristics 
Latino Population: Latino population is expected to have a positive relationship with all  
three dependent variables. 
 
Latino Education: Districts with more Latinos with a high school degree are expected to  
be positively associated with all three dependent variables. 
 
Latino Poverty: Districts with more Latinos in poverty are expected to have a negative  
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relationship with all three dependent variables.  
 
Enrollment: As an indicator of urban areas, the enrollment measure is expected to have a  
positive relationship with all three dependent variables.  This stems from the fact 
that this is generally where the minority population in Texas tends to reside, and 
that these larger districts are actively recruiting Latino bureaucrats to their 
system.    
 
 
Explaining Relationships over Time 
 Tables 5.1 through 5.3 present the OLS results for the primary analyses.  All of 
the models were estimated using Huber-White standard errors to account for observed 
heteroscedasticity.  The percentage of Latino administrators in 2001 is the dependent 
variable in Table 5.1.  The first column displays the results for all of the districts in the 
sample, and shows that Latino teachers, Latino board members, and election structure 
appear to have no additional influence beyond what is explained by Latino 
administrators in 1993.  Also, though not shown in the table, Latino population and 
enrollment affect the percentage of Latino administration positively and significantly.   
Columns two and three break the sample into those districts with no Latino 
administrators in 1993 and those that did.  If Latino board representation has any 
influence on bringing more Latinos to the system, then we should see evidence of this in 
column two.  In districts with no Latino administrators, however, none of the 
independent variables explain variation eight years later, and the amount of explained 
variance is near zero.  Districts that had at least some administrative representation in 
1993 show a relationship between board and bureaucratic representation in 2001.  It is  
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Table 5.1. Explaining Administrative Representation in Latino Minority 
Districts: 1993 – 2001  
 
OLS Dependent Variable: % Administrators in the District Who are Latino (in 2001-02) 
 Latino Administrators in  
1993-94? 
 
Independent Variables40 All Districts No Yes 
 
% Latino Admin. (1993)              .52**  … … 
 
% Latino Teachers (1993)              .29  .27 .60 
 
% Latino Board Members (1993)               .01  -.02 .19* 
 
Interaction 
 
Ward Structure (1993)     .73  .17 1.83 
 
x  % Latino Board Members (1993)          -.02 -.02 -.07 
 
 
Number of Cases         820 729 91 
R2          .27 .04 .46 
F         26.54** 5.88** 13.31** 
 
* indicates significance at <.05  ** < .01    0 < .10 
All models estimated using STATA 8.0, White-Huber standard errors used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
40 All models include (2001) controls for % Latino students, % Latino population in district, % Latinos 
with a high school diploma, % Latinos below poverty, and total enrollment.   In the interest of clarity, I do 
not report these results here.   
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Table 5.2. Explaining Teacher Representation in Latino Minority Districts: 
1993 – 2001  
 
OLS Dependent Variable:  % Teachers in the District Who are Latino (in 2001-02) 
 Latino Teachers in 1993-94? 
 
Independent Variables41 All Districts No Yes 
 
% Latino Admin. (1993)              .16**     .07**   .23** 
 
% Latino Teachers (1993)              .41**  … … 
 
% Latino Board Members (1993)               .02 0   .01   .05** 
 
Interaction 
 
Ward Structure (1993)     .39  .64  .14 
 
x  % Latino Board Members (1993)           .03*  .05*  .02 
 
 
Number of Cases         822 410 412 
R2          .68 .21 .65 
F         99.12** 46.17** 77.61** 
 
 
* indicates significance at <.05  ** < .01    0 < .10 
All models estimated using STATA 8.0, White-Huber standard errors used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41 All models include (2001) controls for % Latino population in district, % Latinos with a high school 
diploma, % Latinos below poverty, and total enrollment.   In the interest of clarity, I do not report these 
results here.   
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Table 5.3. Explaining School Board Representation in Latino Minority 
Districts: 1993 – 2001  
 
OLS Dependent Variable:  % of Board that is Latino (in 2001-02) 
 Latino Representation  
in 1993-94? 
 
Independent Variables42 All Districts No Yes 
 
% Latino Admin. (1993)              .01  .04  -.05 
 
% Latino Teachers (1993)              .27  .22   .96 0 
 
% Latino Board Members (1993)               .69**   …   … 
 
Interaction 
 
Ward Structure (1993)    -1.13 -1.04 -6.53 
 
x  % Latino Population (1993)           .15 0  .26**  .18 
 
 
Number of Cases         873 764 109 
R2          .57 .24 .18 
F         25.97**  7.20**  3.41** 
 
 
* indicates significance at <.05  ** < .01    0 < .10 
All models estimated using STATA 8.0, White-Huber standard errors used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42 All models include (2001) controls for % Latino population in district, % Latinos with a high school 
diploma, % Latinos below poverty, % Non-Citizens, and total enrollment.   In the interest of clarity, I do 
not report these results here.   
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unclear if this relationship is top-down or bottom-up, because endogeneity is already 
present in this sub-sample by definition.  Also, there is no evidence of institutional 
effects in any of the models.   
What about teachers?  Table 5.2 presents the same analysis based on a Latino 
teacher (in 2001) dependent variable.  Here, unlike in the cross-sectional results from 
chapter four, we see substantial evidence of a top-down process.  After controlling for 
the percentage of teachers in 1993, Latino administrators are significantly and positively 
associated with more Latino teachers in 2001.  Latino school board members are also 
associated with more Latino teachers in districts where there was already a bureaucratic 
presence in 1993.  Most striking, in systems where there were no Latino teachers in 
1993, Latino ward representation on the school board produces significant and positive 
teacher representation eight years later.  Even after employing strict controls, Latino 
school board representation influences who is hired in the district years later, and in 
those districts with the least amount of bureaucratic representation we find that structure 
plays an influential role in the process.  
Now we would like to see if bureaucratic representation has any influence on 
who gets elected to the school board.  In table 5.3 we see the results of this examination.  
Contrary to expectations, Latino administrative levels in 1993 appear to have no effect 
on Latino legislative representation in 2001.  In addition, we see very little evidence of 
teacher influence, except perhaps in districts that already have Latino representation 
(column three).  But much like the results in table 5.1 this finding simply reinforces 
causality questions, as it does not speak to whether one caused the other given that they 
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are both present and related from the starting point (1993).  Instead, the top-down model 
of influence finds more support.  Not only is Latino population associated with more 
Latino school board members, after controlling for representation levels in 1993, but 
ward election structures play an influential role in this process.  Higher levels of 
descriptive representation are found in ward districts than in at-large systems, all else 
equal.  More interesting is the result that indicates where this is taking place.  In column 
two we see that among districts where there was no Latino representation in 1993, those 
using ward elections produced significantly more Latino representation.   
 
Explaining Change over Time 
The evidence presented in the first three tables builds support for a top-down 
model, but there is another way to look at this question.  In tables 5.4 – 5.7 I use the 
amount of change in representation as dependent variables, instead of the observed 
levels in 2001.  That is, I subtract the percentage of Latinos at each level in 1993 from 
their 2001 measures.  The descriptive statistics for these change variables can be found 
in the appendices.  In many ways these models represent the theoretical story much more 
closely because we are interested in how each group affects the amount of change over 
time.   
Table 5.4 displays the results of administrative change regressed on the 
independent variables from 1993.  I control for the base level of representation in 1993, 
and test for independent effects from the other measures.  Secondly, while the main  
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Table 5.4. Explaining Change in Latino Administration in Minority 
Districts: 1993 – 2001  
 
OLS Dependent Variable:  Change in % Latino Administrators (1993-2001) 
 
  
All Districts 
No Latino Administrators in 
1993-94 
Independent Variables43    
% Latino Admin. (1993)            -.47** … 
 
% Latino Teachers (1993)              .42**    .40* 
 
% Latino Board Members (1993)             .02 -.01 
 
Interaction 
 
Ward Structure (1993)   1.18   .66 
 
x  % Latino Board Members (1993) -.01  -.01  
 
 
Number of Cases         812 721 
R2          .10 .05 
F           5.24**  6.89**  
* indicates significance at <.05  ** < .01    0 < .10 
All models estimated using STATA 8.0, White-Huber standard errors used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
43 All models include controls for Change in % Latino population in district, Change in the % of Latinos 
with a high school diploma, Change in the % of Latinos below poverty, and total enrollment in 2001.  In 
the interest of clarity, I do not report these results here.   
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Table 5.5. Explaining Change in Latino Teachers in Minority Districts: 
1993 – 2001  
 
OLS Dependent Variable:  Change in % Latino Teachers (1993-2001) 
 
  All Districts No Latino Teachers in 1993-94 
Independent Variables44    
% Latino Admin. (1993)               .17**     .09** 
 
% Latino Teachers (1993)              -.38**  … 
 
% Latino Board Members (1993)              .03*  .01 
 
Interaction 
 
Ward Structure (1993)    1.43**  1.11 0 
 
x  % Latino Board Members (1993)   .05**  .08* 
 
 
Number of Cases         814 402 
R2          .23 .09 
F          11.83** 14.12**  
* indicates significance at <.05  ** < .01    0 < .10 
All models estimated using STATA 8.0, White-Huber standard errors used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
44 All models include controls for Change in % Latino population in district, Change in the % of Latinos 
with a high school diploma, Change in the % of Latinos below poverty, and total enrollment in 2001.  In 
the interest of clarity, I do not report these results here.   
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Table 5.6. Explaining Change in Latino Representation in Minority 
Districts: 1993 – 2001  
 
OLS Dependent Variable:  Change in % Latino Board Members (1993-2001) 
 
  
All Districts 
No Latino Board Members in 
1993-94 
Independent Variables45    
% Latino Admin. (1993)            -.03 -.05 
 
% Latino Teachers (1993)            .31  .09 
 
% Latino Board Members (1993)              -.26**  … 
 
Interaction 
 
Ward Structure (1993)    2.05  2.92* 
 
x  % Latino Population (1993)  -.02 -.02 
 
 
Number of Cases         815 402 
R2          .16 .09 
F           4.57** 14.12**  
* indicates significance at <.05  ** < .01    0 < .10 
All models estimated using STATA 8.0, White-Huber standard errors used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
45 All models include controls for Change in % Latino population in district, Change in the % of Latinos 
with a high school diploma, Change in the % of Latinos below poverty, and total enrollment in 2001.  In 
the interest of clarity, I do not report these results here.   
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Table 5.7. Explaining Change in Latino Representation 
in Minority Districts: 1993 – 2001: Controlling for Structural Change  
 
OLS Dependent Variable:  Change in % Latino Board Members (1993-2001) 
 
  All Districts 
No Latino Board Members in 
1993-94 
Independent Variables46    
% Latino Admin. (1993)            -.05 -.07 
 
% Latino Teachers (1993)                .51**     .47** 
 
% Latino Board Members (1993)               -.28**  … 
 
Interaction 
 
Ward Structure Change in 90’s   -3.35  -3.01 
 
x  % Latino Population (1993)   .30*     .40** 
   
x  % Latino Administrators (1993)  .30    .80* 
   
x  % Latino Teachers (1993) -.26   -.74  
 
 
Number of Cases         869 760 
R2          .18 .25 
F           4.42** 5.50**  
* indicates significance at <.05  ** < .01    0 < .10 
All models estimated using STATA 8.0, White-Huber standard errors used. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
46 All models include controls for Change in % Latino population in district, Change in the % of Latinos 
with a high school diploma, Change in the % of Latinos below poverty, and total enrollment in 2001.  In 
the interest of clarity, I do not report these results here.   
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independent variables of interest remain the same, the control variables have been 
converted into change variables to account for population and contextual changes during 
the 1990’s.  Again, these are very strict controls, and the coefficient magnitudes are 
unimportant.  We are most interested in the sign and significance of each variable.   
The results for the full sample in column one generally support the findings from 
table 5.1, with one significant difference.  Latino administrators do not seem to come 
from districts with Latino school board representation, rather they seem to stem from 
population characteristics (both Latino population change and enrollment change were 
positive and significant), and from the ranks of teachers.  There is strong evidence of 
home grown administration, particularly in districts with no Latino administrators in 
1993 (column two).  These are exactly the districts where we would expect to see some 
effects from the bureaucracy and from the school board.  Evidence of school board 
influence is consistently absent. 
In table 5.5, I perform the same analyses using the change in percentage of 
Latino teachers over the eight year period.  There is strong evidence here for the top-
down theoretical process.  Not only do districts with more administrators and school 
board members bring in more teachers, but the effects of the election structure are 
significant as well.  In fact, similar to the results from table 5.2, in districts where there 
were no Latino teachers in 1993, ward elected school board members (compared to their 
at-large counterparts) produce a positive influence on the dependent variable.                                
Table 5.6 provides a look at the opposite process.  Consistent with table 5.3’s 
findings, there is little evidence of a bottom up process.  Teachers and administrators 
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have no influence on changes in Latino representation during the 1990’s.  Instead these 
changes come from the top of the political food chain: the people.  Changes in Latino 
population and Latino education over the decade are the main contributors to 
representation change (results not shown).  Lastly, the use of wards changes the 
representational intercept in those districts that had Latino representation in 1993.  This 
is exactly where gains from structure are expected, as lack of representation is one of the 
key reasons for changing structure in the first place.   
Next, I explore the Justice Department data on electoral change during the 
1990’s.  These data allow us to look at two separate issues.  First we want to know if 
districts that changed rules in the early part of the 90’s, before the courts made it more 
difficult to do so, experienced the kind of change that their “already ward” and “at-large” 
counterparts did not.  Districts that already used ward rules prior to the 1990’s would not 
be expected to evidence as great a change as newly structured districts.  Ninety-six 
Texas districts went through this change in the 1990’s, and we want to see if the causal 
processes operate differently here than in other districts.  This is particularly pertinent in 
terms of observed change during this time period.  Districts that were using wards prior 
to 1990 would be expected to show smaller changes (if any) than those that were more 
recently granted the rule change.   
Table 5.7 displays the results for a test of bottom-up influence.  The other two 
(top-down) models are not presented, as their results are supportive of earlier outcomes.  
The findings in table 5.7 however, are intriguing.  I created a dummy variable for the 
districts that changed election rules during the 1990’s.  I then interact this dummy 
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variable with Latino population, and each type of Latino bureaucrat to look for separate 
slope estimates in newly changed districts.  These interaction slopes are comparable to 
both ward and at-large districts that did not experience change during the 1990’s 
(creating a very tough and reasonable test for independent effects due simply to these 
new rules).47  The Latino population consistently contributes to more Latino legislative 
representation.  One of the most interesting findings however, is that the percentage of 
Latino administrators has a positive and significant influence on the dependent variable 
in districts were no Latinos were on the school board in 1993, and the rules of the game 
were changed.  This is a fairly concrete bit of evidence (and one of the first so far) that 
Latino administrators in districts that change their election rules to favor Latino 
candidates are a significant factor in bringing them into office.  In the absence of more 
consistent findings across estimations it is difficult to know if this is evidence of a 
general relationship, or is simply constrained to these changed environments.                      
 
Explaining Institutional Change 
The data from the Justice Department also allow an examination of the factors 
that contribute to institutional change.  To do this, I estimate a nonlinear Probit model 
that pits different theoretical perspectives against one another.  There are three general 
groups of interest in explaining the change from at-large to ward districts during the 
1990’s.  The first is the public.  Whether it is a push from Latino voters, or from groups 
                                                          
47 Excluding districts that already use wards to select their members would in effect turn the “Change” 
dummy into an informal “Ward” measure.  This is not theoretically consistent.  We want to know if these 
particular wards had any effect.         
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like MALDEF and LULAC advocating for Latinos, it is expected that districts with 
more Latinos, more education, and less poverty will experience rule changes.  Latino 
education and poverty are indicators of the public resources available to litigate (or 
threaten litigation) institutional rule changes.  Petitioning the Civil Rights Division for 
electoral changes is a costly process and should dissuade low resource areas from 
winning the right to transform.  Also, urban areas of higher concentration should be 
more likely to change, thus enrollment is expected to have a positive influence.     
After controlling for these general population characteristics, it is expected that 
districts with more Latino teachers and administrators will have a higher probability of 
initiating change.  If the bureaucratic representation story is correct, these agents because 
of their information, expertise, and discretionary influence, should have some control 
over the rules of the game.  If this relationship is found, it would put the previous 
representational findings in a much different perspective.  This would be significant 
evidence for the power of the agent to help select their legislative masters.   
Thirdly, because a lack of legislative representation is one of the necessary 
factors in the process of changing from at-large to ward rules, I expect Latinos on the 
school board to have a negative relationship with the probability of institutional change.  
More clearly, if Latinos are achieving descriptive representation in the district, the 
school system has good reason to believe that change is unnecessary.  An alternative 
hypothesis is possible however.  The story of wards is the story of turning descriptive 
representation into substantive representation.  If, as the evidence consistently 
demonstrates, at-large elected Latinos are unable to convert their position into policy 
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outputs, then it is possible that they may advocate for institutional modification.  
Because of their high ranking position in the district, these members would have 
substantial amounts of political, social, and legal resources available for such action.  
This suggests that Latino board members have a positive influence on the probability of 
changing the rules of the game.  The competing hypotheses are tested using a different 
measure of representation.  In an effort to overcome the “constant representation” 
problem discussed previously, I transform the interval school board measure into a 
dummy variable: 0 = no representation on the board, and 1 = Latino representation.  This 
changes the model from one that looks at increases in Latino representation across 
districts to one that examines the simple difference between some representation and 
none.          
Lastly, I include measures of Black population and bureaucratic contextual 
factors because some of the districts that changed may be related to Black instead of 
Latino politics.  The VRA was originally conceived in terms of Black civil rights’ 
protection, and it is important to control for these features of the district.  During the 
time period under investigation, however, and due to the high concentration of Blacks in 
Texas to the largest cities (most of which changed their structures in the 1970’s and 
1980’s) these measures are not expected to play a role in the process.  For this decade 
and in this state, the process is conceived as one dominated by Latinos.       
Table 5.8 presents the results of the Probit analysis.  For obvious reasons the 
estimation excludes districts that have historically used wards.  First, it is readily  
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Table 5.8. Explaining the Switch to Ward Elections During the 1990’s in 
Minority Districts: Probit results 
 
Dependent Variable:  Change from At-large (0) to Ward (1) Elections (Excludes 
districts that already used wards in 1993) 
 
  
Coefficient 
(Standard Error) 
Marginal Effect 
(When Latino Rep.=0, others 
at mean) 
Independent Variables48    
Latino Representation (0,1; 1993) .30 (.20) .028 
 
% Latino Population (1990) .06** (.01) .007 
 
% Latino Teachers (1993) .002 (.02) .000 
 
% Latino Administrators (1993)      -.003 (.01) -.000 
 
% Latino with HS diploma (1990) .910 (.54) .085 
 
Enrollment (in 1000’s; 1993)             .02* (.01) .000 
 
% Black Teachers (1993)  -.002 (.02) -.000 
 
% Black Population (1990)   .02 (.01) .002 
 
% Black with HS diploma (1990) .40 (.30) .037 
 
% Black Below Poverty (1990) .74** (.28) .069 
 
% Latino Below Poverty (1990) .08 (.41) .008 
 
Constant -3.15 (.32) … 
 
 
Number of Cases         833  
Wald Chi2        185.06**  
McFadden’s Adj. R2          .29    
                                                          
48 * indicates significance at <.05  ** < .01    0 < .10 
All models estimated using STATA 8.0. 
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apparent that neither Latino bureaucratic or legislative representation has anything to do 
with the decision to use ward rules.  None of these measures achieves statistical 
significance, suggesting that the initial institution-building process has little to do with 
them.  Population characteristics do influence this process however. Districts with more 
Latinos, higher Latino education levels, and higher overall enrollment are all more likely 
to change from at-large to ward systems during this time period.  The marginal effect of 
the Latino education measure is particularly interesting in that it is the largest in the 
model.  The marginal effects are generated with Latino representation set at zero, and the 
other variables at their means.  Theoretically we are interested in the size of the effects 
when there is no Latino representation on the board.                                                                   
 By and large the measures of Black politics do not play a role in the institutional 
change process, with one interesting exception.  Black education levels, population 
numbers and bureaucratic influence do not contribute significantly to the model, 
however Black poverty is significantly and positively associated with the likelihood of 
change.  This is intriguing because in the presence of the other controls, districts with 
higher levels of Black poverty are more likely to move from at-large to ward rules.  Not 
only is this contrary to expectations about community resources, but in light of the 
evidence favoring a Latino politics perspective, the findings support an interesting 
Black/Latino dynamic.  This is speculation, but perhaps Black poverty in the district has 
an influence on the Latino decision process to campaign for redress.  It is also possible 
that Black-influenced ward changes are simply about fixing underperforming districts, 
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and that this has nothing to do with Latino politics.  Much more work in this area is 
needed before we can determine the causes.  The general evidence does however fit with 
the substantial top-down support seen in the previous sections.              
 
Discussion 
 Do organizational inputs reflect an overwhelming bureaucratic influence?  I 
examined this question using a cross-sectional time series dataset encompassing eight 
years in Texas.  The general results consistently support a pluralistic model of minority 
policy influence flowing from public demographic and resource characteristics to 
minority descriptive representation, and then to substantive outcomes.  Ward structures 
interact with Latino board representation in the manner described by the national and 
Texas results from chapter three, but the relationship over time is strongest between 
Latino representatives and Latino teachers.  Even in the presence of strict lagged 
controls, every model of street-level Latino representation showed evidence of a positive 
relationship between school members and teachers, and the relationship was strongest in 
districts with ward rules and districts where Latinos were underrepresented in the 
classroom.   
 I did not find the same type of evidence for administrative representation.  While 
there is certainly a connection between Latino administrators and school board members, 
the causal process is still rather murky.  Not only was there no general legislative 
influence on the recruitment of minority administrators, but even ward structures failed 
to provide additional institutional incentives for these outputs.   This does not mean that 
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the strong cross-sectional findings are wrong, but it does mean that this relationship is 
much more complicated than when first conceived.   
 Although there was a fairly top-down flavor to the findings here, there were a 
few indications of an endogenous process in particular environments.  Latino teachers 
were related positively to both administrative change (table 5.4) and Latino 
representation in 2001 (table 5.3).  The first result is the most compelling because it is 
consistent across multiple tests and is significant in the most typical Texas environment, 
when teachers are present and Latino administrators are not.  The finding reflects the 
home-grown nature of many administrators in Texas schools.  The second result is 
interesting but inconsistent across estimations, and it is difficult to sort out the causal 
questions based on this alone.         
Lastly, Latino administrators had one significant relationship with Latino board 
representation (table 5.7).  In newly changed districts, Latino administrators appear to be 
very influential in bringing Latinos to the board.  More compelling is that this occurs in 
districts with no Latino legislative representation in 1993, providing strong causal 
evidence for the effect.  The result, however, stands alone in the bevy of null findings for 
this relationship, and so awaits future verification.                 
As for institutional change, the bureaucracy seems to play no active role in this 
process.  At least at the level of the organization.  It is possible that they function in 
accordance with Latino advocacy groups outside of the public organization, but it is not 
possible to tease out this relationship with these data.  Instead, electoral rules appear to 
come from demographic characteristics, particularly Latino education and population 
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factors, although the role of Black poverty is substantial and significant.  These models 
also need to be explored further using more precise estimation techniques (perhaps a 
survival model).        
I discuss these results within the context of the entire project in the concluding 
chapter.  I also discuss the full model using estimated lags for each component of this 
endogenous process.        
  
 
175
CHAPTER VI  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
There were three stated purposes for the research presented here.  The first was to 
explain how political institutions and policy outputs can change in the presence of a 
growing minority population when the preferences of these minorities differ from those 
of the majority.  I discussed how representation in all three branches of government can 
lead to these changes, specifically in the local legislature and local bureaucracy.  
Secondly, I demonstrated the relationship between local legislative representation of 
Latino minority populations to substantive policy outcomes that favor this minority 
group, and explained how variable electoral institutions influence this relationship.  The 
third general purpose of this research was to make the argument that the study of 
minority politics need not take place within a theoretical vacuum.  That is, I use theories 
of minority group behavior (as opposed to Latino group behavior), and relevant 
empirical tests, to inform mainstream democratic theory.  The theory and findings speak 
to the ability of democratic theory to fully explain and predict changes in institutions, 
policy, and policy outputs in a dynamic preference environment.  A minority politics 
research program can provide substantial insight into these processes.   
 I asked a simple question in this project: “Where does Latino legislative 
representation come from in a minority Latino environment?”   The prime suspects in 
the causal story were the public and the bureaucracy.  The former reflects a traditional, 
pluralistic, top-down model of policy influence.  The latter suggests a less democratic (in 
many respects), but nonetheless effective means for gaining political influence when the 
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majority thwarts traditional efforts.  I also examined the role of electoral institutions in 
this process, and conversely, the role of each of the actors in shaping institutional 
variation.   
 Using education policy as a means to test ideas about institutional effects, 
descriptive and substantive representation, and minority vs. majority politics, I was able 
to contribute to a number of issues in different subfields of political science.  
Representation scholars interested in how under-represented groups can gain access to 
the policy process when denied traditional avenues find that minority bureaucrats may 
play an indirect role.  Policy and political control theorists might be alarmed by the 
possibility of this function for the public agent.  The results reported here speak to some 
of the circumstances that may lead to minority influence during the implementation 
process.  Particular policy areas like education are more susceptible to policy shifts 
during implementation, mostly at the local level where outcomes are murky and the 
clientele are significant contributors to their production.  The question is, “Does this 
happen, and if so, how?”   
 Education policy in the United States is characterized by a number of factors that 
contribute to an increased role for the minority representative.  First, unlike other 
elections, school board contests are nonpartisan, creating a vacuum of information for 
voters who then rely on other candidate characteristics to make their decisions.  Primary 
among these is a candidate’s race or ethnicity.  Although I do not have the opportunity to 
test this claim directly, the results indicate overwhelming support for the assumption.  In 
each of the models, the Latino population was positively and significantly associated 
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with the amount of legislative representation on the school board.  Moreover, in single 
member ward elections, the power of Latinos to select one of their own increases 
substantially, and they appear to consistently take advantage of this new “influence 
technology” (Bertelli and Lynn 2004).    
 A second factor contributing to a greater role for minority representatives at the 
local level is the size of the legislative board.  Minority members have more pull on a 
seven member legislative board than they do in a body of 100 or more members.  
Because of this I expect, and witness, a large amount of policy influence with the 
addition of just one Latino school board member.    
Thirdly, school boards deal with policies that can be mapped on to a single issue 
space.  Both legislators and clientele see student outcomes as the predominant measure 
of success and failure in the district, and typically see these in terms of majority versus 
minority policy shifts (whether it is budgeting decisions, staffing, capital improvements, 
etc.). Unlike other levels of government, this makes it easier for voters to decide if a 
candidate is producing preferable outcomes, and thus makes it easier for officeholders to 
understand what their constituency desires (whether it is an at-large or ward 
constituency).  This single issue space allows us to model the differences between at-
large and single member ward constraints in a straightforward manner using the logic of 
the median voter theorem.        
Lastly, local level elections are one of the few types in the United States that still 
feature at-large rules.  The conversation at the state and federal levels are about where to 
draw district lines to benefit minority and partisan constituencies.  The unique local level 
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variation provides political scientists an opportunity to look at both institutional change 
and institutional effects on policy outputs and outcomes.  Evaluations of these 
phenomena provide insight into the differences between descriptive and substantive 
representation that can no longer be observed beyond the local level.  Theoretical and 
empirical leverage is incredible at this level of analysis because institutional variation is 
so rich and the policy differences between majority and minority populations are 
immense.  
Using this distinctive setting, I examine the role of each actor in the organization 
in terms of their influence on organizational outputs, and on each other.  Minority groups 
enter the policy process somehow; we want to know where they come from, and whether 
their influence differs from a normatively pleasing understanding of democratic political 
control.  If Latino bureaucrats and legislators are “caused” by the population 
demographics of the district, or by other labor market features, then a pluralistic 
perspective of minority policy change is the most appropriate.  If however, any of the 
representational changes over time are due to bureaucratic influence, or if the power of 
the bureaucrat extends to choosing the rules of the game or selecting their public 
masters, then the pluralist viewpoint is insufficient for minority politics.         
 
The Public 
 The public is the theoretical foundation of the policy process as their preferences 
are translated into bureaucratic outcomes through the public organization. The results 
largely support this pluralist, top-down perspective.  The demographic characteristics of 
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school board members, teachers, administrators, and the electoral rules are all preceded 
by, and related to: the percentage of the population that is Latino, their level of 
educational attainment, and the percentage of non-citizens in the district.  Figures 6.1 
and 6.2 reflect the importance of these political principals in the policy process.  Figure 
6.1 presents organizational change in an at-large environment and figure 6.2 represents 
the causal chain in single-member ward school districts. 
 I find consistent evidence that in at-large elections, the public produces Latino 
representation, but this relationship is weak in Latino minority districts.  Candidates 
must appeal to the entire district because of at-large constraints, creating 
disproportionate levels of descriptive representation.  Compare this with figure 6.2, 
where the relationship between the public and their board representatives is much 
stronger when mediated by ward rules.  These results were observed in every model of 
Latino descriptive representation in the paper.  The public also plays a substantial role in 
producing Latino bureaucrats and administrators.  As expected, these agents are more 
likely to be found in places with a larger Latino labor pool.              
 The role of the public is important in determining the rules under which their 
representatives are selected as well.  After controlling for the influence of other actors in 
the process, I find that the greatest predictors of change from at-large to ward elections 
were Latino education levels and Latino population.  This comes with a caveat though as 
Black poverty levels also seemed to play a substantial if undetermined role.  No other 
Black demographic factor was important, suggesting a Latino dominated model of 
institutional change.       
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Figure 6.1. Theoretical Model in At-Large Districts 
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Figure 6.2. Theoretical Model in Ward Districts 
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Local Legislators 
 Once Latinos gain legislative office, does electoral variation continue to be a 
factor in producing organizational change?  Yes.  In figure 6.1, we see that even in at-
large districts, Latino representatives are weakly related to more Latino administrators 
and teachers, all else equal.  In figure 6.2 we see the relationship between descriptive 
representation on the school board and substantive street-level staffing outputs is 
strengthened tremendously.  A large amount of time series analysis confirms what the 
cross-sectional analyses did not: Latino school board members have a greater impact on 
the staffing of Latino teachers than they do on recruiting Latino administrators, and this 
causal process is more concrete in ward districts than in at-large districts.   
Where do Latino school board members come from?  Aside from the public, 
these legislative representatives appear to come from the influence of a large Latino 
street-level presence.  This makes sense, although the exact nature of the casual 
mechanism remains unclear at this point.  Most school districts in Texas (and across the 
country) have substantial minority representation only in the ranks of teachers.  These 
agents show up first, and in some cases this leads to little change in the administrative 
and school board makeup, but in many cases these districts begin to show signs of 
bottom-up influence to other levels.  I find consistent evidence for this influence 
throughout the project.   
What about school administrators?  Do they have any influence on school board 
representation?  Yes, but only in a particular environment.  Latino administrators seem 
to have a large effect on a Latino legislative presence in newly changed ward districts.  
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That is, they appear to take advantage of recently changed influence technology (ward 
rules) in an unintended but effective way.  While there is evidence that Latino school 
board members have a weak impact on Latino management, the effect for a bottom-up 
influence is strong in this particular environment.     
 
Bureaucrats 
 I found no evidence that Latino teachers or administrators have any affect on 
institutional change.  There is simply no connection between more Latino bureaucrats 
and a greater probability that election rules will change, once population characteristics 
are taken into account.  Instead, rules appear to change when Latino advocates like 
MALDEF, LULAC, or even unsuccessful school board candidates threaten to litigate 
against the organization.   
Once implemented however, bureaucrats appear to take full advantage of the new 
rules.  The relationship between Latino administrators and teachers is positive and 
significant in nearly every model, and is strengthened in particular environments.  Latino 
administrators create room for Latino teachers in districts where there were none in the 
early 1990’s.  Conversely, Latino teachers contribute independently to the process of 
hiring Latino superintendents and other administrators where none existed in 1993.  This 
endogenous relationship does not necessarily have to be anti-pluralist or anti-democratic.  
It is unknown if Latino teachers are simply being indoctrinated and selected on type to 
be administrators, or if they are using their substantial bargaining leverage to bring these 
people in.  The evidence simply supports their endogenous affiliation.  
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Lastly, I looked at “new” wards, those districts that changed their rules some 
time during the 1990’s.  Here I found one of the most interesting results in the paper.   
Administrators are substantially and significantly linked to the presence of Latino board 
members, years later, only in these newly changed districts.  In at-large districts, these 
players have little to no influence on who their legislative master is.  This is not the case 
in newly created ward environments.  Here, these agents are very influential in helping 
select their political principal.  Again, within the organization it is unclear how this 
process works itself out, although I provide a number of plausible theoretical reasons.  In 
districts where there are no Latino board members in the early 90’s, Latino 
administrators and ward rules interact to create Latino legislators eight years later.  This 
lends concrete weight to the bottom-up bureaucratic influence perspective.   
     
Problems and Prospects 
 There are a number of potential problems with the current analysis.  The first is 
highlighted by some of the differences between the findings in chapter four and chapter 
five.  The cross-sectional analyses of both the national and state samples produced 
almost identical results concerning the interaction of descriptive representation and 
election structures.  Latino legislators are associated with more Latino bureaucratic 
representation in ward systems than at-large ones. They are also more likely to get 
elected by ward than they are at-large.  A cross-sectional analysis alone, however, may 
be inappropriate because it does not provide any insight into causality, particularly in a 
policy space where bureaucrats wield so much potential power.   
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 Chapter five demonstrates that the strong link between Latino board members 
and Latino administrators was actually more tenuous than first thought.  The relationship 
is consistent but weak.  But this was the key to the causal chain in chapter four.  How do 
these new results reconcile this?  The results in chapter five suggest that the relationship 
between board members and teachers is much stronger than previously understood.  
Because of this, the causal chain looks a bit more complex but remains a top-down story 
for the most part.   
 The problem with the cross-sectional time series analysis is that legislative 
representation does not present itself well to a year to year analysis.  For example, 
decreases in percentages from one year to the next are not expected to be associated with 
massive firings in the bureaucracy.  More to the point, constant representation (very 
common in Texas) might have a substantial impact on the dependent bureaucratic 
variables, but will not show up empirically (a constant will not predict variation over 
time).  This makes the use of traditional estimation procedures suspect for our purposes, 
so I use a variety of models to find out exactly who is causing whom.  To correct these 
problems in the future I would want to collect more time points and possibly model 
legislative representation differently.  Perhaps variation in the level of Latino 
representation is not the key factor in the causal process.  Instead, a variable that would 
measure constant representation or simply the number of Latinos on the board would 
provide more leverage over time (given that most of the school boards in Texas are 
seven members).   
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 Nonetheless, I provide fully fixed cross-sectional time series models for all three 
groups in tables 6.1 and 6.2.  These models are under very tight restrictions, as both time 
and space is controlled by using dummies for each year and each district.  I discovered 
the lag structure using a combination of modified granger tests and trial and error with 
different lags (AIC and BIC were used to determine the best fit).  The difference 
between one lag and the next is minimal to the point of nonexistence, confirming that 
these models are most likely picking up cross-sectional variation from each year, rather 
than anything across time.  They are included for the reader who would like to see what 
a full analysis looks like.   
 Thus qualified, we can take a brief look at the tables.  For the most part they 
support the notion of a top-down policy process.  Wards mediate the type of legislative 
representation observed, both descriptive and substantive.  Administrators help bring in 
more Latino teachers, but the opposite is not true (column two in table 6.1).  Lastly, 
administrators have little to do with Latino legislative representation, but teachers appear 
to have some positive effect.  By and large, the fully fixed models are supportive of the 
findings from chapter four and five separately.      
 Because all of the analyses focus on the level of the organization, it is difficult to 
get into the black box with these data.  That is, unlike much of the burgeoning political 
control literature, I am unable to say anything about actual policy preferences of any of 
the actors (except for the public perhaps).  The next step in this project would be to find 
a way to measure the policy preferences of Latino legislators, bureaucrats and the public 
directly to see if bureaucrats are actually representing their “constituency” in a way that  
  
 
187
Table 6.1. Fully Fixed Models with Appropriate Lags: Explaining 
Bureaucratic Change Across Time and Space 
 
Dependent Variables: % Latino Teachers % Latino Administrators 
 
Independent Variables49 
Coefficient (Robust 
Standard Error) 
Coefficient (Robust Standard 
Error) 
 
% Latino on School Board  -.01 (.01) -.01 (.03) 
 
% Latino Students   .05** (.01) .01 (.03) 
 
% Latino Teachers  … (.02) .13 (.10) 
 
% Latino Administrators      .02* (.01) … … 
 
Ward Election (1yr.lag) .37 (.24) … … 
 
Ward X Latino Repr. (1yr. lag)  .05** (.01) … … 
 
Ward Election (3 yr. lag) … … -.35 (.83) 
 
Ward X Latino Repr. (3 yr. lag)        … …     .12** (.04) 
 
1995 (Dummy) .19** (.08) … … 
1996  .32** (.07) … … 
1997  .48** (.07) .14 (.20) 
1998   .56** (.07)   .35 0 (.21) 
1999 .58** (.08)    .47** (.19) 
2000 .66** (.09)    .58** (.22) 
2001 .84** (.10)    .72** (.26) 
     
Constant 1.34 (.22) 1.58** (.64) 
 
Number of Cases         7119 5338 
F 31.03** 3.89** 
Adjusted R2         .86 .69 
* indicates significance at <.05  ** < .01    0 < .10  
All models estimated using STATA 8.0, White-Huber standard errors reported. 
 
 
                                                          
49 Models are fully fixed across space and time with dummies for years and districts.  The different year 
dummies reflect the nature of the representational lag structure for each model.       
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Table 6.2. Fully Fixed Models with Appropriate Lags.  
Explaining Legislative Change Across Time and Space 
 
Dependent Variable:  % Latino on School Board 
 
Independent Variables50 
Coefficient (Robust 
Standard Error) 
 
 
% Latino Students    .04* (.02)   
 
% Latino Teachers (4 Yr. Lag)    .11 0 (.06)   
 
% Latino Administrators (1 Yr. Lag)   .03 (.02)   
 
Ward Election    -2.06* (1.00)   
 
Ward X Latino Population     .40* (.20)   
 
1998   -.09 (.11)   
1999 -.12 (.11)   
2000  .17 (.12)   
2001  .03 (.12)   
     
Constant  1.68* (.71)   
 
 
Number of Cases         4453  
F 2.98**  
Adjusted R2         .95  
* indicates significance at <.05  ** < .01    0 < .10 
All models estimated using STATA 8.0, White-Huber standard errors reported. 
 
                                                          
50 Models are fully fixed across space and time with dummies for years and districts.  The different year 
dummies reflect the nature of the representational lag structure for each model.     
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differs from legislative intent.  Until then, this evidence supports a strong top-down 
process with endogenous tendencies in particular environments.        
 I would also like to extend the time series analysis on both space and time 
dimensions.  I would like to collect data in more states, particularly California (with 
strong teacher’s unions), to see if there are other contextual factors that prevent or 
promote the observations here.  I am in the process of looking at these phenomena for 
Blacks in Texas, and the interaction of conjoint Black and Latino legislative 
representation and its effects on bureaucratic outputs.  Finally, more time points would 
benefit the current look at Texas.  Many of the ward districts under observation here 
transformed their structures prior to the 1990’s.  Extremely valuable information could 
be gathered from a longer time analysis, beginning before any of these wards existed.                 
 
Pluralism or Not   
I began this project with two competing frameworks of minority politics.  The 
first, a traditional, pluralist, top-down perspective suggests that minorities use the 
legislature and the courts to create policy space for their preferences.  Organized, 
educated, and informed Latino citizens are more likely to find political success through 
these outlets.  The VRA and its extensions have “fixed” previous difficulties for this 
group in the political system.  Bureaucrats who are appointed do so at the regard of a 
more representative legislature, and do not change policy in the school or in the 
classroom unless it comports with their delegated responsibility.   
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 The results presented here by and large support this theoretical perspective. 
When Latinos are denied access to candidates of their choice, they receive help from the 
courts and the federal government to win the rights to new “influence technologies” in 
the form of new election rules.  The voters use this new tool to select Latino 
representatives who in turn produce preferred outputs at a higher rate than their at-large 
counterparts.  But like Rodney Hero (1992), I am skeptical, and see some evidence that 
two levels of influence are present.       
Most of the organizations under scrutiny had no legislative or management level 
Latinos in the system.  Many of them did however, have a large percentage of Latino 
street-level bureaucrats.  These agents’ relationship with their elected counterparts years 
later represents a critical role for this profession in bringing Latinos into the political 
process.  Whether it is through training and indoctrination or through bargaining to bring 
in upper-level representatives, teachers play a large role in this policy system.  They are 
not bystanders.  Often, in areas where Latino parents and students seek policy change, 
their only advocates are Latino teachers.  There is also some evidence that Latino 
administrators in particular environments were able to influence the legislature as well.  
The ability of minorities to make policy gains through the infiltration of an unelected 
bureaucracy is normatively unappealing in many respects, but it appears to have 
occurred in Texas during the 1990’s.  Minorities are, at times, compelled to operate in a 
non-pluralistic manner to catch up with their Anglo majority counterparts.   
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APPENDIX A: THE NATIONAL SAMPLE OF SCHOOL BOARDS USING AT-LARGE AND WARD ELECTIONS 
 
STURCTURAL 
BREAKDOWN VARIABLE N MEAN STD. DEV. MIN. MAX.
 % Latino Teachers 768 3.50 4.62 0.00 48.00 
 % Latino Administrators 719 3.46 5.58 0.00 36.00 
 % Latinos on Board 855 2.94 8.59 0.00 60.00 
Latino Minority/  % Latino Population 858 10.85 11.72 0.45 49.95 
At-Large Districts % Latinos w/ H. S. Degree 838 68.53 16.61 6.90 100.00 
 % Latinos in Poverty 837 13.54 12.38 0.00 100.00 
 % Non-Citizens  858 22.40 13.58 0.00 69.78 
       
 % Latino Teachers 291 2.76 5.01 0.00 31.00 
 % Latino Administrators 274 2.82 6.52 0.00 44.00 
 % Latinos on Board 328 2.18 8.96 0.00 80.00 
Latino Minority/ % Latino Population 328 8.18 11.01 0.29 48.84 
Ward Districts % Latinos w/ H. S. Degree 322 65.93 17.46 14.89 100.00 
 % Latinos in Poverty 322 16.39 12.45 0.00 81.25 
 % Non-Citizens  328 25.32 16.18 1.16 74.01 
       
 % Latino Teachers 85 40.50 24.52 7.00 94.00 
 % Latino Administrators 85 41.79 26.99 2.40 98.00 
 % Latinos on Board 88 51.90 31.12 0.00 100.00 
Latino Majority % Latino Population 89 69.91 14.48 50.59 97.84 
Districts % Latinos w/ H. S. Degree 85 43.68 10.42 22.20 64.55 
 % Latinos in Poverty 85 26.10 12.16 6.10 62.51 
 % Non-Citizens  89 27.46 10.55 2.00 49.73 
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APPENDIX B: THE TEXAS SAMPLE OF SCHOOL BOARDS USING AT-LARGE AND WARD ELECTIONS 
 
STRUCTURAL  
BREAKDOWN VARIABLE N MEAN STD. DEV. MIN. MAX.
 % Latino Teachers 774 2.23 3.44 0.00 44.00 
 % Latino Administrators 773 1.69 6.95 0.00 100.00 
 % Latinos on Board 773 1.93 6.50 0.00 57.14 
Latino Minority/  % Latino Population 774 12.90 10.80 0.00 49.81 
At-Large Districts % Latinos w/ H. S. Degree 765 49.25 20.87 0.00 100.00 
 % Latinos in Poverty 769 23.96 16.42 0.00 100.00 
 % Non-Citizens  769 20.66 15.45 0.00 100.00 
       
 % Latino Teachers 112 6.89 5.34 0.00 28.00 
 % Latino Administrators 112 7.53 11.45 0.00 75.00 
 % Latinos on Board 112 11.34 13.00 0.00 42.86 
Latino Minority/ % Latino Population 112 28.97 14.05 1.09 49.63 
by Ward Districts % Latinos w/ H. S. Degree 112 45.14 13.79 0.00 100.00 
 % Latinos in Poverty 112 26.61 10.24 0.00 75.00 
 % Non-Citizens  112 15.56 12.61 0.00 60.00 
       
 % Latino Teachers 129 49.56 28.18 0.00 100.00 
 % Latino Administrators 128 53.47 33.68 0.00 100.00 
 % Latinos on Board 129 44.68 34.08 0.00 100.00 
Latino Majority % Latino Population 130 75.50 15.69 50.15 99.44 
Districts % Latinos w/ H. S. Degree 130 45.10 9.58 22.18 67.62 
 % Latinos in Poverty 130 32.36 8.17 16.18 53.91 
 % Non-Citizens  130 12.36 9.75 0.61 41.11 
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